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PRIVACY LOCALISM 
Ira S. Rubinstein* 
Abstract: Privacy law scholarship often focuses on domain-specific federal privacy laws 
and state efforts to broaden them. This Article provides the first comprehensive analysis of 
privacy regulation at the local level (which it dubs “privacy localism”), using recently enacted 
privacy laws in Seattle and New York City as principal examples. Further, this Article 
attributes the rise of privacy localism to a combination of federal and state legislative failures 
and three emerging urban trends: the role of local police in federal counterterrorism efforts; 
smart city and open data initiatives; and demands for local police reform in the wake of widely 
reported abusive police practices. 
Both Seattle and New York City have enacted or proposed (1) a local surveillance 
ordinance regulating the purchase and use of surveillance equipment and technology by city 
departments, including the police, and (2) a law regulating city departments’ collection, use, 
disclosure, and retention of personal data. In adopting these local laws, both cities have sought 
to fill two significant gaps in federal and state privacy laws: the public surveillance gap, which 
refers to the weak constitutional and statutory protections against government surveillance in 
public places, and the fair information practices gap, which refers to the inapplicability of the 
federal and state privacy laws to government records held by local government agencies. 
Filling these gaps is a significant accomplishment and one that exhibits all of the values 
typically associated with federalism such as diversity, participation, experimentation, 
responsiveness, and accountability. This Article distinguishes federalism and localism and 
shows why privacy localism should prevail against the threat of federal and—more 
importantly—state preemption. This Article concludes by suggesting that privacy localism has 
the potential to help shape emerging privacy norms for an increasingly urban future, inspire 
more robust regulation at the federal and state levels, and inject more democratic control into 
city deployments of privacy-invasive technologies. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Over the past decade, the U.S. Congress has largely abdicated its role 
in regulating online consumer privacy or modernizing electronic 
surveillance laws to strengthen privacy protections in the context of 
emerging technologies. Congress enacted many important privacy laws 
from the 1970s through the 1990s, and updated several of them in the 
2000s, but since then its privacy accomplishments have dwindled.1 Both 
Democrats and Republicans have introduced comprehensive online 
consumer privacy bills but have not passed any of them.2 Despite five 
years of debate, Congress has also failed to update the Electronic 
Communications Privacy Act (ECPA), the thirty-two-year-old law 
governing electronic surveillance.3 Congress has fared somewhat better in 
reforming foreign intelligence surveillance following the revelations of 
former National Security Agency (NSA) contractor Edward Snowden. 
For example, it ended bulk collection of telephone metadata under the 
NSA foreign surveillance law.4 But the era of reform did not last. During 
the first year of the Trump presidency, the Republican Congress voted to 
rescind Obama-era broadband privacy rules,5 and at the beginning of its 
second year rejected a bipartisan push to add new privacy protections to a 
provision of the foreign surveillance law that was about to expire.6 
During this period, state legislatures have been very active and 
successful in addressing consumer security and privacy. As of 2017, 
almost all fifty states have enacted breach notification statutes requiring 
                                                     
1. See DANIEL J. SOLOVE & PAUL M. SCHWARTZ, INFORMATION PRIVACY LAW 36–39 (6th ed. 
2018) [hereinafter SOLOVE & SCHWARTZ, INFORMATION PRIVACY LAW]. 
2. See discussion infra section I.A.1. 
3. The most recent attempt at modernization, brought forward in July 2017 by Senators Mike Lee 
and Patrick Leahy, has languished in the Senate Judiciary Committee since its introduction despite 
unanimous passage of related legislation by the House. See ECPA Modernization Act of 2017, S. 
1657, 115th Cong. (2017); Allison Grande, Sens. Push ECPA Reform Bill to Up Email, Location 
Privacy, LAW360 (July 27, 2017, 9:38 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/948832/sens-push-
ecpa-reform-bill-to-up-email-location-privacy (last visited Oct. 20, 2018). 
4. Sabrina Siddiqui, Congress Passes NSA Surveillance Reform in Vindication for Snowden, 
GUARDIAN (June 3, 2015, 2:28 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/jun/02/congress-
surveillance-reform-edward-snowden [https://perma.cc/L4Q2-EDA5]. 
5. S.J. Res. 34, 115th Cong. (2017) (enacted); see Kimberly Kindy, How Congress Dismantled 
Federal Internet Privacy Rules, WASH. POST (May 30, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/how-congress-dismantled-federal-internet-privacy-
rules/2017/05/29/7ad06e14-2f5b-11e7-8674-437ddb6e813e_story.html?utm_term=.72a16f43a646 
[https://perma.cc/SGU8-E3T8]. 
6. See Louise Matsakis, Congress Renews Warrantless Surveillance—and Makes It Even Worse, 
WIRED (Jan. 11, 2018, 4:19 PM), https://www.wired.com/story/fisa-section-702-renewal-congress/ 
[https://perma.cc/2Q4L-VVKL]. 
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firms to disclose security breaches involving personal information and a 
few have set substantive requirements for data security.7 But states have 
done more than fill the gaps in federal privacy laws.8 They have expanded 
online privacy protections,9 regulated private- and public-sector use of 
emerging technologies,10 and enacted social media privacy laws.11 
Now there is a new kid on the block: local privacy law and regulation. 
Local governments (primarily cities but also counties) have joined federal 
and state governments in enacting important new privacy laws.12 This 
development has yet to receive attention even in the newest editions of 
privacy law casebooks and treatises. And the reason is obvious: until 
recently, cities played only a minor role in information privacy law. But 
this is beginning to change for several reasons. 
American cities, especially large urban centers, are data-rich 
environments. Cities have large populations and city dwellers generate a 
vast amount of data through daily interaction with devices and sensors as 
they crisscross public spaces and utilize city services. A growing number 
of local police departments rely on special purpose technologies such as 
video security cameras, facial recognition technology, automatic license 
plate readers (ALPRs), police dashboard and body-worn cameras, and 
gunfire location services to assist them in maintaining public order, 
enforcing criminal laws, and safeguarding citizens against terrorist 
attacks. In New York City, for example, these surveillance efforts take 
place on a very broad scale that, when combined with analytic tools for 
                                                     
7.  See Security Breach Notification Laws, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (Sept. 29, 2018), 
http://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-and-information-technology/security-breach-
notification-laws.aspx [https://perma.cc/LJ9X-LLVQ]. 
8. Id. at 948 (noting that the federal government has yet to enact a general federal data breach 
notification statute or to establish broad standards requiring private firms outside the financial services 
or health care sectors to reasonably protect consumer data). 
9. See, e.g., Gregory S. McNeal, California AG Releases Guide to Online Privacy Laws, FORBES 
(May 21, 2014, 7:19 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/gregorymcneal/2014/05/21/california-ag-
releases-guide-to-californias-online-privacy-laws/#2b5ac0b3798c [https://perma.cc/DW4D-YYNP] 
(describing amendments to California’s “landmark” Online Privacy Protection Act of 2003).  
10. See infra section III.D.1. 
11. Beginning in 2012, many states have limited what entities may do with or require of 
individuals’ personal social media accounts. Twenty-six have done so for employers; sixteen for 
educational institutions; and one for landlords. See State Social Media Privacy Laws, NAT’L CONF. 
ST. LEGISLATURES (Jan. 2, 2018), http://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-and-
information-technology/state-laws-prohibiting-access-to-social-media-usernames-and-
passwords.aspx [https://perma.cc/5F4P-4MG5].  
12. See infra sections II.A, II.B. 
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discovering unanticipated patterns,13 provide the basis for what Professor 
Andrew Ferguson and others refer to as “big data policing.”14 
Cities also offer a diverse range of municipal services that touch almost 
every aspect of each resident’s life. City agencies use a variety of means, 
including city web sites and Internet of Things (IoT) devices, to collect 
data related to infrastructure, traffic, utilities, tourism, education, child 
welfare, housing, and healthcare. So-called “smart cities” analyze these 
massive datasets to enable more efficient and effective monitoring and 
coordination of maintenance, mobility, environmental management, 
visitor movements, social services, and neighborhood sentiment.15 They 
are also starting to deploy mobile apps to make such services more readily 
accessible to city residents.16 And many cities now make these datasets 
freely available to the wider public through open data programs that 
publish all sorts of government data that anyone can use, analyze, or 
redistribute as they wish for a range of beneficial purposes.17 
The arrival of big data in the urban environment brings with it an array 
of privacy challenges centered on two very different types of data: police 
data and civic data.18 Police data encompasses criminal and arrest records 
collected by local police departments, other crime data, and related 
metadata captured by surveillance technologies.19 Civic data includes both 
registration data (i.e., birth, death, marriage, and voting records 
                                                     
13. See Thomas H. Davenport, How Big Data Is Helping the NYPD Solve Crimes Faster, FORTUNE 
(July 17, 2016), http://fortune.com/2016/07/17/big-data-nypd-situational-awareness/ 
[https://perma.cc/8CQD-QF4A]. 
14. See generally ANDREW GUTHRIE FERGUSON, THE RISE OF BIG DATA POLICING: 
SURVEILLANCE, RACE, AND THE FUTURE OF LAW ENFORCEMENT (2017); Elizabeth E. Joh, Policing 
by Numbers: Big Data and the Fourth Amendment, 89 WASH. L. REV. 35 (2014).  
15. On the value and uses of civic data, see generally STEPHEN GOLDSMITH & SUSAN CRAWFORD, 
THE RESPONSIVE CITY: ENGAGING COMMUNITIES THROUGH DATA-SMART GOVERNANCE (2014). 
16. See Kelsey Finch & Omer Tene, Welcome to the Metropticon: Protecting Privacy in a 
Hyperconnected Town, 41 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1581, 1584 (2015). 
17. See generally Frederik J. Zuiderveen Borgesius et al., Open Data, Privacy, and Fair 
Information Principles: Towards a Balancing Framework, 30 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 2073 (2015). 
18. See Liesbet van Zoonen, Privacy Concerns in Smart Cities, 33 GOV’T INFO. Q. 472, 474–75 
(2016). Zoonen analyzes city privacy concerns by identifying a two-by-two scheme in which there 
are two types of data (personal or impersonal) and two purposes for collection and use (service or 
surveillance). Applying this scheme, she argues that police data (personal data combined with 
surveillance purposes) raises greater privacy concerns than civic data (personal data combined with 
service purposes).  
19. Police data may also include (1) external data collected by other government agencies and 
(2) privately collected data that a local police department purchases from external sources such as 
commercial data brokers or police analytic platforms. See Sarah Brayne, Big Data Surveillance: The 
Case of Policing, 82 AM. SOC. REV. 977, 994 (2017). Police department acquisition of data from other 
government agencies or from external sources is beyond the scope of this paper.  
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maintained at the local level) and the vast range of data generated and 
used by municipal services. 
Cities large, medium, and small have responded to the privacy issues 
associated with urban big data by enacting local surveillance ordinances 
governing police data and adopting broad privacy principles addressing 
civic data. More than fifteen cities now have surveillance ordinances 
requiring local police forces to prepare and publish protocols disclosing 
the intended use and deployment of surveillance equipment and 
technologies, including information on data collection, use, access, 
retention, and sharing with other governmental entities.20 These and other 
cities have also developed privacy guidelines governing smart city/IoT 
data practices, with Seattle and New York City emerging as leaders in 
these efforts. Both cities have enacted local laws covering all municipal 
data collection and use and have appointed Chief Privacy Officers.21 
While this legislative activity is partly a response to regulatory gaps left 
by federal and state privacy laws, privacy localism also results from 
several broader and overlapping societal trends. These include the war on 
terror, which heightened the role of local police in federal counter-
terrorism activities; “smart city” initiatives, which rely on potentially 
invasive technologies to help cities achieve important municipal goals 
such as improving their delivery of services; and the intense public 
scrutiny of abusive policing practices, including the use of certain 
surveillance technologies.22 
This Article provides the first comprehensive analysis of privacy 
localism by examining its origins, motivations, and outcomes in response 
to these trends.23 Using detailed case studies of Seattle and New York 
City, it considers how these two very different cities have regulated the 
collection, use, and disclosure of personal information by both police and 
civilian agencies. This requires exploring a variety of policy issues 
including how police balance security against privacy safeguards as they 
                                                     
20. See Community Control over Police Surveillance, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/issues/privacy-
technology/surveillance-technologies/community-control-over-police-surveillance 
[https://perma.cc/XE7G-TU2J] (identifying cities that have enacted or are considering local laws 
regulating police acquisition and use of surveillance technologies). Some of these laws also require 
city council approval prior to acquisition and use. See infra sections II.A.1, II.B.1. 
21. See infra sections II.A.2, II.B.2. 
22. See infra section I.A.2. 
23. For two complementary studies of local privacy regulation that also rely on case studies of 
major cities, see generally Catherine Crump, Surveillance Policy Making by Procurement, 91 WASH. 
L. REV. 1595 (2016) (discussing Seattle, Oakland, San Diego), and Jan Whittington et al., Push, Pull, 
and Spill: A Transdisciplinary Case Study in Municipal Open Government, 30 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 
1899 (2015) (discussing Seattle). 
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adopt networked surveillance technology and how civilian agencies 
balance data exchanges and data analysis to achieve public goods against 
the need to maintain the confidentiality of the underlying data and the trust 
of local citizens. 
What, then, is privacy localism? In normative terms, localism refers to 
a preference for local control of government function, while the law of 
localism describes the relations between states and their local 
governments.24 This Article mainly addresses cities, but the term “local” 
covers every political subdivision smaller than a state. Thus, “privacy 
localism” refers to local control over the collection, use, and disclosure of 
the personal data of city residents. It encompasses the ordinances, local 
laws, executive orders, resolutions, regulations, policies, and practices of 
local governments insofar as they control (1) the surveillance activities of 
city police departments and other city agencies, and (2) the data collection 
and use practices of city agencies in the course of providing municipal 
services. The term also emphasizes a set of values including 
decentralization and local autonomy, which are traditionally associated 
with both federalism and localism.25 
Of course, skeptics will ask whether privacy localism is viable. They 
will quite properly express doubts as to whether cities—occupying the 
lowest slot in the federal-state-city hierarchy—have enough power to 
engage in privacy localism without falling prey to federal, and especially 
state, interventions. Obviously, local privacy regulations are always at risk 
of federal and state preemption. Furthermore, federal and state agencies 
have far more resources at their disposal compared to cities, most of which 
probably lack the regulatory expertise and personnel needed to enter the 
already crowded field of privacy regulation or make any significant 
contributions.26 Thus, there are structural as well as practical constraints 
on privacy localism. 
And yet, cities can contribute a great deal to privacy law. This Article 
argues that cities have ample power to regulate both local police 
surveillance activities and local data governance practices, and that 
preemption is much less of an obstacle to privacy localism than one might 
suspect.27 It offers three arguments in favor of privacy localism. The first 
is that privacy issues are highly salient to cities for the reasons already 
                                                     
24. See David J. Barron, A Localist Critique of the New Federalism, 51 DUKE L.J. 377, 381 (2001).  
25. See infra section III.A. 
26. See Edward Glaeser & Cass R. Sunstein, Regulatory Review for the States, NAT’L AFF., 
Summer 2014, at 37, 48. 
27. Note, too, that even when federal or state law threatens to preempt local privacy regulation, it 
mainly establishes privacy “floors” that cities can and do exceed. See infra section III.B. 
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identified: that is where the people are, and hence where their data is, in 
great abundance. The second is that both Fourth Amendment doctrine and 
federal and state electronic surveillance laws are mostly silent on 
government surveillance in public places (the public surveillance gap),28 
and generally fail to address the data practices of government agencies 
(the fair information practices gap).29 Privacy localism fills both of these 
gaps. The third is that cities are ideally suited to regulate police use of 
surveillance technology and local data practices because of their 
willingness to innovate, experiment, and devise novel approaches to 
privacy protection. 
To set the stage for this discussion, Part I briefly considers the perilous 
state of privacy in the twenty-first century and how cities have responded 
to federal and state legislative failures and the broader societal trends 
identified above. It also analyzes in detail the public surveillance gap and 
the fair information practices gap. Part II then presents detailed case 
studies of local privacy regulation in Seattle and New York City, 
examining both local surveillance laws and local privacy principles 
governing city agencies. It concludes with a preliminary assessment of 
these regulations in terms of their overall contribution to democratic 
governance of local police forces and how well they close the two privacy 
gaps. Part III begins by attempting to sort out the relationship between 
federalism and localism. Next, it responds to the highly realistic threat that 
federal and (more importantly) state laws may limit or preempt a city’s 
power to regulate local police surveillance and municipal data service, 
explaining why this threat is manageable. The Article then concludes with 
a forward-looking inquiry into the future of privacy localism on a national 
basis. 
I. WHY PRIVACY LOCALISM? 
A. Privacy at Risk 
1. The Death of Privacy? 
In an aptly named article in a 2000 Stanford Law Review symposium 
on “Cyberspace and Privacy: A New Legal Paradigm?,” Professor 
A. Michael Froomkin analyzed the public and private sector’s routine 
collection of personal data and the growing use of privacy-destroying 
                                                     
28. See infra section II.C.2. 
29. See infra section II.C.3. 
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technologies.30 While denying that current privacy law in the United 
States has kept up with the rapid advance of these technologies and 
practices, Froomkin rejected the idea that privacy was dead.31 Rather, he 
pinned his hopes on fair information practices and surveillance laws 
restricting data collection, use, and retention.32 
Almost twenty years later, is it still premature to mourn the death of 
privacy? Froomkin warned of the dangers of pervasive information 
collection online and in physical space before the 9/11 terrorist attacks 
and Congress’s expansion of federal surveillance laws and practices; 
before the rise of pervasive and invasive surveillance technologies—such 
as networked video surveillance systems, facial recognition software, 
cheap Global Position System (GPS) tracking devices, the massive data 
collection resulting from ubiquitous IoT devices and new modes of 
profiling, and location tracking via social media platforms and third-party 
apps; and before big data began to systematically undermine the main 
premises of privacy law.33 If privacy is not yet dead, it is no doubt 
stunned.34 In any case, Froomkin has since ceased to believe that a legal 
response will emerge anytime soon or that the future bodes well for 
privacy.35 And his pessimism certainly seems justified based on 
Congress’s poor record of enacting federal privacy laws that keep pace 
with a new generation of invasive technologies and the advent of big data. 
Despite its poor record, Congress has not been passive. Rather, it has 
introduced laws and held hearings on numerous subjects—spyware, 
cybersecurity, online behavioral tracking, cell phone tracking, mobile 
apps, biometrics, and access to social media passwords—none of which 
have advanced very far. Between 1970 and the mid-2000s, Congress 
passed over two dozen mostly sector-specific federal privacy laws.36 
Congress has also taken up omnibus privacy legislation seven times 
between 1999 and 2011, but few bills were even reported out of 
committee.37 In 2016, the Obama Administration tried to jumpstart the 
                                                     
30. A. Michael Froomkin, The Death of Privacy, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1461, 1468–1500 (2000). 
31. Id. at 1542. 
32. Id. 
33. See generally Ira S. Rubinstein, Big Data: The End of Privacy or a New Beginning?, INT’L 
DATA PRIVACY L., May 2013, at 74, 76–78.  
34. See Monty Python, The Dead Parrot Sketch, DAVID P. BROWN 
https://www.davidpbrown.co.uk/jokes/monty-python-parrot.html [https://perma.cc/FQ6R-DU8M]. 
35. See A. Michael Froomkin, Lessons Learned Too Well: Anonymity in a Time of Surveillance, 59 
ARIZ. L. REV. 95 (2017).  
36. See supra text accompanying notes 1–6.  
37. See, e.g., Commercial Privacy Bill of Rights Act of 2011, S. 799, 112th Cong. (2011); Best 
Practices Act, H.R. 5777, 111th Cong. (2010); Online Personal Privacy Act, S. 2201, 107th Cong. 
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legislative process by issuing a draft discussion bill, but it failed to find 
any sponsors in Congress.38 
There are ample grounds to predict that the 115th Congress will not 
surpass its predecessors. To begin with, there is much controversy 
concerning the accomplishments of the Republican Congress under 
President Donald Trump.39 On the privacy front, the verdict is clear: the 
new Congress has not passed a single privacy bill of note. Instead, it 
withdrew the Obama Administration’s broadband privacy rules, leaving 
the path open for state legislatures and city governments to take up the 
slack.40 It has yet to agree on a data security breach notification bill, even 
though the existing patchwork of state breach notification laws—all fifty 
states, the District of Columbia, Guam, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin 
Islands have enacted such laws—cries out for federal consolidation.41 It 
reauthorized a foreign surveillance provision allowing warrantless 
surveillance in certain cases without adding new privacy protections.42 
But even a unanimously passed reform bill in the House and a new 
bipartisan bill in the Senate was not enough to make 2017 the year that 
Congress achieved ECPA reform.43 
There are some indications that Congress is stepping up its efforts to 
enact consumer privacy legislation.44 In the meantime, the states continue 
                                                     
(2002); Consumer Privacy Protection Act of 2002, H.R. 4678, 107th Cong. (2002); Consumer Online 
Privacy and Disclosure Act, H.R. 347, 107th Cong. (2001); Electronic Privacy Bill of Rights Act of 
1999, H.R. 3321, 106th Cong. (1999); Online Privacy Protection Act of 1999, S. 809, 106th Cong. 
(1999). S. 2201 was reported out of committee but did not advance.  
38. See Natasha Singer, Why a Push for Online Privacy Is Bogged Down in Washington, N.Y. 
TIMES (Feb. 28, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/29/technology/obamas-effort-on-
consumer-privacy-falls-short-critics-say.html (last visited Oct. 20, 2018).  
39. Kelsey Snell, What Congress Accomplished and Didn’t Accomplish in 2017, NPR: ALL THINGS 
CONSIDERED (Dec. 29, 2017, 4:49 PM), https://www.npr.org/2017/12/29/574693600/what-congress-
accomplished-and-didnt-accomplish-in-2017 [https://perma.cc/QBS4-7CE3]. 
40. See Eyragon Eidam & Jessica Mulholland, 10 States Take Internet Privacy Matters into Their 
Own Hands, GOV’T TECH. (Apr. 10, 2017), http://www.govtech.com/policy/10-States-Take-Internet-
Privacy-Matters-Into-Their-Own-Hands.html [https://perma.cc/DKS6-EX8M]; Kindy, supra note 5. 
41. See NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES, supra note 7.  
42. Matsakis, supra note 6; see also Robyn Greene, Americans Wanted More Privacy Protections. 
Congress Gave Them Fewer, SLATE (Jan. 26, 2018, 7:45 AM), 
https://slate.com/technology/2018/01/congress-reauthorization-of-section-702-of-the-fisa-is-an-
expansion-not-a-reform.html [https://perma.cc/BNT2-Y3NL]. 
43. See Grande, supra note 3. This is not the first time ECPA reform has stalled in the Senate after 
easy passage through the House. See Sean D. Carberry, House Passes Email Privacy Act, Again, FCW 
(Feb. 7, 2017), https://fcw.com/articles/2017/02/07/ecpa-passes-house-again.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/TEC2-VMJF].  
44. See Daniel R. Stoller, Bipartisan Senate Quartet in Talks on Data Privacy Bill, BLOOMBERG 
L.: PRIVACY & DATA SEC. (Aug. 29, 2018), https://www.bna.com/bipartisan-senate-quartet-
n73014482126/ [https://perma.cc/HLJ2-8RZM]. 
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to play the role of “especially important laboratories for innovations in 
information privacy law.”45 States have always filled gaps in federal 
privacy law and developed new laws addressing emerging technologies 
and social practices.46 In May 2018, the California Legislature passed a 
bold and sweeping consumer privacy law that may have ripple effects 
throughout the United States.47 But for reasons discussed below, the states 
have neither tackled surveillance laws addressing a new class of pervasive 
and invasive technologies on a comprehensive basis nor enacted (or 
extended) state privacy laws to protect records held by local governments. 
Hence the need for privacy localism. 
2. Local Trends 
One of the societal trends prompting local privacy regulations is the 
war on terror, which has forced federal intelligence agencies to enlist state 
and especially local police departments to serve as their “eyes and ears.”48 
With control over billions of dollars in federal funding and generally 
superior knowledge of foreign threats, the intelligence community seeks 
to preserve centralized control over local counter-terrorism efforts, even 
though much of the surveillance conducted within city limits is 
undertaken by local police.49 Federal counter-terrorism officials interact 
with local law enforcement in two main ways. First, the Department of 
Justice (DOJ) and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) provide 
grant-in-aid programs to fund the acquisition of equipment used in 
                                                     
45. Paul M. Schwartz, Preemption and Privacy, 118 YALE L.J. 902, 916 (2009) (arguing that 
preemptive, omnibus federal privacy law would undermine experimentation in federal and state 
sectoral privacy laws). Compare id., with Patricia L. Bellia, Federalization in Information Privacy 
Law, 118 YALE L.J. 868 (2009) (arguing that state experimentation tends to follow federal leadership).  
46. See supra text accompanying notes 7–11. 
47. See Eric Goldman, A Privacy Bomb Is About to Be Dropped on the California Economy and 
the Global Internet, TECH. & MKTG. L. BLOG (June 27, 2018), 
https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2018/06/a-privacy-bomb-is-about-to-be-dropped-on-the-
california-economy-and-the-global-internet.htm [https://perma.cc/GWQ2-V34M]. The new 
California law may even prompt Congress to enact long awaited privacy legislation, which industry 
hopes would include language preempting the new California law. See Jedidiah Bracy, Notes from 
the IAPP Publications Editor, July 27, 2018, IAPP: U.S. PRIVACY DIG. (July 27, 2018), 
https://iapp.org/news/a/notes-from-the-iapp-publications-editor-july-27-2018/ 
[https://perma.cc/FV4Y-WQXG]. 
48. Samuel J. Rascoff, The Law of Homegrown (Counter) Terrorism, 88 TEX. L. REV. 1715, 1721 
(2010). See generally Matthew C. Waxman, National Security Federalism in the Age of Terror, 64 
STAN. L. REV. 289 (2012). 
49. See Waxman, National Security Federalism in the Age of Terror, supra note 48, at 302–05; 
Matthew C. Waxman, Police and National Security: American Local Law Enforcement and Counter-
Terrorism After 9/11, 3 J. NAT’L SEC. L. & POLICY 377, 388 (2009). 
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counterterrorism and law enforcement activity, subject to various federal 
conditions and requirements.50 Second, many cities participate in Joint 
Terrorism Task Forces designed to coordinate counter-terrorism activity 
across multiple levels of government51; they also help staff “fusion 
centers” designed to generate and share local intelligence using 
sophisticated monitoring and information gathering techniques.52 
Not surprisingly, New York City took the lead in deploying a broad 
range of surveillance technologies and otherwise securing the city in the 
wake of the 9/11 attacks. For example, in 2008, the New York Police 
Department (NYPD) launched a networked surveillance system in Lower 
Manhattan “to bring extra protection to the Financial District, one of the 
most tempting terror targets on earth.”53 It then worked with Microsoft to 
co-design a citywide network of sensors, databases, devices, software, and 
related infrastructure known as the “Domain Awareness System” 
(DAS).54 Initially, the DAS included video security cameras, automatic 
license plate readers (ALPRs), and radiation sensors.55 Later on, the 
NYPD added geocoded criminal records and integrated the network 
surveillance capabilities of the DAS with analytic methods designed to 
inform both tactical decisions (like sending automatic alerts when 
gunshots were detected) and strategic decisions (like using predictive 
policing algorithms to help allocate police resources).56 Recognizing the 
                                                     
50. Waxman, National Security Federalism in the Age of Terror, supra note 48, at 308. Of course, 
in the aftermath of 9/11, the U.S. government also invested heavily in new surveillance technology 
for its own use; set up bulk surveillance programs to gain systematic access to huge volumes of 
telephone and internet metadata, foreign communication, and travel and financial data; and engaged 
in aggressive data mining and analysis projects like the Total Information Awareness (TIA) program. 
See generally Ira S. Rubinstein et al., Systematic Access to Private-Sector Data: A Comparative 
Analysis, in BULK COLLECTION: SYSTEMATIC GOVERNMENT ACCESS TO PRIVATE-SECTOR DATA 5–
48 (Fred H. Cate & James. X. Dempsey eds., 2017) (describing a range of NSA surveillance 
programs); Ira S. Rubinstein et al., Data Mining and Internet Profiling: Emerging Regulatory and 
Technological Approaches, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 261 (2008) (discussing the TIA program). 
51. See generally Susan N. Herman, Collapsing Spheres: Joint Terrorism Task Forces, Federalism, 
and the War on Terror, 41 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 941 (2005). 
52. See generally Danielle Keats Citron & Frank Pasquale, Network Accountability for the 
Domestic Intelligence Apparatus, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 1441 (2010). 
53. RAY KELLY, VIGILANCE: MY LIFE SERVING AMERICA AND PROTECTING ITS EMPIRE CITY 204 
(2015). 
54. See Neal Ungerleider, NYPD, Microsoft Launch All-Seeing “Domain Awareness System” with 
Real-Time CCTV, License Plate Monitoring, FAST CO. (Aug. 8, 2012), 
https://www.fastcompany.com/3000272/nypd-microsoft-launch-all-seeing-domain-awareness-
system-real-time-cctv-license-plate-monito [https://perma.cc/73G3-7267].  
55. See E. S. Levine et al., The New York City Police Department’s Domain Awareness System, 
INTERFACES, Jan.-Feb. 2017, at 70, 75–76. 
56. Id. at 73. 
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utility of the DAS for general policing, the NYPD eventually deployed 
the DAS to every precinct in the city and later developed a mobile version 
optimized for smartphones and tablets for use by all of its police officers.57 
More recent reports indicate that the NYPD has adopted sophisticated 
facial recognition technology to search images from social media and 
surveillance cameras for potential offenders.58 This amounts to police 
surveillance of public spaces at an unprecedented scale that, when 
combined with large-scale analytics, results in big data policing.59 To its 
credit, the NYPD understood from the outset that the sheer size and scope 
of the DAS would raise serious privacy concerns and, in the absence of 
federal surveillance laws addressing the DAS, adopted privacy guidelines 
covering its use of this new surveillance system; in 2017, the city council 
introduced a local surveillance law as well.60 
Another trend is the rash of smart city initiatives and their tendency to 
neglect privacy issues.61 There are many definitions of “smart cities.” 
From the technical perspective of IBM engineer Colin Harrison, the term 
denotes an instrumented, interconnected, and intelligent city.62 Privacy 
researchers Kelsey Finch and Omer Tene start from a similar definition of 
smart cities as growing networks of connected technologies generating 
actionable data about the city and its residents ranging from more efficient 
permit and licensing systems to new transportation services to improved 
infrastructure, but worry that the “scale on which smart cities collect, 
analyze, and exploit data about their citizens could set them apart from 
any other surveillance mechanism in history.”63 At the same time, smart 
cities also have to contend with a host of new issues resulting from (1) the 
embrace of “open data,” which requires new risk management tools to 
                                                     
57. Id. 
58. See Faiza Patel & Michael Price, Keeping Eyes on NYPD Surveillance, BRENNAN CTR. FOR 
JUSTICE (June 13, 2017), https://www.brennancenter.org/blog/ny-city-council-needs-increase-
scrutiny-nypd%E2%80%99s-surveillance-arsenal [https://perma.cc/3N7C-3P5U]. 
59. Levine et al., supra note 55, at 73 (commenting that as of April 2016, the DAS contained the 
following records: “two billion readings from license plates (with photos), 100 million summonses, 
54 million 911 calls, 15 million complaints, 12 million detective reports, 11 million arrests, two 
million warrants, and 30 days of video from 9,000 cameras”). See generally FERGUSON, supra note 
14. 
60. See infra section II.B.1. 
61. See Finch & Tene, supra note 16. 
62. Colin Harrison et al., Foundations for Smarter Cities, IBM J. RES. & DEV., July-Aug. 2012, at 
1, 2 (noting that smart cities enable the “capture and integration of live real-world data through the 
use of sensors, kiosks, meters, personal devices, appliances, cameras, smart phones, implanted 
medical devices, the web, and other similar data-acquisition systems, including social networks as 
networks of human sensors”). 
63. Finch & Tene, supra note 16, at 1606. 
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balance the gains from civic innovation against the risks of re-
identification and associated privacy harms;64 and (2) cities becoming 
“platforms” and therefore having to mediate how citizens as users interact 
with smart city technologies and publicly and privately developed apps 
for accessing city services and datasets ranging from budget projections 
to building permits to parking violations to student disciplinary reports.65 
As Finch and Tene point out, this new role provides cities with a golden 
opportunity to act as data stewards by setting new norms and standards 
around privacy for emerging technologies.66 
Finally, the growing emphasis on big data policing and smart city 
enhancements to urban quality of life coincide with a third trend: intense 
public scrutiny of abusive policing practices such as stop and frisk, racial 
profiling, excessive use of force, police perjury, police militarization, 
and—most tragically—multiple police shootings of unarmed civilians.67 
The common factor in these practices is their malignant effect on racial 
minorities, immigrants, the poor, and the most vulnerable in our 
communities. The need for police reform provides the broader context and 
sense of urgency around cities adopting both local surveillance ordinances 
and citywide data privacy principles. 
B. Two Gaps in Privacy Law 
Privacy localism helps address two significant gaps in federal and state 
privacy regulation. The first is the absence of Fourth Amendment or 
statutory protection for personal information collected in public settings. 
The second is the absence of federal or state privacy laws applicable to 
city agencies that collect, store, use, or share records about individuals 
that contain personal information. 
1. The Public Surveillance Gap 
Professor Christopher Slobogin recently coined the phrase “panvasive 
surveillance” to capture the idea that mass surveillance techniques are 
                                                     
64. Id. at 1611–13. When cities publish thousands of data sets on all kinds of civic functions, they 
increase the risk of exposing the sensitive information of local residents. They therefore need tools 
for evaluating whether, and how, a sensitive dataset may be released to the public while minimizing 
the risk of privacy violations. 
65. Id. at 1593–95. 
66. Id. at 1607. 
67. See generally JAMES FORMAN JR., LOCKING UP OUR OWN: CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN BLACK 
AMERICA (2017); BARRY FRIEDMAN, UNWARRANTED: POLICING WITHOUT PERMISSION 6–14 (2017); 
FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, WHEN POLICE KILL (2017). 
14 - Rubinstein (3).docx (Do Not Delete) 1/6/2019  12:43 PM 
2018] PRIVACY LOCALISM 1975 
 
now “pervasive and invasive,” and affect “huge numbers of people, most 
of whom are innocent of any wrongdoing.”68 For reasons that all of these 
scholars have readily identified, “the Fourth Amendment is not implicated 
by most types of panvasive surveillance.”69 Nor do related federal 
electronic surveillance laws (ECPA) offer protection against police use of 
panvasive surveillance in public spaces. This results in a gap in the law, 
the “public surveillance gap.” 
Privacy theory has long recognized the tension between the 
surveillance of pedestrians on public streets and the anonymity enjoyed in 
public places. In his early and influential analysis of the function of 
privacy in a democratic society, Professor Alan Westin identified 
anonymity as a “state of privacy” that “occurs when the individual is in 
public places or performing public acts but still seeks, and finds, freedom 
from identification and surveillance.”70 More recently, Slobogin offered a 
sophisticated treatment of “a right to public anonymity,” which he defines 
as an assurance that when in public, one is “presumptively nameless . . . as 
far as the government is concerned.”71 His primary concern was to 
establish a Fourth Amendment basis for “privacy in public.”72 More 
specifically, he made the case for applying the reasonable expectation of 
privacy test to closed-circuit television (CCTV) operated by the 
government in public spaces, notwithstanding the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
contrary holdings in a series of cases described below.73 
U.S. Supreme Court precedent establishes that citizens do not generally 
enjoy a reasonable expectation of privacy in public. In Katz v. United 
States,74 which is best known for Justice Harlan’s concurring opinion 
establishing the reasonable expectation of privacy test, Justice Stewart 
                                                     
68. Christopher Slobogin, Panvasive Surveillance, Political Process Theory, and the 
Nondelegation Doctrine, 102 GEO. L.J. 1721, 1723 (2014) [hereinafter Slobogin, Panvasive 
Surveillance]. Other Fourth Amendment scholars have recognized the same phenomenon, although 
they call it by different names. See, e.g., Barry Friedman & Cynthia Benin Stein, Redefining What’s 
“Reasonable”: The Protections for Policing, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 281, 286 (2016); Daphna 
Renan, The Fourth Amendment as Administrative Governance, 68 STAN. L. REV. 1039, 1051–53 
(2016). 
69. Slobogin, Panvasive Surveillance, supra note 68, at 1723. 
70. ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 31 (1970). 
71. CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, PRIVACY AT RISK: THE NEW GOVERNMENT SURVEILLANCE AND 
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 91 (2007) [hereinafter SLOGOBIN, PRIVACY AT RISK]. 
72. Id. at 79–117; see also HELEN NISSENBAUM, PRIVACY IN CONTEXT 91 (2010); Andrew D. 
Selbst, Contextual Expectations of Privacy, 35 CARDOZO L. REV. 643 (2013) (applying Nissenbaum’s 
theory of contextual integrity to Fourth Amendment analysis); Joel R. Reidenberg, Privacy in Public, 
69 U. MIAMI L. REV. 141 (2014). 
73. SLOBOGIN, PRIVACY AT RISK, supra note 71, at 106–17. 
74. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
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asserted in the majority opinion that “[w]hat a person knowingly exposes 
to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth 
Amendment protection.”75 Over the next few years, the Court consistently 
held that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in anything seen or 
heard from a public vantage point.76 The Court extended this doctrine to 
open fields, even if they are secluded and the owner takes steps to shield 
them from public view,77 and to naked-eye aerial observation of a person’s 
backyard78 or a greenhouse with partially open sides and roof.79 In the 
“beeper” cases, which involved police use of radio transmitters to follow 
vehicles and their contents on a public road, the Court held that the Fourth 
Amendment did not apply because a “person traveling in an automobile 
on public thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his 
movements from one place to another.”80 
Thus, police use of video cameras, ALPRs, shot detectors, drones, and 
facial recognition software—in other words, all the components of the 
NYPD’s DAS—would not constitute a search under the plain view or 
open fields doctrines or the beeper cases.81 Public surveillance receives 
somewhat more protective treatment under United States v. Jones,82 a 
2012 case in which the police, acting without a valid warrant, attached a 
GPS tracking device to the underside of a drug suspect’s car and tracked 
his movement over a period of twenty-eight days. In a majority opinion 
authored by Justice Scalia, the Court revived the traditional trespass 
theory of the Fourth Amendment to find that the government’s physical 
installation of the device constituted a “search” under the Fourth 
Amendment.83 But in two separate concurrences, five justices rejected the 
                                                     
75. Id. at 351. 
76. See, e.g., Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234, 236 (1968). 
77. Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170 (1984). 
78. California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986). 
79. Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989). Later cases added the “general public use” exception 
under which “surveillance of private property by using highly sophisticated surveillance equipment 
not generally available to the public” might require a warrant. See Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 
476 U.S. 227, 238 (1986). But many commentators have disparaged this exception as unworkable 
given the rapid pace of technological development and the ready availability of even the most 
sophisticated technology. See SLOBOGIN, PRIVACY AT RISK, supra note 71, at 54–62. 
80. United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281 (1983) (police tracked a container in a car holding 
chemicals used in drug manufacturing). One exception is when use of the device reveals a “critical 
fact about the interior of the premises,” which would constitute a search and therefore requires a 
warrant. See United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 715 (1984) (police tracked container to inside of 
homes). 
81. See SLOBOGIN, PRIVACY AT RISK, supra note 71, at 106–08. 
82. 565 U.S. 400 (2012). 
83. Id. at 404, 409 (as Justice Scalia noted in defending his approach, “[t]he Katz reasonable-
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trespass approach as artificial and irrelevant; they instead directly 
confronted the issue of whether long-term GPS monitoring of the 
defendant’s vehicle violated his reasonable expectation of privacy under 
the Katz test and concluded that it had.84 
Justice Alito’s concurrence made this point rather bluntly, stating that 
the majority’s reasoning “largely disregards what is really important (the 
use of a GPS for the purpose of long-term tracking).”85 Justice 
Sotomayor’s concurrence went even further, noting that “GPS monitoring 
generates a precise, comprehensive record of a person’s public 
movements that reflects a wealth of detail about her familial, political, 
professional, religious, and sexual associations,” which the government 
can then store and efficiently “mine . . . for information years into the 
future.”86 
Jones signals a greater willingness on the part of the Court to confront 
new surveillance technologies head-on rather than allow the Fourth 
Amendment to atrophy in the contemporary setting. Two more recent 
opinions by Chief Justice Roberts continue this trend. In Riley v. 
California,87 a unanimous Court held that police require a warrant to 
search the information on a cell phone seized incident to an arrest because 
cell phones are quantitatively and qualitatively different from other items 
found on an arrestee’s person, in part due to the “immense storage 
capacity” of modern cell phones.88 And this past term, in Carpenter v. 
United States,89 a divided Court held that the government conducts a 
search when it accesses historical cell site location information to 
determine the location of a suspect over a four-month period.90 As in 
Jones (and drawing on Riley), the Carpenter court concluded that such 
monitoring is a “new phenomenon” warranting a higher level of 
protection than ordinary record requests.91 Thus, the 5-4 majority opinion 
adopted a different approach from past cases that both breaks the shackles 
                                                     
expectation-of-privacy test has been added to, but not substituted for, the common-law trespassory 
test . . .”). 
84. Id. at 413–18 (Sotomayor, J., concurring); id. at 418–31 (Alito, J., concurring).  
85. Id. at 424 (Alito, J., concurring). 
86. Id. at 415 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
87. 573 U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014).  
88. Id. at 2478. 
89. 585 U.S. __, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018). 
90. Id. at 2220. 
91. Id. at 2216 (characterizing both GPS tracking of a vehicle and cell site location information as 
“detailed, encyclopedic, and effortlessly compiled”). 
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of trespass theory and begins chipping away at the third-party doctrine.92 
While the Court did not overrule United States v. Miller93 or Smith v. 
Maryland,94 it refused to apply the third-party doctrine automatically and 
declined to extend it to the collection of cell site location information.95 
Instead, the Court announced a “digital-Katz test for surveillance 
technologies.”96 This test amounts to a multifactor analysis of data 
quantity and quality in a specific technology. The majority found that use 
of this particular surveillance technology violated a reasonable 
expectation of privacy based on its sensitivity, exhaustiveness, retrieval 
cost, capability of reconstructing past movement, and voluntariness of 
third-party sharing. But the Court emphasized that its decision was 
narrow, while refusing to express a view on other technologies, such as 
real-time collection of cell site location information or “tower dumps” (a 
technique for collecting all the devices connected to a specific particular 
cell site during a particular interval).97 
Together, Jones, Riley, and Carpenter suggest that a (sometimes thin) 
majority of the Court firmly believes that when surveillance is all-
encompassing, it may violate society’s reasonable expectations of 
privacy, even in cases where the surveillance occurs in public places. And 
yet, it is not at all clear that this line of cases will alter the Court’s 
treatment of video cameras and the related public surveillance 
technologies associated with the DAS.98 Unlike the GPS tracking at issue 
in Jones, which consisted of long-term monitoring of a single known 
                                                     
92. Under this doctrine, no search occurs when a person voluntarily turns over data to a third party 
such as bank records to a bank or dialed phone numbers to a telecommunications company, because 
she assumes the risk these records will be shared outside the company, even with the government. 
See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 742–43 (1979); United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 
(1976).  
93. 425 U.S. 435 (1976). 
94. 442 U.S. 735 (1979). 
95. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2219–20.  
96. Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Future-Proofing the Fourth Amendment, HARV. L. REV.: BLOG 
(June 25, 2018), https://blog.harvardlawreview.org/future-proofing-the-fourth-amendment/ 
[https://perma.cc/97SL-WQNY]. 
97. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2220. Carpenter generated four dissenting opinions, none of which 
were happy with the Court’s new balancing test. Justice Kennedy defended the third-party doctrine, 
arguing that it controlled cell site location information; Justice Thomas wanted the Court to reconsider 
(and perhaps repeal) the Katz test; Justice Alito worried that the holding would justify challenges to 
other court orders (including various kinds of subpoenas); Justice Gorsuch objected to Katz and the 
third-party doctrine and hinted at a new property-based test (not confined to trespass) under which a 
person might have a sufficient interest in his cell site location information as a form of “papers” to 
justify protection under the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 2223–72. 
98. See Slobogin, Panvasive Surveillance, supra note 68, at 1747 (concluding that panvasive 
surveillance remains “immune from constitutional review” notwithstanding the decision in Jones). 
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target, the DAS components engage in universal monitoring of every 
person or vehicle who passes within range of a video camera, license plate 
reader, gunshot detector, or drone. These devices passively record and 
store images and sounds, which are fed into a prescriptive analytics 
program designed to detect suspicious behavior, including abandoned 
packages or movement in prohibited areas. If the program triggers an 
alarm, a trained police officer reviews and evaluates it, taking into account 
other sensor feeds and geocoded records in the vicinity of the alarming 
sensor. This prevents the police from deploying resources if the alarm is 
a false-positive; however, if the officer judges the alarm to be legitimate, 
a police response follows.99 Thus, the DAS bears little resemblance to 
GPS tracking because the monitoring capabilities of the DAS are wide, 
but not very deep.100 
Of course, one can devise a hypothetical in which the NYPD uses the 
wide area monitoring of the DAS to track an individual over an extended 
period of time. But this is not the intended purpose of the DAS and it 
seems more likely that if police sought to track specific individuals over 
an extended period, they would rely on GPS tracking devices (as in Jones) 
or cell site location information (as in Carpenter). Nonetheless, some 
scholars argue that any time the police use a system like the DAS to track 
and identify an individual, the courts should treat this as a “search” 
requiring a warrant.101 But important differences remain between: (1) the 
ordinary use of individual component technologies of the DAS; (2) the 
use of the network surveillance capabilities of the DAS when integrated 
with predictive analytics to track and identify a suspect over time (which 
might happen in the future); and (3) the twenty-eight day GPS monitoring 
at issue in Jones or the 127 days of cell phone monitoring at issue in 
Carpenter. In short, the ordinary use of the DAS simply does not generate 
the comprehensive record of a person’s public movements that animated 
the Court’s new line of reasoning in Jones and Carpenter. The absence of 
long-term monitoring by the DAS seems like enough of a distinguishing 
factor for the Court to adhere to its earlier reasoning in Katz and the pre-
                                                     
99. Levine, supra note 55, at 74. 
100. Professor Kiel Brennan-Marquez helped me formulate this distinction.  
101. See, e.g., CONSTITUTION PROJECT, GUIDELINES FOR PUBLIC VIDEO SURVEILLANCE: A GUIDE 
TO PROTECTING COMMUNITIES AND PRESERVING CIVIL LIBERTIES 28 (2007), 
http://constitutionproject.org/pdf/Video_Surveillance_Guidelines_Report_w_Model_Legislation4.p
df [https://perma.cc/27EF-DW7Z] (arguing that law enforcement must obtain a warrant prior to using 
a public video surveillance system to track or identify an individual); see also Rachel Levinson-
Waldman, Hiding in Plain Sight: A Fourth Amendment Framework for Analyzing Government 
Surveillance in Public, 66 EMORY L.J. 527, 602–05 (2017).  
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digital cases rather than treat the DAS or its component parts as another 
novel technology warranting a different approach.102 
So far, this section has focused on the Fourth Amendment gap in 
addressing surveillance of public spaces. There is a parallel gap in federal 
surveillance laws, which generally do not cover law enforcement use of 
video surveillance in public spaces. Congress deliberately omitted video 
surveillance from the scope of the Wiretap Act, which otherwise covers 
governmental interception of “wire” and “oral” communications.103 And 
this omission was not reversed when Congress enacted ECPA, which 
extended the Wiretap Act to “electronic communications.”104 
Furthermore, the operative provision of the Wiretap Act prohibits the 
“interception” of wire, oral, or electronic communications, and video 
surveillance does not require “interception” as that term is defined in the 
statute.105 Thus, public video surveillance and most other components of 
the DAS are beyond the scope of ECPA except to the extent that they 
record conversations.106 The norm for CCTV cameras and ALPRs is silent 
recording that captures images but not sounds. Nor are gunshot detectors 
designed to capture human voices (although occasionally they do, in 
which case the Wiretap Act might apply).107 
2. The Fair Information Practices Gap 
The Fair Information Practices (FIPs) are the basis for modern privacy 
regulation, both in the United States and abroad.108 There are different 
                                                     
102. See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2220 (stating that the Court’s decision does not “call into question 
conventional surveillance techniques and tools, such as security cameras”). 
103. See PROSKAUER ON PRIVACY: A GUIDE TO PRIVACY AND DATA SECURITY LAW IN THE 
INFORMATION AGE § 6.2.1.A.2 (Kristen J. Mathews ed., 2d ed. 2016) (citing S. REP. NO. 99-541, at 
16–17, reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3570–71); United States v. Koyomejian, 970 F.2d 536, 539–
40 (9th Cir. 1992) (discussing omission). 
104. See SOLOVE & SCHWARTZ, INFORMATION PRIVACY LAW, supra note 1, at 378.  
105. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(4) (2012). 
106. If video surveillance includes sound, it would fall within the definition of “oral 
communications” under the Wiretap Act. See SOLOVE & SCHWARTZ, INFORMATION PRIVACY LAW, 
supra note 1, at 378.  
107. See Alexandra S. Gecas, Gunfire Game Changer or Big Brother’s Hidden Ears?: Fourth 
Amendment and Admissibility Quandaries Relating to Shotspotter Technology, 2016 U. ILL. L. REV. 
1073, 1096–97 (2016). 
108. See SOLOVE & SCHWARTZ, INFORMATION PRIVACY LAW, supra note 1, at 663–65. The FIPs 
are a set of internationally recognized privacy principles that date back to the 1970s. They have helped 
shape not only the main U.S. privacy statutes but also European data protection law. See generally 
FTC, PRIVACY ONLINE: FAIR INFORMATION PRACTICE IN THE ELECTRONIC MARKETPLACE (2000), 
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/privacy-online-fair-information-practices-
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formulations of the FIPs and they vary as to both the number of principles 
and their substantive content. But all versions have in common the 
allocation of “rights and responsibilities that are associated with the 
transfer and use of personal information.”109 
In 1974, Congress enacted the Privacy Act, which regulates the way 
federal agencies collect, maintain, use or disseminate the personal 
information of individuals.110 The Privacy Act is the first federal law to 
embody the FIPs. But it applies only to federal agencies; it does not apply 
to the private sector or to state or local agencies.111 Relatively few states 
have statutes comparable to the Privacy Act and the ten or so that do vary 
widely. For example, New York’s Personal Privacy Protection Act 
requires that each state agency “that maintains a system of records” must 
comply with the FIPs.112 But the law does not apply to local governments. 
Although Washington is one of the few states to have created an Office of 
Privacy and Data Protection, whose remit includes updating state agency 
privacy policies, consumer education and outreach, monitoring citizen 
complaints, and promoting best practices,113 Washington does not have a 
state law imposing the FIPs on government agencies. 
It follows that there is a gap—a fair information practices gap—that 
applies to the collection, use, and disclosure of personal information by 
most state and city governments. This gap is significant. It means that 
most local governments are not required by law to adhere to the FIPs. It 
also means that they neglect an equally important aspect of the Privacy 
Act, and the more recent E-Government Act, requiring federal agencies 
                                                     
electronic-marketplace-federal-trade-commission-report/privacy2000text.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/8Y2K-6LD8]. 
109. SOLOVE & SCHWARTZ, INFORMATION PRIVACY LAW, supra note 1, at 664. 
110. Privacy Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-579, 88 Stat. 1896 (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. 
§ 552a (2012)) (limiting disclosure, data collection and retention of such information, requiring 
various notices, granting a right of access and correction, imposing data security requirements, and 
providing enforcement rights).  
111. See SOLOVE & SCHWARTZ, INFORMATION PRIVACY LAW, supra note 1, at 666. There is one 
exception—the Act’s rules for social security numbers apply beyond federal agencies. Id. 
112. N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW § 94 (McKinney 2018). A few other states have similar laws, for 
example, California, Massachusetts, and Minnesota. See DANIEL J. SOLOVE & PAUL M. SCHWARTZ, 
PRIVACY LAW FUNDAMENTALS: 2017, 125–26 (2017) [hereinafter SOLOVE & SCHWARTZ, PRIVACY 
LAW FUNDAMENTALS]; Uniform Information Practices Act, HAW. REV. STAT. § 92F-1 (2018) 
(Hawaii); Fair Information Practices Act, IND. CODE § 4-1-6 (2018) (Indiana); Government Records 
Access and Management Act, UTAH CODE ANN. § 63G-2-101 (West 2018) (Utah). States with much 
narrower government records laws include Alaska, Connecticut, and Wisconsin. 
113. See Wash. Exec. Order 16-01 (Jan. 5, 2016), 
https://www.governor.wa.gov/sites/default/files/exe_order/eo_16-01.pdf [https://perma.cc/2BGY-
L5GB]; Office of Privacy and Data Protection Creation Act, H.R. 2875, 64th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 
2016) (codifying E.O. 16-01). 
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to prepare both System of Records Notices (SORNs)114 and Privacy 
Impact Assessments (PIAs).115 
In sum, the vast majority of states and cities are not bound by the FIPs 
when state and local agencies collect, store, use, and disseminate personal 
information. Nor do they benefit from related methodologies and practices 
like SORNs and PIAs, which require government officials administering 
data-rich programs to think about privacy protections and hold them 
accountable if they neglect this responsibility. 
II. CASE STUDIES: SEATTLE AND NEW YORK CITY 
The case for privacy localism rests on the idea that local autonomy 
helps promote laboratories for democracy as well as participatory 
opportunities for citizens. There is little question that states have played 
this role when acting as first movers in identifying and regulating 
emerging privacy concerns and enabling simultaneous experimentation 
with multiple policy solutions. As noted above, California has a long 
history of enacting innovative privacy laws that have shaped privacy and 
security standards on a national basis,116 and recently passed a new 
consumer privacy law with national implications.117 This Part argues that 
the time is ripe to expand this characterization of the benefits of local 
                                                     
114. Federal agencies must publish SORNs in the Federal Register when they maintain personal 
information in system of records and the information is retrieved by a personal identifier. See 5 U.S.C. 
§ 552a(e)(4) (2012). SORNs serve two salutary purposes: they provide (1) notice to the public about 
their rights under the Privacy Act and (2) useful information for privacy advocates, alerting them to 
new government databases and thereby enabling them to analyze whether these databases comply 
with federal law. See Jeramie D. Scott, DoD Claim that NSA in Compliance with Privacy Act Ring 
Hollow, EPIC: PRIVACY RTS. BLOG (Feb. 12, 2015, 5:31 PM), http://epic.org/blog/2015/02/dod-
claim-nsa-in-compliance-with-the-privacy-act-when-it-clearly-is-n.html [https://perma.cc/G3J8-
TLA6]. Second, they force agencies to continually examine and rationalize their own policies and 
practices (as a prelude to issuing new SORNs). 
115. Section 208 of the E-Government Act of 2002 requires agencies to conduct a PIA before 
developing or procuring IT systems or initiating projects that collect, maintain, or disseminate 
personal information from or about members or the public. See Pub. L. No. 107-347, § 208-b, 116 
Stat. 2899, 2921–22 (codified as amended at 44 U.S.C. § 3501 (2012)). The purpose of a PIA is to 
demonstrate that program managers and system owners have consciously incorporated privacy 
protections throughout the development of a system or program. Agencies are required to make PIAs 
publicly available through publication in the Federal Register or through a posting on the agency 
websites, subject to certain exceptions. See generally OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE 
OF THE PRESIDENT, M-03-22, OMB GUIDANCE FOR IMPLEMENTING THE PRIVACY PROVISIONS OF THE 
E-GOVERNMENT ACT OF 2002 (2003), 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/omb/memoranda_m03-22 [https://perma.cc/LJH5-VN4V]. 
116. See Hogan Lovells, California Continues to Shape Privacy and Data Security Standards, 
IAPP: PRIVACY TRACKER (Oct. 1, 2013), https://iapp.org/news/a/california-continues-to-shape-
privacy-and-data-security-standards/ [https://perma.cc/39RS-AMXV].   
117. Goldman, supra note 47. 
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policymaking from states to cities. It explores in detail the experiments 
with privacy localism in Seattle and New York City. Both cities have 
enacted or introduced local surveillance ordinances. Both are subject to 
ongoing judicial oversight related to police practices and abuses. Both 
have imposed citywide privacy laws while embracing open data 
programs. Accordingly, they are similar enough for comparison, yet their 
experiments in privacy also reflect profound differences in their political 
and cultural make-up, not least of which is New York’s direct experience 
with the devastating 9/11 terrorist attacks. 
There are two additional arguments in favor of privacy localism. The 
first is the new emphasis on governance rules and agency design as 
solutions to Fourth Amendment doctrinal deficiencies and the lack of 
transparency and accountability in modern policing. Legal scholars such 
as Christopher Slobogin,118 Barry Friedman and Maria Ponomarenko,119 
and Daphna Renan120 have all turned to administrative law as a new source 
of insight into these longstanding problems. And privacy localism 
perfectly exemplifies this administrative turn by relying on locally elected 
officials to establish policy and exercise discretion in applying local rules 
in a reasonable manner. The second is that privacy localism in Seattle and 
New York City seem remarkably successful in addressing the public 
surveillance gap and the fair information practices gaps. 
A. Seattle 
Seattle is Washington State’s largest and fastest-growing city, with an 
estimated 2017 population of about 725,000.121 It has a vibrant local 
                                                     
118. See Slobogin, Panvasive Surveillance, supra note 68.   
119. See Barry Friedman & Maria Ponomarenko, Democratic Policing, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1827 
(2015). 
120. See Renan, supra note 68. 
121. U.S. Census Bureau estimates rank Seattle as the eighteenth largest city in the United States. 
It has a metropolitan area population of over 4,500,000, the thirteenth largest in the country. U.S. 
CENSUS BUREAU, ANNUAL ESTIMATES OF THE RESIDENT POPULATION: APRIL 1, 2010 TO JULY 1, 
2017 [hereinafter U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, ANNUAL ESTIMATES], 
https://factfinder.census.gov/faces/nav/jsf/pages/community_facts.xhtml (last visited Nov. 21, 2018).  
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economy122 and a lower crime rate than most medium-size U.S. cities.123 
The City has not experienced a large-scale terrorist act involving major 
loss of life or serious property damage, although several smaller terrorist 
incidents have occurred.124 Thus, for most residents, life in Seattle is not 
colored by a fear of crime or terrorist attacks nor has the Seattle Police 
Department (SPD) implemented heightened security measures designed 
to prevent or respond to such attacks. 
Although Seattle’s elected offices are officially non-partisan, the city 
is staunchly liberal with a heavy Democratic tilt.125 Washington State has 
a roughly even divide between Democrats and Republicans, but 
Democrats control the governor’s office, the State House of 
Representatives, and the State Senate.126 In a recent study calculating the 
level of conservatism of all U.S. cities with a population above 20,000, 
Seattle ranked as the third most liberal city.127 
In Seattle, the mayor appoints the chief of police, who serves at the 
mayor’s pleasure.128 The SPD is relatively small, with approximately 
1,400 sworn officers (about twenty officers per 10,000 residents) and a 
2016 budget of about $320 million out of a total citywide budget of 
$5.1 billion.129 It has a mixed history with privacy protection/regulation. 
                                                     
122. The city/region is home to major high-tech and aerospace firms such as Amazon, Microsoft, 
Starbucks, and Boeing, the fifth largest U.S. container port, and a globally recognized public 
university, the University of Washington. See Gregory Lewis McNamee, Seattle, Washington, United 
States, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA (last updated Oct. 4, 2018), 
https://www.britannica.com/place/Seattle-Washington [https://perma.cc/X2D5-HHET]. 
123. See Violent Crime Statistics for Every City in America, CBS CHI. (Oct. 22, 2015, 5:00 PM), 
https://chicago.cbslocal.com/2015/10/22/violent-crime-statistics-for-every-city-in-america/ 
[https://perma.cc/Y7YJ-W6CN].  
124. OFFICE OF EMERGENCY MGMT., CITY OF SEATTLE, SHIVA – THE SEATTLE HAZARD 
IDENTIFICATION AND VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS (2014), 
https://www.seattle.gov/Documents/Departments/Emergency/PlansOEM/SHIVA/SHIVAv6.3Final.
pdf [https://perma.cc/f5zx-jv7g]. 
125. Here’s How Seattle Voters’ Support for Trump Compared to other Cities’, SEATTLE TIMES 
(Nov. 17, 2016, 6:45 AM), https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/politics/heres-how-seattle-
voters-support-for-trump-stacks-up-to-other-u-s-cities/ (last visited Oct. 21, 2018) (eighty-seven 
percent of Seattle voters supported Clinton over Trump in the 2016 election). 
126. See Jennifer Bendery, Democrats in Washington State Win Full Control of the Government, 
HUFFPOST (Nov. 7, 2017, 11:33 PM), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/washington-state-
senate-special-election_us_5a00a45be4b0baea2633bfae [https://perma.cc/SPR4-CYCL]. 
127. See Chris Tausanovitch & Christopher Warshaw, Representation in Municipal Government, 
108 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 605, 609 (2014) (basing rankings on recent large-scale population surveys 
regarding public policy).  
128. SEATTLE POLICE DEP’T, CITY OF SEATTLE, 2017–2018 PROPOSED BUDGET 369, 
https://www.seattle.gov/financedepartment/17proposedbudget/documents/SPD.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/32H8-Y2XX] (overview of the Seattle Police Department). 
129. CITY OF SEATTLE, 2016 PROPOSED BUDGET 15, 
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On the one hand, the SPD is more transparent than most American police 
forces. For example, the SPD police manual is publicly available on the 
internet and it covers departmental standards, values, policies, and 
practices across a range of operational and personnel issues.130 On the 
other hand, the SPD has some history of misconduct involving 
surveillance and use of force. Notable incidents include spying on 
political protests in the 1960s and 1970s131; inadequately preparing for the 
1999 World Trade Organization meeting in Seattle, where 100,000 
protestors disrupted the conference and engaged in minor rioting132; using 
a stun gun on a seven-months-pregnant African-American woman after 
she was stopped for going twelve miles over the speed limit and refused 
to get out of her car or sign her speeding ticket133; and two racially-charged 
use-of-force incidents in 2010, one involving a fatal shooting of a Native 
American experiencing a mental health crisis,134 the other involving the 
kicking, beating, and berating of two handcuffed Latino suspects.135 
In 2011, the DOJ announced an investigation of the SPD based in part 
on these widely publicized incidents.136 The investigation found that the 
SPD routinely used excessive force and followed policing practices that 
                                                     
http://www.seattle.gov/financedepartment/16proposedbudget/documents/16proposedbudgetexecsu
mmary.pdf [https://perma.cc/WKL4-HM5S]. 
130. SEATTLE POLICE DEP’T, CITY OF SEATTLE, SEATTLE POLICE DEPARTMENT MANUAL (2018) 
[hereinafter SEATTLE POLICE DEPARTMENT MANUAL], https://www.seattle.gov/police-manual 
[https://perma.cc/YA7Z-78T2]; see Friedman & Ponomarenko, supra note 119, at 1848 (identifying 
Chicago and Seattle as among the few cities with publicly available police manuals). 
131. Michael Sweeney, Seattle Law Limits Police in Intelligence Gathering, WASH. POST (July 3, 
1979), https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1979/07/03/seattle-law-limits-police-in-
intelligence-gathering/916c9159-31da-4a1f-ab55-9804ba5efa19/?utm_term=.d842564b88e8 
[https://perma.cc/7T8F-6ZSN]. 
132. See Sam Howe Verhovek, Seattle Police Chief Resigns in Aftermath of Protests, N.Y. TIMES 
(Dec. 8, 1999), http://www.nytimes.com/1999/12/08/us/seattle-police-chief-resigns-in-aftermath-of-
protests.html (last visited Oct. 21, 2018). 
133. Adam Liptak, A Ticket, 3 Taser Jolts and, Perhaps, a Trip to the Supreme Court, N.Y. TIMES 
(May 14, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/15/us/police-taser-use-on-pregnant-woman-goes-
before-supreme-court.html (last visited Oct. 21, 2018).  
134. See Lynda V. Mapes, Carver’s Death a Violent End to a Tormented Life, SEATTLE TIMES 
(Oct. 15, 2010, 10:00 PM), https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/carvers-death-a-violent-end-
to-a-tormented-life/ (last visited Oct. 21, 2018). 
135. See Steve Miletich & Sara Jean Green, Video of SPD Officer Kicking Prone Man Sparks 
Internal Investigation, SEATTLE TIMES (May 8, 2010, 11:25 PM), 
https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/video-of-spd-officer-kicking-prone-man-sparks-internal-
investigation/ (last visited Oct. 21, 2018). 
136. See Mike Carter, Justice Department to Investigate Seattle Police Civil-Rights Practices, 
SEATTLE TIMES (Mar. 31, 2011, 9:22 PM), https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/justice-
department-to-investigate-seattle-police-civil-rights-practices/ (last visited Oct. 21, 2018).  
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could lead to discriminatory or biased policing.137 Although the City of 
Seattle initially objected to these findings, in 2012 it entered into a consent 
decree requiring the city to adopt new policies and provide training 
designed to address excessive force.138 Five years later, the federal 
monitor overseeing court-ordered police reforms praised the SPD for 
achieving a dramatic turnaround but then refused to find the police 
department in compliance with its federally mandated obligations, due in 
part to a June 2017 incident in which two white officers fatally shot 
Charleena Lyles, a thirty-year-old African-American mother of four.139 
The city objected, and six months later, James Robart, a federal district 
court judge in Seattle, found the SPD in “full and effective compliance” 
with the court-ordered police reforms.140 
1. Seattle’s Surveillance Ordinances and Body Camera Policy 
The 2013 Ordinance—In 2013, the Seattle City Council approved a 
bill and ordinance requiring city departments to obtain council approval 
prior to acquiring and using certain surveillance equipment.141 One 
explicit goal of the ordinance—which was the first of its kind in the 
country—was “to avoid creating a constant and pervasive surveillance 
                                                     
137. CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, INVESTIGATION OF THE SEATTLE POLICE 
DEPARTMENT 2 (2011), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/crt/legacy/2011/12/16/ 
spd_findletter_12-16-11.pdf [https://perma.cc/TK6L-S7TS]. 
138. The Consent Decree  
calls for the restoration of constitutional policing through substantial and far-reaching reform of 
the SPD’s use of force policies and practices, training, full and complete implementation of new 
policy, adoption of policies and training to eliminate discriminatory policing, and the 
development of improved relations, trust, and support among and from all of Seattle’s many and 
varied communities. 
Seattle Consent Decree: How It Came About, What It Is, and What the Monitor Does, SEATTLE 
POLICE MONITOR (2017), http://www.seattlemonitor.com/overview/ [https://perma.cc/9S5R-7HVD]. 
139. Steve Miletich, Despite Progress, Seattle Police Not Yet in Compliance with Reforms, Federal 
Monitor Says, SEATTLE TIMES (Sept. 8, 2017, 4:24 PM), http://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-
news/crime/despite-progress-seattle-police-not-yet-in-compliance-with-reforms-federal-monitor-
says/ (last visited Oct. 21, 2018). But see Steve Miletich, Seattle Police Dispute Monitor’s Report, 
Say They’ve Met Federal Reform Standards, SEATTLE TIMES (Sept. 12, 2017, 3:37 PM), 
http://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/crime/seattle-police-dispute-monitors-report-say-theyve-
met-federal-reform-standards/ (last visited Oct. 21, 2018). 
140. Steve Miletich, Seattle Asks Federal Judge to Find It in Compliance with Court-Ordered 
Police Reforms, SEATTLE TIMES (Sept. 29, 2017, 12:40 PM), https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-
news/in-watershed-moment-seattle-asks-federal-judge-to-find-it-in-compliance-with-court-ordered-
reforms/ (last visited Oct. 21, 2018). 
141. See SEATTLE, WASH., ORDINANCE 124142 (Mar. 18, 2013) (codified at SEATTLE, WASH. 
MUN. CODE § 14.18) [hereinafter SEATTLE SURVEILLANCE ORDINANCE], 
http://clerk.seattle.gov/~scripts/nph-brs.exe?d=ORDF&s1=117730.cbn.&Sect6= 
HITOFF&l=20&p=1&u=/~public/cbor1.htm&r=1&f=G [https://perma.cc/QHM2-U2HW]. 
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presence in public life.”142 Relying on a consensus approach, the coalition 
of privacy advocates who initially sought the ordinance collaborated with 
representatives of the mayor, police chief and county prosecutor, all of 
whom were represented on the drafting committee that eventually wrote 
the law.143 
The city council adopted the surveillance equipment ordinance 
following negative media reports and a public outcry in response to two 
incidents: the city’s secretive acquisition of two small drones and its 
installation of surveillance cameras (along with a “mesh network”) at 
Seattle’s waterfront.144 Both were funded by a $5 million federal grant.145 
The SPD behaved secretively in both cases by failing to consult with or 
notify the city council or the public prior to acquiring or installing the 
equipment.146 
The ordinance required SPD and other city agencies to obtain council 
approval before deploying “surveillance equipment.”147 More 
specifically, it obligated the SPD to develop operational and data 
management protocols for all such equipment.148 The operational 
protocols addressed the proper deployment, acquisition, and use of the 
equipment including information on its purpose, type, specific location, 
and use; its effect on privacy and anonymity rights and how any potential 
abuses of these rights would be mitigated; a description of data collection 
practices (including the extent of any real-time monitoring and how data 
would be used, accessed, retained and shared with other city departments); 
and a public outreach plan for affected communities.149 The data 
management protocols required the SPD to submit written protocols 
addressing, at a more granular level, how data collected by the 
surveillance equipment would be retained, stored, indexed, and 
accessed.150 
                                                     
142. Id.  
143. Sweeney, supra note 131. 
144. Christine Clarridge, Seattle Grounds Police Drone Program, SEATTLE TIMES (Feb. 7, 2013, 
9:33 PM), http://seattletimes.com/html/localnews/2020312864_spddronesxml.html (last visited Oct. 
21, 2018); Christine Clarridge, Waterfront Surveillance Cameras Stir Privacy Fears, SEATTLE TIMES 
(Jan. 31, 2013, 8:45 PM), http://seattletimes.com/html/latestnews/2020260670_ 
waterfrontcamerasxml.html (last visited Oct. 21, 2018).   
145. Clarridge, Waterfront Surveillance Cameras Stir Privacy Fears, supra note 144.  
146. Crump, supra note 23.  
147. SEATTLE SURVEILLANCE ORDINANCE, supra note 141. 
148. Id. 
149. Id. 
150. Id. 
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The 2013 surveillance ordinance represented a big step by the SPD 
toward transparency and accountability in public surveillance. But it had 
shortcomings, too. First, it defined “surveillance equipment” very 
narrowly, covering “drones or unmanned aircraft and any attached 
equipment used to collect data” but excluding many other types of 
equipment such as body-worn cameras, traffic cameras, and security 
cameras.151 Second, the city council adopted a last-minute proposal by the 
SPD to significantly widen an exemption for using surveillance 
equipment for purposes of criminal investigations under exigent 
circumstances.152 This change expanded the exemption to cover 
investigations supported by reasonable suspicion.153 Third, and most 
importantly, the 2013 ordinance lacked any enforcement mechanism that 
would impose specific penalties on the SPD if it failed to seek approval 
or submit the required protocols in a timely fashion.154 And that is exactly 
what happened. 
The 2017 Ordinance—In the spring of 2017, a combination of media 
exposure and revived public backlash led the city council to reconsider 
the effectiveness of the 2013 ordinance and begin work on replacing it. 
The SPD had purchased and begun using a social media tracking tool 
called Geofeedia, without seeking approval by the city council or 
submitting the required protocols.155 This controversial decision 
illustrated the lack of clarity over the scope of the 2013 ordinance and 
                                                     
151. Id. The Seattle Police Department Manual addressed a few of these scenarios but mainly from 
an operational standpoint. See SEATTLE POLICE DEPARTMENT MANUAL, supra note 130, at ch. 16.090 
(in car video system); id. ch. 16.091 (body-worn video pilot program); id. ch. 16.170 (automatic 
license plate readers). 
152. Phil Mocek, Updates to Seattle Surveillance Equipment Bill, MOCEK.ORG (Mar. 15, 2013), 
https://mocek.org/blog/2013/03/15/updates-to-seattle-surveillance-equipment-bill/ 
[https://perma.cc/9HQY-N3S2]; Phil Mocek, Seattle City Council Pass Ordinance Restricting 
Surveillance Equipment After Councilmember Harrell Slips in a Gift for Police, MOCEK.ORG (Mar. 
19, 2013), https://mocek.org/blog/2013/03/19/seattle-passes-ordinance-restricting-surveillance-after-
harrell-slips-in-gift-for-police/ [https://perma.cc/VS7H-4BE6]. 
153. SEATTLE SURVEILLANCE ORDINANCE, supra note 141. For a detailed account of how this 
came to pass, see Phil Mocek, Updates to Seattle Surveillance Equipment Bill, supra note 152; Phil 
Mocek, Seattle City Council Pass Ordinance Restricting Surveillance Equipment After 
Councilmember Harrell Slips in a Gift for Police, supra note 152. 
154. See Press Release, ACLU Wash., ACLU Urges City Council to Put Teeth into Surveillance 
Law, Delay Vote to Add Auditing Process (Mar. 18, 2013), https://www.aclu-wa.org/news/aclu-
urges-city-council-put-teeth-surveillance-law-delay-vote-add-auditing-process 
[https://perma.cc/ZU9Y-GD3U].  
155. Ansel Herz, How the Seattle Police Secretly—and Illegally—Purchased a Tool for Tracking 
Your Social Media Posts, STRANGER (Sept. 28, 2016), 
https://www.thestranger.com/news/2016/09/28/24585899/how-the-seattle-police-secretlyand-
illegallypurchased-a-tool-for-tracking-your-social-media-posts [https://perma.cc/F2QX-PHUZ]. 
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whether it applied only to hardware or to software as well. An SPD 
spokesperson told a local newspaper that the Geofeedia purchase “‘should 
have been cleared . . . in accordance with the Seattle Municipal Code’”156 
(i.e., the surveillance equipment ordinance), while a local TV station 
reported that according to sources inside the police department, “the 
[surveillance equipment ordinance] applies only to hardware like 
cameras, not software like Geofeedia.”157 A few weeks later, the ACLU 
of Northern California blogged that it had obtained records showing that 
Twitter, Facebook, and Instagram provided user data access to Geofeedia, 
and that Facebook and Instagram had already cut off Geofeedia’s access 
to company data.158 In any case, the SPD clearly did not seek approval 
from the city council or develop any of the required protocols in this case 
or—quite possibly—in any other case involving covered surveillance 
equipment between 2013 and 2017. 
In developing a new ordinance, the City Council convened a 
stakeholder working group consisting of council staff, key staff from the 
mayor’s office, the city IT and law departments, and the SPD, along with 
advocacy groups led by the ACLU-WA. The group met over the course 
of several months to discuss and revise a draft ordinance developed by the 
ACLU-WA.159 The revised ordinance, which the mayor signed into law 
on August 2, 2017,160 repealed and replaced the 2013 ordinance, changing 
it in a number of ways, several of which are worth highlighting. 
To begin with, the new ordinance jettisons “surveillance equipment” in 
favor of two newly defined terms: “surveillance technology,” broadly 
defined as “any electronic device, software program, or hosted software 
                                                     
156. Id. 
157. See Essex Porter, OPA Investigates Reported SPD Acquisition of Tool that Tracks Social 
Media Posts, KIRO 7 (Sept. 29, 2016, 8:18 PM), http://www.kiro7.com/news/local/opa-investigates-
reported-spd-acquisition-of-tool-that-tracks-social-media-posts/451898379 [https://perma.cc/F4EG-
DBYL].  
158. See Matt Cagle, Facebook, Instagram, and Twitter Provided Data Access for a Surveillance 
Product Marketed to Target Activists of Color, ACLU OF N. CAL. (Oct. 11, 2016), 
https://www.aclunc.org/blog/facebook-instagram-and-twitter-provided-data-access-surveillance-
product-marketed-target (last visited Nov. 11, 2018). Twitter soon followed. See Ally Marotti & 
Tribune News Servs., Twitter Cuts off Chicago Startup Geofeedia After ACLU Reports Police 
Surveillance, CHI. TRIBUNE (Oct. 11, 2016, 12:05 PM), 
http://www.chicagotribune.com/bluesky/originals/ct-twitter-suspends-geofeedia-access-bsi-
20161011-story.html [https://perma.cc/NC5K-LPHE]. 
159. Email from Mary F. Perry, Dir. of Transparency & Privacy, Seattle Police Dep’t to Ira 
Rubinstein, Senior Fellow, Info. Law Inst., NYU (Sept. 11, 2017, 9:21 AM) (on file with author); 
Memorandum from Amy Tsai to Gender Equity, Safe Cmtys. & New Ams. Comm. (June 28, 2017), 
http://seattle.legistar.com/View.ashx?M=F&ID=5285300&GUID=80E7C8BB-BAA2-4975-BED5-
BE523C258367  [https://perma.cc/NE4N-TJD3]. 
160. SEATTLE, WASH. MUN. CODE § 14.18 (amended 2017). 
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solution that is designed or primarily intended to be used for the purpose 
of surveillance,” subject to various exceptions and exemptions that 
resemble those in place under the 2013 ordinance161; and “surveillance 
data,” defined as “any electronic data collected, captured, recorded, 
retained, processed, intercepted, or analyzed by surveillance technology 
acquired by the City or operated at the direction of the City.”162 This 
revision significantly broadens the scope of the ordinance. Indeed, the 
definition of “surveillance data” was among the most hotly debated issues 
in the city council hearings. The SPD objected that an overly broad 
definition would render the ordinance unworkable.163 The ACLU-WA 
worried that a narrow definition would undermine transparency and 
accountability.164 In the end, the city council split the difference by linking 
“surveillance data” to technology “acquired by the City or operated at the 
direction of the City.”165 
The 2017 ordinance also imposes a new obligation on departments 
filing surveillance impact reports to conduct community outreach prior to 
council approval.166 And it narrows the exigent circumstances exception, 
which previously allowed temporary use of surveillance equipment in 
advance of council approval based on a criminal investigation supported 
by reasonable suspicion, but now requires a showing of imminent risk of 
death or serious injury.167 This is a much higher standard. Finally, the 
ordinance adds several new oversight and enforcement provisions 
including a private right of action against the city for injunctive or 
declaratory relief for any material violation of the new bill, after a ninety-
day opportunity for the city department to address the concern.168 As a 
practical matter, however, a requirement that all city departments create 
an inventory of existing surveillance technologies and process them for 
                                                     
161. Id. § 14.18.010. 
162. Id.  
163. See infra text following note 355 for further discussion. 
164. See Seattle Adopts Nation’s Strongest Regulations for Surveillance Technology, ACLU 
WASH. (Aug. 8, 2017), https://www.aclu-wa.org/news/seattle-adopts-nation%E2%80%99s-
strongest-regulations-surveillance-technology [https://perma.cc/JLN3-T3CK]. Presumably, this 
excludes data acquired by the city from independent sources such as DHS or state and local agencies 
sharing surveillance data with a regional fusion center. Although the ACLU praised the final bill, it 
also called upon the council to enact a future ordinance ensuring that Seattle’s acquisition and sharing 
of surveillance data is fully regulated, citing the vulnerability of immigrants and refugees to federal 
enforcement if there are inadequate controls on data sharing. Id.  
165. SEATTLE, WASH., MUN. CODE § 14.18.010. 
166. Id. § 14.18.020(C). 
167. Id. § 14.18.030(C)(1).  
168. Id. §§ 14.18.060–.070.  
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council approval at a rate of at least one per month169 may prove even 
more burdensome than potential lawsuits depending on the number of 
such technologies, which may be very high in light of the broader 
definitions discussed above. 
The ACLU-WA praised the replacement ordinance as “the strongest 
measure adopted by an American city to regulate the acquisition of 
surveillance technology.”170 In fact, the new Seattle ordinance compares 
very favorably with strong measures recently adopted in Santa Clara 
County, California171 and in Oakland.172 There is little reason to analyze 
these ordinances at length because Seattle borrowed from them 
extensively. 
The Body Camera Policy—Seattle has also moved ahead with plans 
to improve public safety and enhance police accountability by requiring 
patrol officers to wear body cameras.173 Both policymakers and advocacy 
groups believe that body cameras, if properly deployed, can help protect 
the public against police misconduct and the police against false 
accusations of abuse.174 Police use of body cameras raises several difficult 
policy issues. These include where to set the limits on police discretion 
over when to record; the privacy interests of victims, suspects, third-
parties, and the police; whether to use body cameras inside the home and 
other private spaces; and how to apply the FIPs to the retention, 
disclosure, and secondary uses of body camera video footage.175 In 
comparison with the locally-negotiated surveillance ordinance, the city 
did not have as free a hand in resolving these issues locally. Rather, state 
                                                     
169. Id. § 14.18.070(3).   
170. Seattle Adopts Nation’s Strongest Regulations for Surveillance Technology, ACLU WASH., 
supra note 165. 
171. SANTA CLARA CTY., CAL., OR. NS-300.897 (2016) (codified at SANTA CLARA CTY. ORD. 
CODE § A40); see Kevin Forestieri, Santa Clara County Cracks Down on Police Surveillance 
Technology: New Law Aims to Increase Transparency and Public Control over Police Tech, PALO 
ALTO ONLINE (June 20, 2016, 7:34 AM), https://www.paloaltoonline.com/news/2016/06/18/county-
cracks-down-on-police-surveillance-technology [https://perma.cc/LZY8-BBAG].  
172. Cyrus Farivar, Oakland Passes “Strongest” Surveillance Oversight Law in US, ARS 
TECHNICA  (May 3, 2018, 1:00 AM), https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2018/05/oakland-passes-
strongest-surveillance-oversight-law-in-us/ [https://perma.cc/YEU9-UGS8]. 
173. Jennifer Sullivan, SPD to Test Body Cameras on a Dozen Officers, SEATTLE TIMES (Sept. 24, 
2014, 9:37 PM), https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/spd-to-test-body-cameras-on-a-dozen-
officers/ (last visited Oct. 25, 2018). 
174. See generally Jay Stanley, Police Body-Mounted Cameras: With Right Policies in Place, a 
Win for All, ACLU (Oct. 2013), https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/police_body-mounted_cameras.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/D573-N6C9].  
175. Id. 
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legislation and the federal courts both greatly influenced the body camera 
policies Seattle eventually adopted. 
The SPD began experimenting with body cameras in 2014 with a small 
pilot program involving a dozen officers.176 Immediately it had to contend 
with two thorny issues under state law: whether the use of body cameras 
violated Washington State’s all-party consent rule and whether body 
camera footage would be accessible to the public under Washington’s 
very expansive public disclosure law. 
The Washington Privacy Act requires that all parties to a private 
conversation must consent to an audio recording, although it also states 
that the consent obligation may be satisfied if any of the parties announces 
that they will be recording the conversation in a reasonable manner so 
long as the recording contains that announcement.177 The SPD 
circumvented this problem by initially recording only video and not 
audio.178 An advisory opinion from the Washington State Office of the 
Attorney General later clarified that the “Washington Privacy Act does 
not require officer consent because the Washington [State] Supreme Court 
has recognized that a conversation between a police officer and a member 
of the public that occurs in the performance of the officer’s duties is not 
private.”179 
Washington’s Public Records Act (PRA) creates a presumption of “full 
access to information concerning the conduct of every level of 
government” and generally trumps other laws that conflict with its open-
access mandate.180 The PRA recognizes the right to privacy as a possible 
exemption from disclosure but defines the right very narrowly181 and 
imposes a policy of construing all exemptions narrowly.182 Thus, the 
Washington State Supreme Court held in Fisher Broadcasting Seattle TV 
                                                     
176. Sullivan, supra note 173. 
177. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.73.03(3) (2018). 
178. Sullivan, supra note 173. 
179. Wash. Att’y Gen. Op. No. 8, Video and Audio Recording of Communications Between 
Citizens and Law Enforcement Officers Using Body Cameras Attached to Police Uniforms (Nov. 24, 
2014), http://www.atg.wa.gov/ago-opinions/video-and-audio-recording-communications-between-
citizens-and-law-enforcement-officers [https://perma.cc/Q8Q3-YFQ6]. The clear majority of states 
follow a “one-party consent” rule so this is not an issue in these jurisdictions. See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL 
LAW §§ 25.00–.05 (McKinney 2017). 
180. See Nissen v. Pierce County, 183 Wash. App. 581, 589–90, 333 P.3d 577, 581–82 (2014) 
(citing Neighborhood All. of Spokane Cty. v. Spokane Cty., 172 Wash. 2d 702, 714–15, 261 P.3d 
119, 125–26 (2011)). 
181. WASH. REV. CODE § 42.56.050. 
182. Id. § 42.56.030; see, e.g., Bldg. Indus. Ass’n of Wash. v. Wash. Dep’t of Labor & Indus., 123 
Wash. App. 656, 662, 98 P.3d 537, 541 (2004). 
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LLC v. City of Seattle183 that police body camera footage in Washington 
is generally subject to disclosure under the PRA.184 And this remains the 
rule even when gross privacy violations may result from the release of 
unredacted footage.185 Indeed, Washington’s PRA allows requests for 
police video that are “both anonymous and massively broad.”186 This 
policy almost halted the SPD pilot program before it even began. 
In September 2014, a local programmer named Tim Cleamans filed an 
anonymous request for “every single video” the SPD ever recorded.187 
SPD’s legal advisor on PRA issues, Mary Perry—who had argued and 
lost Fisher Broadcasting—concluded that the under this ruling the police 
could withhold video footage only in cases under pending litigation.188 If 
acted on, Cleamans’s request would have been a financial and logistical 
nightmare. After all, the PRA still required the SPD to review and redact 
video footage under any applicable privacy exemptions before releasing 
it and at that time the process was “manual, a painstaking, frame-by-frame 
ordeal.”189 Eventually, the SPD approached Cleamans and the two sides 
reached an informal détente in which Cleamans agreed to withdraw his 
request if the SPD would automatically redact body camera footage and 
make it available online.190 With Cleamans’s help, the SPD then 
sponsored a “hackathon” to refine the automated redaction system and 
launched a YouTube channel featuring footage from the pilot program, 
with the images automatically blurred and the audio muted.191 The SPD 
hired Cleamans as a consultant for six months but after a dispute he 
resigned and immediately wrote a program for automating requests for the 
footage, enabling him to file over 2,000 requests over the next year.192 
                                                     
183. 180 Wash. 2d 515, 326 P.3d 688 (2014). 
184. Id. at 535, 326 P.3d at 698 (requiring agencies to justify non-disclosure of video on a case-by-
case basis). 
185. See McKenzie Funk, Should We See Everything a Cop Sees?, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 18, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/23/magazine/police-body-cameras.html?_r=0 (last visited Oct. 
27, 2018) (describing one such example involving video footage of a woman apparently overdosing 
on meth, claiming she is pregnant, and being restrained and administered medical aid). 
186. Mark Harris, The Body Cam Hacker Who Schooled the Police, WIRED (May 22, 2015), 
https://www.wired.com/2015/05/the-body-cam-hacker-who-schooled-the-police/ 
[https://perma.cc/5JGZ-KHUA]. 
187. See Funk, supra note 185.  
188. Id. 
189. Id. (noting that the SPD “was then sitting on more than 1.5 million individual dashcam and 
surveillance videos, or about 300,000 hours and 350 terabytes total”).   
190. Id. 
191. Id.; see also S.P.D. BodyWornVideo, YOUTUBE, https://www.youtube.com/ 
channel/UCcdSPRNt1HmzkTL9aSDfKuA [https://perma.cc/94PA-9D62].  
192. Funk, supra note 185. Cleamans also persisted in uploading unredacted video footage to 
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Meanwhile, in 2015, the federal monitor appointed by Judge Robart to 
oversee Seattle police reforms endorsed the use of body cameras by 
officers, calling them a key tool for accountability and transparency.193 
Thereafter, the SPD conducted a six-month pilot program to evaluate 
body camera technology and equipment during field use.194 In 
consultation with officers who had participated in the pilot and 
community stakeholders, it developed a policy regulating both in-car and 
body-worn video. In 2015 and again in 2016, the Seattle City Council 
imposed a proviso to the city budget that would not be lifted until the 
Council was satisfied that the SPD had engaged in an extensive 
community outreach process regarding this policy. In January 2017, the 
Council removed the proviso following the SPD’s completion of agreed-
upon outreach efforts.195 The SPD then submitted a draft body camera 
policy to the Council addressing some of the stakeholder concerns 
discussed during the outreach events.196 
On May 3, 2017, Judge Robart approved this policy over the objections 
of the ACLU-WA and others.197 The ACLU noted a “confusion of 
purpose” in the SPD policy: was the goal police accountability or 
evidence-gathering for criminal prosecution? Clearly the two differ and 
may diverge. In addition, they argued that the police retained too much 
discretion to turn cameras on and off. Finally, they pointed to the risk that 
that body cameras might become a generalized surveillance tool rather 
than an accountability measure, with predictable results.198 
By this point in the SPD rollout, the Washington State Legislature had 
provided some temporary relief to Seattle and other cities facing massive 
public record requests by (1) amending the PRA to exempt body camera 
video recordings from disclosure if nondisclosure was essential for the 
                                                     
YouTube, including some highly invasive and embarrassing scenes of the police interviewing a sex 
worker who reveals her name, address, email address, and telephone number in the video. 
193. Steve Miletich, Time for SPD Officers to Wear Body Cameras ‘Is Now,’ Federal Monitor 
Says, SEATTLE TIMES (June 16, 2015, 4:07 PM), https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/time-for-
spd-officers-to-wear-body-cameras-is-now-federal-monitor-says/ (last visited Oct. 27, 2018). 
194. See Memorandum from Amy Tsai, Council Staff, to Gender Equity, Safe Cmtys. & New Ams. 
Comm. (Feb. 22, 2017) (on file with author). 
195. Id. 
196. The draft policy is reprinted in the Tsai Memorandum, while the final policy is now available 
in the SPD Manual. Id.; see SEATTLE POLICE DEPARTMENT MANUAL, supra note 130, at § 16.090. 
197. Steve Miletich, Federal Judge Approves Body-Camera Plan for Seattle Police, SEATTLE 
TIMES (May 4, 2017, 5:29 PM), https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/crime/federal-judge-
approves-body-camera-plan-for-seattle-police/ (last visited Oct. 27, 2018).  
198. See Shankar Narayan, Police Body-Worn Cameras: Not a Panacea, 71 NW. LAW. 32, 34 
(2017).  
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protection of a person’s privacy, and (2) creating a presumption that 
disclosure of certain recordings is offensive to a reasonable person in 
various sensitive settings or situations (home interiors, medical facilities, 
an “intimate” image, a minor, and so on).199 The amendments also made 
it much harder to request video footage in bulk.200 
This temporary fix (most of these provisions will expire in 2019) also 
requires that any law enforcement agency deploying body cameras adopt 
a policy addressing, at a minimum: (1) activation/deactivation 
requirements, and officer discretion in this regard; (2) how to respond to 
a person’s unwillingness to communicate with an officer who is recording 
the communication; (3) requirements for documenting when and why a 
camera was deactivated prior to the conclusion of an interaction with a 
member of the public; (4) requirements for notifying a member of the 
public that he or she is being recorded, including instances where the 
person finds spoken English challenging; (5) training requirements on 
body camera usage; and (6) security rules to protect data collected and 
stored from body cameras.201 However, the legislation neither settled the 
disputes over these contested issues nor established any specific 
substantive requirements. Rather, it created a “Task Force on Body Worn 
Cameras” to further examine police use of body cameras and submit its 
findings and recommendations to the governor and state legislature by 
December 1, 2017.202 The Task Force’s report included recommendations 
on some issues (such as clarifying the definition of “special exemptions” 
in the PRA, modifying the definitions of “intimate image” and “minors,” 
and clarifying the retention requirement) but left other issues unresolved 
(such as whether to strike or retain the provision barring a PRA requestor 
who prevails in litigation over body camera video from recovering fees 
and statutory penalties unless the agency acted with bad faith or gross 
negligence).203 
This left Seattle with one final issue to tackle: negotiating a new 
contract with the two SPD unions that had voiced concerns about the 
effects of a body camera program on patrol officers’ working conditions, 
                                                     
199. See H.B. 2362, 64th Leg., Reg. Sess., 2016 Wash. Sess. Laws 780 (2016). 
200. See generally WASH REV. CODE § 42.56.240(14) (2018).  
201. Wash. H.B. 2362 § 5. 
202. JOINT LEGISLATIVE TASK FORCE ON THE USE OF BODY WORN CAMERAS, COMMITTEE 
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS (2017), http://leg.wa.gov/JointCommittees/Archive/UBWC/ 
Documents/UBWC-FinalRpt.pdf [https://perma.cc/M5S2-ABE4]. 
203. Compare id. at 1–23, with Letter from Shankar Narayan, Tech. and Liberty Project Dir., 
ACLU Wash., to Joint Legislative Task Force (Dec. 15, 2017) (printed in COMMITTEE REPORT, supra 
note 202, at 31).  
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discipline, and privacy.204 But rather than delaying full deployment of the 
body cameras pending completion of union negotiations, in July 2017, 
then Seattle Mayor Ed Murray issued an executive order calling for 
deployment of body cameras to all patrol officers in downtown Seattle by 
September 30, 2017, and a citywide roll-out thereafter.205 Although the 
executive order stated that collective bargaining with the police unions 
would continue prior to and after implementation of the court-approved 
program, this riled the Seattle police officers’ union, leading it to file an 
unfair labor practice complaint that is still pending as of this writing.206 
2. Seattle’s Privacy Program 
The Privacy Initiative—In 2014, Seattle launched a Privacy Initiative 
aimed at providing greater transparency into the city’s data collection and 
use practices.207 Moving beyond the narrow focus of the surveillance 
ordinance, this new initiative sought to ensure that the city took 
“appropriate steps to facilitate the collection, use, and disposal of data in 
a manner that balances the needs of the City to conduct its business with 
individual privacy, in a manner that builds public trust.”208 As part of the 
Privacy Initiative, Mayor Murray convened a group of stakeholders from 
across city departments (including the SPD) to establish a set of governing 
principles, devise an approach to educating city departments on privacy 
                                                     
204. Steve Miletich, Rebuffing Union, Mayor Murray Orders Seattle Police to Begin Wearing Body 
Cameras, SEATTLE TIMES (July 18, 2017, 1:46 PM), https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-
news/crime/rebuffing-union-mayor-murray-orders-seattle-police-to-begin-wearing-body-cameras/ 
(last visited Oct. 27, 2018).  
205. Seattle Mayor Exec. Order 2017-03 (July 17, 2017), http://murray.seattle.gov/wp-
content/uploads/2017/07/EO-2017-03-body-worn-cameras.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q8LR-66GK]; see 
also Press Release, Office of the Mayor, Mayor Murray Signs Executive Order Requiring Body 
Cameras on Patrol Officers (July 17, 2017), http://murray.seattle.gov/mayor-murray-signs-executive-
order-requiring-body-cameras-patrol-officers/ [https://perma.cc/43CT-FVGK]. 
206. Steve Miletich, State Labor Board to Hear Seattle Police Complaint over Use of Body 
Cameras, SEATTLE TIMES (Aug. 24, 2017, 8:52 PM), https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-
news/crime/state-labor-board-to-hear-seattle-police-complaint-over-use-of-body-cameras/ (last 
visited Dec. 2, 2018). 
207. Press Release, Office of the Mayor, City of Seattle Launches Digital Privacy Initiative (Nov. 
3, 2014), http://murray.seattle.gov/city-of-seattle-launches-digital-privacy-initiative/ 
[https://perma.cc/3LU9-S3TN]; see also Seattle City Council Res. 31570 (Feb. 23, 2015), 
http://clerk.seattle.gov/~archives/Resolutions/Resn_31570.pdf [https://perma.cc/TG7E-CZTT] 
(adopting citywide privacy principles). 
208. Press Release, Office of the Mayor, City of Seattle Launches Digital Privacy Initiative, supra 
note 207; see also Angelique Carson, Seattle Launches Sweeping, Ethics-Based Privacy Overhaul, 
PRIVACY ADVISOR (Nov. 7, 2014), https://iapp.org/news/a/seattle-launches-citywide-privacy-
initiative/ [https://perma.cc/H2FM-V6XY] (lauding the Seattle privacy initiative as one of the most 
progressive in the country). 
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practices, and determine how to assess compliance.209 They were assisted 
by a Privacy Advisory Committee comprised of privacy researchers, 
practitioners, and community representatives, including privacy experts 
from the University of Washington and Microsoft.210 
In 2015, the City released Privacy Principles governing its data 
collection and use practices.211 This set of six principles provides an 
ethical framework for developing appropriate policies, standards, and 
practices regarding the public’s personal information. They offer a local 
take on the FIPs and include (1) a statement valuing privacy; 
(2) collection limitations; (3) use limitations; (4) accountability; 
(5) disclosure limitations; and (6) accuracy.212 The City also outlined a 
process for privacy reviews, consisting of a self-service assessment using 
a standardized questionnaire, then a privacy threshold analysis to be 
reviewed with a “Privacy Champion” appointed by each city department, 
followed by a full-scale privacy impact assessment.213 Additionally, the 
city allocated resources in its 2016 budget to launch an online training and 
awareness program (required of anyone who interacts with the public’s 
personal data), hire a full-time Chief Privacy Officer,214 and adopt a 
citywide privacy statement that provides direction to all city departments 
about their obligations to follow the new principles, the privacy statement, 
and privacy review process.215 
The Program’s privacy policy specifically excludes surveillance 
technologies, as the city’s surveillance ordinance already covers them.216 
                                                     
209. Press Release, Office of the Mayor, City of Seattle Launches Digital Privacy Initiative, supra 
note 207. 
210. Privacy Advisory Committee, CITY OF SEATTLE, https://www.seattle.gov/tech/initiatives/ 
privacy/privacy-advisory-committee [https://perma.cc/3JEW-SEBV].  
211. Seattle City Council Res. 31570, supra note 207. The City of Seattle (along with the 
University of Washington) also joined a national network of university-city partnerships to work on 
“smart city” solutions, which was part of a Smart Cities Initiative under the Obama White House. See 
Smart Cities – Seattle, SMART CITIES LIBRARY, https://www.smartcitieslibrary.com/smart-cities-
seattle/ [https://perma.cc/4CK9-FQDL].  
212. DEP’T OF INFO. TECH., CITY OF SEATTLE, CITY OF SEATTLE PRIVACY PROGRAM 7 (2015) 
[hereinafter PRIVACY PROGRAM BROCHURE], http://ctab.seattle.gov/wp-
content/uploads/2015/10/COS-Privacy-Program.pdf [https://perma.cc/J6N6-KBB5]. 
213. Id. at 8. 
214. In May 2016, the city appointed its first Chief Privacy Officer, who has since been replaced. 
See Press Release, Seattle Information Technology, City of Seattle Hires Ginger Armbruster as Chief 
Privacy Officer (July 11, 2017) http://techtalk.seattle.gov/2017/07/11/city-of-seattle-hires-ginger-
armbruster-as-chief-privacy-officer/ [https://perma.cc/RR3S-YGZD]. 
215. To date, Seattle has published nine PIAs. Its first PIA assesses a smart metering pilot project 
referred to as the Seattle City Light Advanced Metering Initiative (AMI). See infra text accompanying 
notes 362–67.  
216. PRIVACY PROGRAM BROCHURE, supra note 212, at 35 (stating that data not falling under the 
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However, a year after announcing the Privacy Principles, the city began 
consolidating all information technology (IT) employees and tasks into a 
new IT department, with the goal of “establish[ing] consistent standards 
and priorities for IT investments” and protecting city resources against 
threats, “especially related to security and privacy risks.”217 This 
consolidation covers the IT activities of the SPD as well as civilian 
departments.218 Thus, it would appear that all technologies acquired or 
used by the SPD are covered either by the revised surveillance ordinance 
or the city’s Privacy Program. 
The Open Data Program—Beginning in 2010 with its Open Data 
Program and data.seattle.gov portal, Seattle has led the nation in its 
embrace of public data sharing and open access datasets.219 Former Mayor 
Murray expanded the program to all city agencies and departments in 
February 2016 when he announced a citywide Open Data Policy that 
makes all city data “open by preference”—meaning that the city favors 
making city data sets publicly available while reserving the right to 
withhold data if doing so would avoid harm to residents.220 The 2016 
executive order set limits on this default preference by making 
accessibility contingent on “screening for privacy and security 
considerations.”221 A year later, the city issued an Open Data Plan. One of 
the top five priorities in the plan was to complete a privacy risk assessment 
in partnership with the Future of Privacy Forum.222 
The Future of Privacy Forum report speaks glowingly of Seattle’s 
commitment to balancing privacy and transparency, while offering some 
recommendations for improvement.223 Specifically, the report found that 
Seattle took seriously the risks of re-identification, data quality and 
accuracy, and bias, and that the city had “largely demonstrated that its 
                                                     
Program’s protections included “[d]ata collection or use of technologies governed by the City’s 
Surveillance Ordinance (SMC 14.18)”). 
217. IT Consolidation, CITY OF SEATTLE, https://www.seattle.gov/tech/initiatives/it-consolidation 
[https://perma.cc/M55W-A7SH]. 
218. See Colin Wood, Seattle Begins Three-Year IT Consolidation, GOV’T TECH. (Nov. 30, 2015), 
https://web.archive.org/web/20170824232241/http://www.govtech.com/Seattle-Begins-Three-Year-
IT-Consolidation.html [https://perma.cc/D5BD-G8B4]. 
219. Seattle Mayor Exec. Order 2016-01 (Feb. 27, 2016), http://murray.seattle.gov/wp-
content/uploads/2016/02/2.26-EO.pdf [https://perma.cc/8VZQ-PQLE]. 
220. Id. 
221. Id.; see also FUTURE OF PRIVACY FORUM, CITY OF SEATTLE OPEN DATA RISK ASSESSMENT: 
JANUARY 2018 FINAL REPORT 6 (Jan. 2018) [hereinafter FPF SEATTLE OPEN DATA RISK 
ASSESSMENT]. 
222. SEATTLE INFO. TECH., CITY OF SEATTLE: 2017 OPEN DATA PLAN 8 (2017). 
223. FPF SEATTLE OPEN DATA RISK ASSESSMENT, supra note 221. 
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procedures and processes to address privacy risks are fully documented 
and implemented.”224 While the report also suggested that Seattle could 
do more to formalize risk assessment of data sets and engage with privacy 
concerns during the data collection phase, the report concluded the City’s 
Open Data Policy was “thoughtful and thorough” in its approach to 
protecting individual privacy and provided “a solid foundation for 
growth.”225 
B. New York City 
New York City is the wealthy, thriving financial and cultural capital of 
the United States, if not the world. It is America’s most populous city with 
an estimated 2017 population of over 8.6 million people.226 Like Seattle, 
New York City has a lower crime rate than similarly-sized cities.227 
Indeed, the city now enjoys historically low crime rates.228 In stark 
contrast with Seattle, where no major terrorist incidents have occurred, 
however, the September 11, 2001, attacks on New York City’s World 
Trade Center (WTC) by the Islamist terrorist group al-Qaeda killed 2,753 
people (including more than 400 first responders), injured thousands 
more, and caused an estimated $60 billion in damage to the WTC site, 
surrounding buildings, infrastructure, and subway facilities.229 The attacks 
changed many things in the city, including how the NYPD understood its 
mission.230 Following 9/11, then Police Commissioner Raymond A. Kelly 
quickly shifted NYPD resources from crime-fighting to counter-
terrorism.231 He established the first local Counter-Terrorism Bureau and 
expanded the existing Intelligence Bureau; he also recruited a Marine 
Corps general to run the former and a senior Central Intelligence Agency 
(CIA) official to take charge of the latter,232 and created a controversial 
                                                     
224. Id. at 4. 
225. Id. at 23–26. For a case study of open data in Seattle, see Whittington et al., supra note 23. 
226. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, ANNUAL ESTIMATES, supra note 121. 
227. Jen Kirby, New York City Had a Record-Low Crime Rate in 2016—But That’s Not the Story 
in Other Cities, N.Y. MAG: DAILY INTELLIGENCER (Jan. 4, 2017), 
http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2017/01/new-york-city-had-record-low-crime-rate-in-
2016.html [https://perma.cc/MJ8Z-L6UY]. 
228. Ashley Southall, Crime in New York City Plunges to a Level Not Seen Since the 1950s, N.Y. 
TIMES (Dec. 27, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/27/nyregion/new-york-city-crime-
2017.html (last visited Oct. 27, 2018).   
229. 9/11: Fast Facts About September 11, CNN (Sept. 11, 2015, 1:56 PM), 
https://cw33.com/2015/09/11/911-fast-facts-about-september-11/ [https://perma.cc/3EY6-Z3XS].  
230. KELLY, supra note 53, at 176. 
231. Id. 
232. Id. at 166, 171. 
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Demographics Unit, which was disbanded after being accused of spying 
on Muslim communities.233 In his book, Vigilance, Kelly argues that these 
and related decisions helped to avert sixteen “active terror plots” during 
the almost twelve years of his second term as police commissioner.234 
In New York City, the mayor appoints the chief of police, who serves 
at the mayor’s pleasure.235 The NYPD is the largest police force in the 
country, with over 36,000 sworn officers (about forty-two officers per 
10,000 residents) and a 2016 budget of over $5 billion236 out of a total city 
budget in 2016 of more than $80 billion.237 Like Seattle, New York City 
is very liberal238; the state is less so.239 Elected officials in New York City 
are partisan, and sometimes fiercely so, even between different factions 
of the same party. Although the present mayor, Bill de Blasio, is the first 
Democratic mayor since 1993,240 he and Democratic Governor Andrew 
Cuomo do not always see eye to eye.241 
The NYPD has a checkered history with respect to both political 
surveillance and biased policing. In 1981, the city settled a decade-long 
class action filed by members of various peace and black activist 
organizations alleging police infiltration of their groups and intimidation 
of, and spying on, their members.242 The settlement decree outlined a 
                                                     
233. See Matt Apuzzo & Joseph Goldstein, New York Drops Unit That Spied on Muslims, N.Y. 
TIMES (Apr. 15, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/16/nyregion/police-unit-that-spied-on-
muslims-is-disbanded.html [https://perma.cc/2ZKQ-ZEPL]. 
234. KELLY, supra note 53, at 208–56 (discussing his 2002–2013 term). 
235. N.Y. CITY CHARTER, § 431(a) (2018). 
236. N.Y. CITY COUNCIL, REPORT ON THE FISCAL 2017 EXECUTIVE BUDGET: NEW YORK POLICE 
DEP’T 1–2 (May 23, 2016), http://council.nyc.gov/budget/wp-
content/uploads/sites/54/2016/06/nypd.pdf [https://perma.cc/6Q8D-5VEJ]. 
237. Press Release, City of New York, Mayor de Blasio Releases FY 2017 Executive Budget (Apr. 
26, 2016), http://www1.nyc.gov/office-of-the-mayor/news/396-16/fact-sheet-mayor-de-blasio-
releases-fy-2017-executive-budget#/0 [https://perma.cc/TE29-QY7D]. 
238. Tausanovitch & Warshaw, supra note 127, at 609 fig.1 (identifying N.Y.C. as the eighth most 
liberal city in the country). 
239. See N.Y. STATE BD. OF ELECTIONS, NYSVOTER ENROLLMENT BY COUNTY, PARTY 
AFFILIATION AND STATUS (Apr. 1, 2016), 
https://www.elections.ny.gov/NYSBOE/enrollment/county/county_apr16.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/PBK6-UE6W]. 
240. Michael Barbaro & David W. Chen, De Blasio Is Elected New York City Mayor in Landslide, 
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 5, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/06/nyregion/de-blasio-is-elected-new-
york-city-mayor.html (last visited Oct. 27, 2018). 
241. Elizabeth Mitchell, Cuomo vs. de Blasio: How a Friendly, Airtight Relationship Between the 
Democratic Heavyweights Turned Ugly. Is It Beyond Repair?, DAILY NEWS (Oct. 29, 2016), 
http://interactive.nydailynews.com/2016/10/inside-the-cuomo-deblasio-feud/index.html (last visited 
Oct. 27, 2018). 
242. Handschu v. Special Servs. Div., 605 F. Supp. 1384, 1417 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), aff’d, 787 F.2d 
828 (2d Cir. 1986).  
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series of intelligence reforms known as the Handschu Guidelines, which 
imposed restrictions on political investigations and provided for civilian 
oversight of the NYPD’s compliance. The settlement also created the 
Handschu Authority, a panel consisting of one civilian and two deputy 
commissioners, whose approval was required for investigations longer 
than thirty days.243 
In 2003, the Southern District of New York agreed to modify the 
guidelines in the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attacks.244 The 2003 Modified 
Handschu Guidelines, among other things, abolished the Authority’s 
approval role and reduced its function to public complaint investigations 
and record reviews.245 But this did not end the long-running controversy 
over NYPD spying on political (and religious) activity. In 2011, the 
Associated Press ran a series of articles demonstrating extensive NYPD 
surveillance and attempted infiltration of local Muslim communities and 
mosques,246 which resulted in a new lawsuit and still further revisions to 
the modified guidelines.247 
Nor have NYPD’s stop-and-frisk practices fared well in the courts. In 
2013, a federal judge found the practices unconstitutional, concluding that 
they violated New Yorkers’ rights to be free from unreasonable searches 
and seizures and that the practices were racially discriminatory.248 To 
remedy these violations, Judge Shira Scheindlin ordered a court-
appointed monitor to oversee a series of reforms to NYPD policing 
practices and also created a mechanism for soliciting input from a variety 
of stakeholders, including the minority communities most directly 
affected by these practices. More recently, the court approved a pilot 
program that would outfit 1,200 police officers with body-worn 
cameras.249 
                                                     
243. Id. at 1420–24. 
244. Handschu v. Special Servs. Div., 273 F. Supp. 2d 327, 349 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).  
245. Id. at 350 (detailing modified guidelines approved by the court). 
246. For a list of relevant references, see FRIEDMAN, supra note 67, at 377 n.4, 378 n.8.  
247. David Kimball-Stanley, Settling for More: The NYPD’s New Oversight Deal, LAWFARE (Mar. 
8, 2017, 11:49 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/settling-more-nypds-new-oversight-deal 
[https://perma.cc/3E6Z-NRH6].  
248. Joseph Goldstein, Judge Rejects New York’s Stop-and-Frisk Policy, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 12, 
2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/13/nyregion/stop-and-frisk-practice-violated-rights-judge-
rules.html (last visited Oct. 27, 2018).  
249. Ashley Southall, Judge Clears Way for Police Body Cameras in New York, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 
21, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/21/nyregion/judge-police-body-cameras-new-
york.html?_r=0 (last visited Oct. 27, 2018). For a discussion of the NYPD’s body camera policy, see 
infra text accompanying note 279–304.  
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Finally, there have been dozens of NYPD incidents involving excessive 
use of force, including the July 2014 death of Eric Garner after a NYPD 
officer put him in a chokehold, an incident that was captured on a cell 
phone video showing Garner yelling “I can’t breathe.”250 Three weeks 
later, a police officer in Ferguson, Missouri shot an unarmed black 
teenager named Michael Brown, leading to nationwide protests and the 
birth of the Black Lives Matter movement.251 
1. New York City’s Public Security Privacy Guidelines and Proposed 
Surveillance Ordinance 
The DAS Guidelines—One of the steps Commissioner Kelly took to 
help protect New Yorkers against future terrorist attacks was creation of 
the DAS (Domain Awareness System), described above. The New York 
City Charter grants the NYPD plenary power to preserve order and 
enforce criminal law. The NYPD created the DAS by exercising that 
power, without need for any additional authority or direction by the city 
council.252 However, the team responsible for developing and 
implementing the DAS anticipated that wide-scale police surveillance of 
public spaces would raise significant privacy concerns.253 Accordingly, 
they released draft privacy guidelines for a thirty-day comment period in 
2009,254 and later that spring, published revised guidelines in final form.255 
The DAS guidelines established policies and procedures serving two 
main goals: “to limit the authorized use of the Domain Awareness System 
and to provide for limited access to and proper disposition of stored 
data.”256 In keeping with the former, the guidelines prohibit targeting or 
                                                     
250. Al Baker et al., Beyond the Chokehold: The Path to Eric Garner’s Death, N.Y. TIMES (June 
13, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/14/nyregion/eric-garner-police-chokehold-staten-
island.html (last visited Oct. 27, 2018).  
251. Josh Hafner, How Michael Brown’s Death, Two Years Ago, Pushed #BlackLivesMatter into 
a Movement, USA TODAY (Aug. 8, 2016, 7:50 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation-
now/2016/08/08/how-michael-browns-death-two-years-ago-pushed-blacklivesmatter-into-
movement/88424366/ [https://perma.cc/224Q-FAZA].  
252. N.Y. CITY CHARTER § 435(a) (2018). 
253. See N.Y. POLICE DEP’T, PUBLIC SECURITY PRIVACY GUIDELINES (2009) [hereinafter NYPD 
PRIVACY GUIDELINES], http://www.nyc.gov/html/nypd/downloads/pdf/crime_prevention/ 
public_security_privacy_guidelines.pdf [https://perma.cc/2VDT-FNMX]. 
254. N.Y. Police Dep’t, Press Release, New York City Police Department Releases a Draft of the 
Public Security Privacy Guidelines for Public Comment (Feb. 25, 2009), 
http://www.nyc.gov/html/nypd/downloads/pdf/crime_prevention/PressRelease-
DraftPublicSecurityPrivacyGuidelines.pdf [https://perma.cc/mpr9-xjsl]. 
255. NYPD PRIVACY GUIDELINES, supra note 253. 
256. Id. at 1. 
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monitoring by the DAS solely based on actual or perceived membership 
in protected categories, which are very broadly defined.257 Additionally, 
while the DAS may be used to monitor public areas and activities “where 
no legally protected reasonable expectation of privacy exists,” this must 
be limited to certain enumerated counter-terrorism purposes258; secondary 
uses beyond counterterrorism purposes and data sharing with a third-party 
require approval by a high ranking official.259 
The DAS guidelines also adopt safeguards protecting the security of all 
sensitive data; limiting database access to authorized personnel who have 
received privacy training and signed a confidentiality agreement; and 
requiring the creation of an immutable data logs, which are subject to 
periodic compliance reviews by a NYPD integrity control officer.260 
Finally, data gathered via the DAS is typically destroyed at the end of an 
(unspecified) retention period for “routine review” unless further retention 
is approved (under unspecified criteria), and retention periods are 
established for different classes of data.261 
The NYPD developed the DAS guidelines voluntarily using an 
informal version of notice-and-comment rulemaking.262 This 
“rulemaking” procedure is hard to assess because there is no public record 
of the number of comments submitted, their content, or the NYPD’s 
response. However, the comments of the Constitution Project are publicly 
available and give some idea of how civil libertarians viewed the DAS 
guidelines.263 
The DAS guidelines take some important steps toward protecting 
privacy rights and civil liberties. While the NYPD deserves credit for 
developing the guidelines and even requesting comments, its informal 
approach to rulemaking only partially satisfies the City Administrative 
Procedure Act, which requires an agency proposing a rule to notify the 
public of the proposed rule, hold a public hearing to provide an 
                                                     
257. Id. at 3. 
258. Id. at 2–3. 
259. Id. at 4. 
260. Id. at 6–7. 
261. For example, the current retention periods are thirty days for video, five years for metadata 
related to the DAS, and five years for ALPR data. Id. at 2–4. 
262. NYPD, Press Release, New York City Police Department Releases a Draft of the Public 
Security Privacy Guidelines for Public Comment, supra note 254.  
263. See Sharon Bradford Franklin, CONSTITUTION PROJECT, Comments of the Constitution 
Project Regarding the New York City Police Department’s Proposed Public Security Privacy 
Guidelines for the Domain Awareness System (Apr. 6, 2009), http://www.constitutionproject.org/wp-
content/uploads/2012/09/137.pdf [https://perma.cc/VE26-SGR3] (suggesting needed improvements 
related to retention, access and auditing).  
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opportunity for public comment, review testimony including any written 
comments, and modify the rule, if necessary, before issuing a final rule.264 
Furthermore, the DAS guidelines are quite weak in two key areas beyond 
the concerns raised above. First, the guidelines fail to specify the criteria 
for approving data sharing with third-parties. Specifically, they do not 
address data-sharing arrangements with federal agencies such as DHS, 
which awarded New York a $25 million grant to help pay for the DAS 
and may have sought access to data in return.265 Second, the guidelines 
provide for very limited oversight. They require periodic reviews of audit 
logs to ensure compliance with the stated rules, but NYPD 
counterterrorism officials conduct these reviews, which do not appear to 
be shared with the city council, the mayor’s office, the general public, or 
with any externally-appointed oversight commission.266 Enhanced 
transparency and oversight seem all the more necessary in light of the fact 
that the rules do not create any private right of action and lack other 
enforcement mechanisms. 
The POST Act—On March 1, 2017, the New York City Council 
introduced a bill requiring the NYPD to disclose information about the 
high-tech surveillance tools it deploys for counterterrorism and law 
enforcement purposes.267 The bill, called the Public Oversight of Police 
Technology (POST) Act, requires the reporting and evaluation of 
surveillance technologies used by the NYPD and broadly defines such 
technologies as any “equipment, software, or system capable of, or used 
or designed for, collecting, retaining, processing, or sharing audio, video, 
location, thermal, biometric, or similar information, that is operated by or 
at the direction of the department.”268 More specifically, the POST Act 
                                                     
264. See Rulemaking Process 101, N.Y.C., http://rules.cityofnewyork.us/content/rulemaking-
process-101 [https://perma.cc/4EP4-6HLM]. 
265. In October 2007, the New York Civil Liberties Union submitted a Freedom of Information 
Law (FOIL) request for documents relating to New York City’s plan to implement an earlier version 
of the DAS. The request included documents transmitted between the NYPD and DHS including, 
among other things, “the extent to which the information will be shared with other law enforcement 
agencies or other entities.” N.Y. Civil Liberties v. N.Y.C. Police Dep’t, 2009 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 2542, 
at *3 (Sup. Ct. Jun. 26, 2009). The NYPD denied the FOIL request, and the denial was upheld despite 
a legal challenge. Id. at *9, *13–14. 
266. N.Y. POLICE DEP’T, PRIVACY GUIDELINES, supra note 253, at 7. 
267. Erin Durkin, NYC Lawmaker Pushes Bill to Make NYPD Unveil All High-Tech Surveillance 
Tools Used, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Feb. 28, 2017), http://www.nydailynews.com/news/politics/pol-
pushes-bill-nypd-unveil-high-tech-surveillance-tools-article-1.2985193 [https://perma.cc/8TH2-
3EP7].  
268. Public Oversight of Surveillance Technology Act, N.Y.C. Council, Int. No. 1482 (as 
introduced Mar. 1, 2017) [hereinafter POST Act], 
https://legistar.council.nyc.gov/LegislationDetail.aspx?ID=2972217&GUID=0D8289B8-5F08-
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requires the NYPD to issue a surveillance impact and use policy (the “SIU 
Policy”), which must describe the capabilities of covered surveillance 
technologies.269 It also requires the NYPD to adopt policies relating to the 
retention, access, and use of data collected by such technology and any 
data sharing with local, state, federal, or private entities; safeguards and 
security measures designed to protect the information collected; internal 
audit and oversight mechanisms; and health and safety effects.270 Upon 
publication of the draft SIU Policy, the Act requires a public comment 
period and consideration of these comments by the police commissioner, 
who then provides the final version of the policy to the city council, the 
mayor, and the public.271 Finally, the bill requires the inspector general 
for the NYPD to audit the SIU Policy to ensure compliance with its terms 
and to recommend any revisions of the policy.272 
Unlike the surveillance ordinances adopted in Seattle and other cities, 
the POST Act is not the product of any public outcry over newly-installed 
surveillance systems. Rather, the NYPD developed the DAS guidelines to 
head off privacy concerns, so the POST Act may reflect some 
combination of its sponsors’ political ambitions and their reluctance to tie 
the hands of a police department that foiled numerous terrorist attacks in 
the years following 9/11.273 
Clearly, the POST Act improves upon the DAS guidelines by imposing 
comprehensive reporting and oversight of all NYPD use of surveillance 
technologies. But this proposed local law is much weaker than its Seattle 
counterpart. It requires the NYPD Commissioner to prepare the SIU 
Policy after public comment and provide it to the city council and mayor, 
but does not require approval prior to any use of the technology in 
question.274 While the POST Act forces the NYPD to become more 
transparent, it dispenses with enforcement mechanisms or penalties for 
non-compliance. Unlike the SPD, which did not oppose the Seattle 
ordinance, the NYPD condemned the POST Act on the grounds that its 
detailed descriptions of surveillance technologies would aid terrorists and 
criminals by disclosing “all sorts of confidential information about how 
these lawful surveillance techniques work.”275 The Bill’s sponsors and 
                                                     
4E6F-A0D1-2120EF7A0DCA (last visited Nov. 21, 2018). 
269. Id. § 1. 
270. Id.  
271. Id. 
272. Id. § 2. 
273. KELLY, supra note 53, at 208–56. 
274. POST Act, supra note 268, § 2. 
275. Ben Kochman & Erin Durkin, NYPD Officials Argue ‘Very Bad’ City Council Bill Would Aid 
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supporters rejected this criticism as wildly overblown, noting that “[t]he 
NYPD always resists transparency measures” and that it is unhelpful to 
mischaracterize the Bill as requiring the NYPD to disclose “operational 
details” on its technology.276 As the Brennan Center pointed out, “the 
federal government routinely discloses its ground rules for using new 
technologies and strongly encourage[s] local agencies to be open to the 
public about the surveillance technologies they use.”277 The POST Act did 
not pass in 2017 but the Council introduced an identical bill early in 2018, 
which is still pending.278 
The Body Camera Policy—In New York City, the police department 
was under somewhat fewer constraints than the SPD in establishing its 
own body-worn camera program. To begin with, New York is a “one-
party” state and thereby avoids all party consent issues, so there is no need 
to obtain consent from other parties to a communication.279 Additionally, 
the state public disclosure law does not require the NYPD to engage in 
massive release of police video footage.280 Although the city council 
introduced a bill and held hearings in 2014 to create a task force to study 
disclosure issues, the bill did not advance.281 
In 2014, prior to launching this mandatory pilot project, the NYPD 
conducted a small pre-pilot program in which fifty-four patrol officers 
volunteered to wear body cameras. Its purpose was to test body camera 
equipment, enhance NYPD’s understanding of the information 
                                                     
Terrorists in Working Around High-Tech Surveillance Tools, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Mar. 1, 2017), 
http://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/nypd-officials-bill-terrorists-dodge-surveillance-article-
1.2986286 [https://perma.cc/U4JX-VBQE]. 
276.  Id. 
277. Michael Price, New York City Is Making Its Citizens Safer by Overseeing Police Technology, 
BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE (Apr. 3, 2017), https://www.brennancenter.org/blog/new-york-city-
making-its-citizens-safer-overseeing-police-technology [https://perma.cc/WR5M-EF7M] (noting 
that DOJ and DHS have published policies on their use of “Stingrays” and that DHS has also been 
open about its use of facial recognition technologies and ALPRs); see also Written Testimony of 
Michael Price, Counsel for the Brennan Center for Justice, Hearing before the N.Y.C. Council Comm. 
on Pub. Safety (June 14, 2017), https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/analysis/Brennan-
Center-Testimony-to-NYC-Council-on-Int-1482.pdf [https://perma.cc/L59H-AHXV]. 
278. N.Y.C. Council, Int. No. 487 (as introduced Feb. 14, 2018), 
https://legistar.council.nyc.gov/LegislationDetail.aspx?ID=3343878&GUID=996ABB2A-9F4C-
4A32-B081-D6F24AB954A0&Options=ID|Text|&Search=487 (last visited Nov. 21, 2018) 
279. N.Y. Penal Law §§ 250.00-.05. 
280. See N.Y. POLICE DEP’T, NYPD RESPONSE TO PUBLIC AND OFFICER INPUT ON THE 
DEPARTMENT’S PROPOSED BODY-WORN CAMERA POLICY 24–26 (2017), 
https://www1.nyc.gov/assets/nypd/downloads/pdf/public_information/body-worn-camera-policy-
response.pdf [https://perma.cc/U5AD-HNKW]. 
281. N.Y.C. Council, Int. No. 607 (2014), http://legistar.council.nyc.gov/LegislationDetail.aspx? 
ID=2103584&GUID=632A9A91-7FD5-424A-880D-7A4E0A8AD0B2 [last visited Nov. 21, 2018].  
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technology infrastructure necessary to support it, and gain insight on 
matters of policy and practical implementation.282 The NYPD then issued 
Operations Order 48, which unilaterally set the rules for officers 
participating in this small pre-pilot.283 In July 2015, the Inspector General 
for the New York City Police Department (OIG-NYPD), a unit of the 
Department of Investigation that operates independently of the NYPD, 
published an initial assessment of the pre-pilot and recommended several 
changes to the program prior to citywide implementation.284 
This activity occurred in the shadow of Floyd v. City of New York,285 a 
landmark federal class action lawsuit addressing the NYPD’s 
controversial stop-and-frisk policies.286  The federal court and the 
appointed monitor overseeing the stop-and-frisk settlement played a 
significant role in supervising the body-worn camera pilot project.287 After 
the pre-pilot ended, and in preparation for distributing body-worn cameras 
more broadly as required by Floyd, the NYPD met with a broad range of 
stakeholders to obtain feedback; then revised its body-worn camera 
policy, sharing the proposed revisions with the police unions.288 The 
Department also sought the assistance of the Policing Project at New York 
University (NYU) School of Law and the NYU Marron Institute to solicit 
public input on the draft policy from both members of the public and 
police officers, respectively.289 At the close of the comment period, more 
                                                     
282. See N.Y. POLICE DEP’T, OPERATIONS ORDER 48, PILOT PROGRAM-USE OF BODY-WORN 
CAMERAS (2014). 
283. Id.; see also OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN. FOR THE NYPD, BODY-WORN CAMERAS IN 
NYC: AN ASSESSMENT OF NYPD’S PILOT PROGRAM AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO PROMOTE 
ACCOUNTABILITY 45–52 (2015) [hereinafter OIG-NYPD, BODY-WORN CAMERAS], 
http://www1.nyc.gov/assets/oignypd/downloads/pdf/nypd-body-camera-report.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/RW9F-TYVD].  
284. See OIG-NYPD, BODY-WORN CAMERAS, supra note 283, at 9–36. 
285. 959 F. Supp. 2d 668 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
286. See generally id. For other examples of stop-and-frisk class actions, see Ligon v. City of New 
York, 925 F. Supp. 2d 478 (S.D.N.Y. 2013), and Davis v. City of New York, 296 F.R.D. 158 
(S.D.N.Y. 2015). 
287. Floyd, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 676. 
288. See Peter Zimroth, Memorandum Regarding Approval of Policies for NYPD Body-Worn 
Camera Pilot Program at 5–7 (Apr. 11, 2017), 
https://ccrjustice.org/sites/default/files/attach/2017/04/Monitor%204%2011%202017%20Memo%2
0to%20Court%20re%20Approval%20of%20BWC%20Op%20Order..pdf [https://perma.cc/SY4R-
TU7B].  
289. Id. at 6; see also POLICING PROJECT, N.Y.U. SCHOOL OF LAW, REPORT TO THE NYPD 
SUMMARIZING PUBLIC FEEDBACK ON ITS PROPOSED BODY-WORN CAMERA POLICY (2017), 
https://static1.squarespace.com/static/58a33e881b631bc60d4f8b31/t/59ce7edfb0786914ba448d82/1
506705121578/Report+to+the+NYPD+Summarizing+Public+Feedback+on+BWC+Policy.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/Q7PG-SB4K]; JONATHAN STEWART, NYU MARRON INST. OF URBAN MGMT., 
REPORT ON THE NYPD OFFICER BODY-WORN CAMERA QUESTIONNAIRE (Feb. 21, 2017), 
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than 25,000 members of the public and more than 5,400 uniformed 
officers had participated.290 
The Department then made several changes to its proposed policy 
based on the feedback received through the comment process.291 These 
included requiring rather than merely encouraging notice to individuals 
being recorded; adding “inventory searches” and “public interactions that 
escalate and become adversarial” to the list of events where recording is 
required; providing additional direction regarding the circumstances when 
an officer may view a recording related to a serious use of force or an 
allegation of misconduct; increasing the retention period from six months 
to one year; and requiring periodic inspections/audits to ensure 
compliance with the Department’s procedures in the use of cameras and 
the resulting footage.292 However, the NYPD did not accept the public’s 
recommendations that more police interactions should be recorded, that 
officers should not be able to view body camera footage before writing a 
report on a use-of-force incident, and that body camera footage should be 
more readily accessible.293 
NYPD body camera footage is a public record and thus subject to New 
York’s freedom of information law (FOIL).294 In comparison with 
Washington state’s PRA, FOIL takes a more expansive view of when an 
unwarranted invasion of privacy exempts a public record from 
disclosure.295 For example, when a TV station recently requested the 
release of NYPD body camera footage, the court delayed approval 
pending a hearing to determine whether reviewing and redacting the 
videos would be unduly burdensome.296 In addition, civil rights and police 
reform advocates have expressed concerns about whether the NYPD 
                                                     
https://marroninstitute.nyu.edu/uploads/content/NYPD_Officer_BWC_Questionnaire_Report.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/GR8M-T7YM].  
290. Zimroth, supra note 288, at 7. 
291. See N.Y. POLICE DEP’T, supra note 280, at 4–25. The revised draft policy is available at N.Y. 
POLICE DEP’T, DRAFT OPERATIONS ORDER: PILOT PROGRAM—USE OF BODY-WORN CAMERAS 
(Mar. 22, 2017), https://www1.nyc.gov/assets/ccrb/downloads/pdf/investigations_pdf/oo_16_17.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/3QXB-CVWN].  
292. N.Y. POLICE DEP’T, NYPD RESPONSE TO PUBLIC AND OFFICER INPUT ON THE 
DEPARTMENT’S PROPOSED BODY-WORN CAMERA POLICY, supra note 280, at 1. 
293. Barry Friedman & Maria Ponomarenko, Pulling the Public into Police Accountability, 
GOTHAM GAZETTE (Apr. 13, 2017), http://www.gothamgazette.com/opinion/6869-pulling-the-
public-into-police-accountability [https://perma.cc/ZBC7-U95C] (commending the NYPD, however, 
for the process it followed in obtaining public input).  
294. N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW §§ 84–90 (McKinney 2018). 
295. See id. § 87(2)(b). 
296. See Time Warner Cable News NY1 v. N.Y.C. Police Dep’t, 53 Misc. 3d 657 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
2016). 
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might alternatively rely on New York State’s Civil Rights Law section 
50-a297 to block requests from news reporters or advocacy groups for the 
release of body-worn camera footage under FOIL.298 This provision treats 
as confidential any personnel records of police officers used to evaluate 
performance toward continued employment and promotion.299 In short, 
the NYPD is less exposed to massive requests for body camera footage 
than the SPD—and it knows it.300 
In April 2017, the monitor in Floyd approved the revised policy as to 
those areas within the monitor’s purview and without requiring any 
further changes.301 Ten days later, the Floyd court approved the 
deployment of body-worn cameras to 1,200 officers.302 This happened 
despite objections from the plaintiffs, who argued that the revised policy 
was likely to increase public surveillance, especially in the black and 
Latino communities that were harmed by racial profiling and aggressive 
stop-and-frisk tactics.303 Going forward, the Department will determine 
whether the cameras made a difference to officer performance, civilian 
complaints, crime levels and prosecutions, and then decide whether to 
continue expanding the program.304 
                                                     
297. N.Y. CIVIL RIGHTS LAW § 50-a (2018). 
298. See generally Meenakshi Krishnan, New York’s Section 50-a Shields Law Enforcement 
Records, YALE L. SCH. MEDIA FREEDOM & INFO. ACCESS CLINIC (Oct. 26, 2016), 
https://law.yale.edu/mfia/case-disclosed/new-yorks-section-50-shields-law-enforcement-records 
[https://perma.cc/J2YX-7R7H]. 
299. See Molloy v. N.Y.C. Police Dep’t, 50 A.D.3d 98 (N.Y. App. Div. 2008) (holding FOIL 
requests related to an investigation by the police would likely be exempt from disclosure under N.Y. 
CIVIL RIGHTS LAW § 50-a). 
300. See N.Y. POLICE DEP’T, NYPD RESPONSE TO PUBLIC AND OFFICER INPUT ON THE 
DEPARTMENT’S PROPOSED BODY-WORN CAMERA POLICY, supra note 280, at 24 (stating—in 
obvious reference to Seattle’s experiment with a YouTube channel—that FOIL “offers a process with 
privacy controls that, in our view, is far superior to the live-streaming of NYPD policing online, as 
some departments have tried to do with sometimes extremely harmful consequences”).  
301. See Southall, Judge Clears Way for Police Body Worn Cameras in New York, supra note 249. 
302. Id. 
303. See Press Release, Center for Constitutional Rights, Attorneys Challenge NYPD Body 
Camera Policy, Asks Judge to Order Changes (Apr. 25, 2017), https://ccrjustice.org/home/press-
center/press-releases/attorneys-challenge-nypd-body-camera-policy-ask-judge-order-changes 
[https://perma.cc/RCQ7-3D85]. 
304. Ashley Southall, Do Body Cameras Help Policing? 1,200 New York Officers Aim to Find Out, 
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 26, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/26/nyregion/do-body-cameras-help-
policing-1200-new-york-officers-aim-to-find-out.html?mcubz=1&_r=0 (last visited Oct. 27, 2018). 
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2. New York City Privacy Principles 
Until very recently, New York City did not undertake a privacy 
initiative of comparable breadth and depth to that of Seattle. In 2016, the 
Mayor’s Office of Technology and Innovation announced a narrow set of 
guiding principles for smart cities that were limited in scope to the use of 
sensor technologies and other IoT deployments.305 Although the privacy 
and transparency principles match up reasonably well with the FIPs, it is 
not clear if they impose binding obligations on city agencies.306 Indeed, 
the guidelines may be nothing more than recommendations, rather than 
legally enforceable obligations.307 Moreover, the IoT Guidelines seem to 
exempt law enforcement projects, noting that “[s]pecial circumstances 
and concerns may also exist for IoT systems and/or data related to public 
safety, security and law enforcement.”308 
In November 2017, however, the City Council enacted its first 
comprehensive privacy laws in the form of two bills designed to protect 
personal information collected by city employees and contractors in the 
course of providing services and benefits to local residents.309 Local 
Law 245 requires every city agency to report on their data collection, 
retention, and disclosure policies and current practices.310 It also 
establishes a Chief Privacy Officer (CPO) and interagency committee to 
review those reports and develop new, detailed protocols for protecting 
identifying information in cooperation with agency privacy officers.311 
                                                     
305. See NYC Guidelines for the Internet of Things, N.Y.C. (2018), 
https://iot.cityofnewyork.us/privacy-and-transparency/ [https://perma.cc/RFN3-Y7G9] [hereinafter 
IoT Guidelines]. 
306. The IoT Guidelines cross-reference several citywide polices and laws. For example, the 
privacy and transparency section cross-references three polices (data classification, encryption, and 
media re-use and disposal) and the NYC Open Data Law. Id. The guidelines do not refer to any 
citywide privacy policies or laws. Id. 
307. See Guidelines for the Internet of Things: FAQ, N.Y.C. (2018), 
https://iot.cityofnewyork.us/faq/ [https://perma.cc/5PA3-EP6G] (describing the IoT Guidelines as 
supplemental and noting that “[c]ity agencies are responsible for implementing and enforcing the 
guidelines when deploying and managing IoT projects”).  
308. Id.  
309. Prior to their enactment, the city had several laws and policies in place imposing mandatory 
security standards relating to personal information and creating the position of Chief Information 
Security Officer, but no privacy laws as such. For a description of these policies, see generally 
Cybersecurity Requirements for Vendors & Contractors, N.Y.C. (2018), 
https://www1.nyc.gov/site/doitt/business/it-security-requirements-vendors-contractors.page 
[https://perma.cc/X736-APXD].  
310. N.Y.C. Council, Local Law 245, Int. No. 1557-A (2017) (codified at N.Y.C. CHARTER § 8 
and N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE §§ 23-1203, 23-1204, 23-1205 (2018)). 
311. Id. 
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Local Law 247312 requires city employees and contractors to protect all 
identifying information by limiting collection, disclosure, and retention, 
except where required by law.313 Requests for the collection or disclosure 
of identifying information are processed by a newly established privacy 
officer within each agency who analyzes whether the collection or 
disclosure furthers the purpose or mission of the agency. 
These new laws, which took effect in June 2018, are best understood 
through the lens of several citywide initiatives and programs that preceded 
and shaped them. For example, in 2008, the mayor’s office launched an 
initiative known as HHS-Connect to provide “a more complete 
understanding of clients’ needs and enable more efficient and effective 
service delivery.”314 HHS-Connect achieves this goal through data 
integration and exchange among multiple health and human services 
agencies. Participating agencies sign an “Inter-Agency Data Exchange 
Agreement” that, among other things, ensures the protection and 
confidentiality of all data exchanged or accessed by HHS-Connect 
systems.315 A few years later, the city enacted the Open Data Law, 
mandating that by the end of 2018, the city make all “public” data sets 
freely available on a single web portal (i.e., any comprehensive collection 
of data that is maintained on a computer system by or on behalf of a city 
agency).316 This law does not explicitly address data protection issues. 
Thereafter, the mayor issued an executive order creating the Mayor’s 
Office of Data Analytics (MODA). MODA’s responsibilities include 
collaborative, data-driven solutions, a citywide data platform, oversight 
for data projects, and implementation of the Open Data Law.317 MODA 
also uses “analytics tools to prioritize risk more strategically, deliver 
services more efficiently, enforce laws more effectively and increase 
transparency,” and has undertaken several initiatives—none of which 
emphasize maintaining privacy.318 
                                                     
312. N.Y.C. Council, Local Law 247, Int. No. 1588-A (Dec. 17, 2017) (codified at N.Y.C. ADMIN. 
CODE §§ 23-1201, 23-1202). 
313. Id. 
314. N.Y.C. Mayor Exec. Order No. 114 (Mar. 18, 2008), 
http://www.nyc.gov/html/om/pdf/eo/eo_114.pdf [https://perma.cc/9KES-F39G].  
315. Inter-Agency Data Exchange Agreement, Agencies of the City of N.Y. (Nov. 2010), 
https://www1.nyc.gov/assets/hpd/downloads/pdf/interagency-
mous/mou_between_hpd_and_city_agencies_for_hhs_connect.pdf [https://perma.cc/CDQ6-PSEF].  
316. N.Y.C. Council, Local Law 11, Int. No. 29-A (Mar. 7, 2012) (codified at N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE 
§ 23-501 et seq.). 
317. N.Y.C. Mayor Exec. Order No. 306 (Apr. 17, 2013), 
http://www.nyc.gov/html/om/pdf/eo/eo_306.pdf [https://perma.cc/EJF5-KSWA].  
318. About the Office of Data Analytics, N.Y.C. (2018), 
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In 2015, the City Council held hearings on a proposed local law that 
would have required each city agency that collects personal information 
to develop a system to protect the privacy of that information. Agencies 
would have to adopt appropriate administrative, technical and physical 
safeguards to ensure the confidentiality of personal records and destroy 
those records once the purpose of collecting that information was 
achieved.319 The bill did not advance, mainly because the mayor’s office 
objected, stating that the bill would “inadvertently impede the delivery of 
critically needed services to New Yorkers . . . through legally authorized 
inter-agency data exchanges that are facilitated through technology.”320 
The new privacy laws enacted in 2017 overcome this objection by 
balancing the privacy interests of those who rely on human services 
against the City’s strong commitment to deliver these services in an 
efficient and effective manner. 
Thus, the new laws set policies restricting the collection and disclosure 
of identifying information but also contain provisions facilitating data 
sharing in routine circumstances or where it serves the best interests of the 
City.321 City agencies also must require contractors and subcontractors 
that obtain identifying information to apply these collection, disclosure, 
and retention requirements.322 Another important goal of the new laws is 
to address any privacy concerns that might deter residents from seeking 
city services by defining “identifying information” in very broad terms.323 
Most definitions of personal information refer mainly to specific 
identifiers that may be used (individually or in combination) to identify or 
locate an individual (e.g., name, address, contact information, license 
plate numbers, and biometrics). In contrast, the term “identifying 
information” refers to identifiers as well as information related to various 
types of status including those enumerated in the NYCID program.324 The 
new law imposes additional requirements for protecting identifying 
                                                     
https://www1.nyc.gov/site/analytics/about/about-office-data-analytics.page [https://perma.cc/49LB-
HCJT]. 
319. See Personal Information Privacy, N.Y.C. Council, Int. No. 627 (as introduced Jan. 22, 2015). 
320. Written Testimony of Mindy Tarlow, Director, N.Y.C. Mayor’s Office of Operations, Hearing 
before the N.Y.C. Council Comm. on Tech. 3 (Feb. 1, 2016), 
legistar.council.nyc.gov/View.ashx?M=F&ID=4233458&GUID=87B6F563-96A0-433A-ACD8-
B36BC7371D67 [https://perma.cc/29VX-25BF]. 
321. N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE §§ 23-1202(c)-(e). 
322. See id. § 23-1202(g). 
323. See id. § 23-1201. 
324. See id. It is more common in privacy circles to refer to these status categories as “sensitive 
information,” which is a special subset of PII usually subject to additional obligations. See generally 
Paul Ohm, Sensitive Information, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. 1125 (2015). 
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information as so defined including anonymization and limitations on 
how third-parties may use such information.325 
The Open Data Program—In 2012, New York City followed 
Seattle’s lead by amending the City’s administrative code to mandate 
publication of city data online.326 The City Council has amended and 
strengthened its Open Data Law several times since,327 and an Open Data 
Team composed of members of MODA and the city information 
technology department is working with a government technology vendor 
to achieve the law’s mandates.328 
In contrast to Seattle, New York City’s open data website explicitly 
disclaims the completeness and accuracy of the city’s data for any 
particular purpose and notes that users must agree to certain terms of use 
imposed by individual agencies to access data made available on the 
central portal.329 Although the City’s Open Data Program shares many of 
the same goals as Seattle’s—transparency, accountability, economic 
growth, and generating research insights—its publications about the 
program fail to explicitly mention the privacy risks inherent in smart city 
data publication activities. While both mention similar goals at various 
points, only Seattle’s contains explicit descriptions of and plans to resolve 
privacy concerns.330 Responsibility for privacy appears to be placed in the 
hands of each individual agency rather than handled in a more centralized 
manner.331 The City appears to define privacy as beyond the scope of its 
Open Data program, noting that disclosure of information that “result[s] 
in an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy” is already exempt from 
public access under FOIL.332 Other than noting the “open by default” 
policy stops where existing privacy law begins, New York City’s strategy 
                                                     
325. N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE §§ 23-1203(3), (5). 
326. N.Y.C. Council, Local Law 11, Int. No. 29-A (mandating open data availability by the end of 
2018). 
327. See NYC OpenData: Laws and Reports, N.Y.C. (2017), 
https://opendata.cityofnewyork.us/open-data-law/ [https://perma.cc/C7WD-KZCQ] (discussing and 
citing amendments of November 2015, January 2016, and December 2017, to strengthen retention 
requirements, response timelines, and make permanent the original Open Data mandate). 
328. NYC OpenData: Overview, N.Y.C. (2017), https://opendata.cityofnewyork.us/overview/ 
[https://perma.cc/N74J-QKUY]. 
329. Id. (discussing Open Data Terms of Use). 
330. Compare id., with SEATTLE INFO. TECH., 2017 OPEN DATA PLAN, supra note 222. 
331. DEP’T OF INFO. TECH. & TELECOMM., N.Y.C., OPEN DATA POLICY AND TECHNICAL 
STANDARDS MANUAL § 4.4.2 (2016), https://www1.nyc.gov/assets/doitt/downloads/pdf/ 
nyc_open_data_tsm.pdf [https://perma.cc/ES4S-UM3X]. 
332. Id. § 4.5(b). 
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for privacy protection in open data initiatives appears, at present, to lack 
an independent privacy apparatus.333 
C. Assessing Privacy Localism in Seattle and New York City 
It is too soon to offer any serious evaluation of the ongoing experiments 
with privacy localism in Seattle and New York City. To begin with, the 
surveillance ordinances are brand new, or still in the proposal stage, and 
the privacy program in New York City is just taking effect. In Seattle, the 
privacy program is several years old but there is still not enough data to 
assess its strengths and weaknesses. When sufficient data is gathered, an 
important question will be whether cities have sufficient expertise and 
resources to engage in privacy regulation as compared to their federal and 
state counterparts. After all, cities like Seattle and New York lack the kind 
of administrative infrastructure taken for granted when Congress 
delegates rulemaking, programmatic design, and ongoing supervisory 
duties to federal agencies. These agencies rely on institutional, 
organizational, and doctrinal mechanisms to produce, review, and 
approve a high volume of rules, licenses, permits, and so on. Lacking 
these mechanisms, officials in Seattle and New York City may be 
overwhelmed by the amount of work required to produce, review and/or 
approve a high volume of privacy-related applications, assessments, and 
reports. 
A second issue is whether local surveillance laws risk isolating local 
police departments by disrupting regional and local partnerships with 
other agencies not subject to similar requirements. For example, during 
the hearings on the revised surveillance ordinance, the SPD raised 
concerns that extending the ordinance beyond surveillance technology to 
encompass surveillance data might jeopardize data sharing arrangements 
under regional partnerships for reducing gang activity and gun violence, 
and even turn Seattle into a data island.334 
Finally, cities may rely too heavily on legal—as opposed to 
technological—instruments of privacy regulation. In their study of 
privacy governance, Professors Colin Bennett and Charles Raab 
distinguish legal instruments like self-regulatory principles and statutes 
from technological instruments including “privacy by design,” i.e., cities 
                                                     
333. Id. § 3.4.1. 
334. See Gender Equity, Safe Communities, & New Americans Committee, SEATTLE CHANNEL, at 
1:21 to 1:22 (July 12, 2017), https://www.seattlechannel.org/mayor-and-council/city-
council/2016/2017-gender-equity-safe-communities-and-new-americans-committee/?videoid= 
x78884 [https://perma.cc/L4R9-L4ZM] (statement of SPD Chief Technology Officer Brian Maxey). 
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imposing design requirements on vendors or only purchasing technology 
with certain privacy protective features.335 To date, Seattle and New York 
City have relied almost exclusively on legal instruments to regulate 
technology deployments and data collection, use, and disclosure within 
their local governments and have largely done without technological 
instruments. 
At this point, however, a preliminary assessment of the surveillance 
oversight and privacy governance programs under development in Seattle 
and New York City is feasible to determine whether they achieve their 
stated purposes. Section II.C thus considers to what extent privacy 
localism contributes to what Barry Friedman calls “democratic policing” 
and closes the two privacy gaps identified above. 
1. Policing and Democratic Governance 
Much of the commentary on urban policing and related privacy issues 
is a tale of competing narratives. One narrative centers on race, crime, and 
the fight for social justice. Thus, it tends to focus on controversial or 
abusive policing practice.336 The other is a tale of terror that focuses on 
the unrelenting string of urban suicide bombings and violent assaults in 
New York, Moscow, Istanbul, Mumbai, Madrid, London, Nairobi, 
Boston, Brussels, Paris, and other cities.337 These attacks have caused tens 
of thousands of deaths and many billions of dollars of economic losses.338 
Controversial policing practices are also part of this terrorism narrative. 
They range from changes in the mission of local police forces to the use 
of new surveillance technologies under broad authorities that do not 
require any showing of particularized suspicion, and—at least in the 
United States—a new emphasis on information sharing and unified action 
across multiple levels of government via fusion centers and Joint 
Terrorism Task Forces.339 
                                                     
335. See COLIN BENNETT & CHARLES RAAB, THE GOVERNANCE OF PRIVACY 117–204 (2006). 
336. See supra text accompanying note 67.  
337. See Robert Muggah, Is Urban Terrorism the New Normal? Probably, WORLD ECON. F. (Jan. 
17, 2016), https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2016/01/is-urban-terrorism-is-the-new-normal-
probably/ [https://perma.cc/WZG6-LN2B]. 
338. This is only a partial listing and it omits smaller but frequent attacks in multiple cities in 
countries such as Afghanistan, Egypt, Iraq, Israel, Lebanon, Libya, Nigeria, and Pakistan; these too 
wreak havoc in their own devastating way. See generally Global Terrorism Database (GTD), UNIV. 
MD. (June 2017), http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/ (last visited Nov. 21, 2018) (listing statistics and 
trends in terror attacks around the world). 
339. See generally STEPHEN GRAHAM, CITIES, WAR, AND TERRORISM: TOWARDS AN URBAN 
GEOPOLITICS (2004); MICHAEL PRICE, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, NATIONAL SECURITY AND 
LOCAL POLICE (2013); Muggah, supra note 337.  
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In his recent work on democratic policing, Professor Friedman 
advances the argument that these two narratives—racial bias in police 
tactics and intelligence gathering via panvasive surveillance—are not 
isolated issues but rather two sides of a single phenomenon: the complete 
breakdown of democratic control over policing.340 Friedman begins by 
observing that due to overbroad enabling statutes, most policing occurs 
without any clear rules or policies in place; or, if they do exist, they are 
not readily accessible to the public.341 Legislators do not have much 
incentive to change this given the powerful special interest groups, like 
police unions, that have a stake in opposing such regulation and the 
political weakness of the victims of out-of-control policing, such as 
minorities and the poor.342 Finally, Friedman contends that courts have 
failed to properly supervise policing procedures mainly because judicial 
remedies, such as the exclusionary rule and damages actions, are 
ineffective.343 Moreover, judicial review is ill-equipped to deal with the 
recent shift from reactive and investigative policing based on 
particularized suspicion, to proactive and programmatic policing targeting 
larger populations and entire neighborhoods or ethnic groups, who are 
subjected to dragnet forms of surveillance.344 Friedman and Ponomarenko 
sum up these governance failures as constituting a kind “police 
exceptionalism” within the administrative state.345 Friedman contends that 
what is urgently needed to overcome police exceptionalism is not more 
oversight but rather “rules that are written before officials act, rules that 
are public, rules that are written with public participation.”346 In short, the 
democratic polity must insist on “transparent democratic processes such 
as legislative authorization and public rulemaking”347 as applied to 
policing. 
Is democratic policing an achievable goal? Friedman is undoubtedly 
correct in suggesting that recent events have forced police to do a better 
job of soliciting public input. In the wake of multiple police killings of 
African-Americans in cities across the country, police chiefs have started 
to listen to local citizens about a range of policy issues. It is more common 
                                                     
340. FRIEDMAN, supra note 67, at 6–14; see also Friedman & Ponomarenko, supra note 119. 
341. Friedman & Ponomarenko, supra note 119, at 1844. 
342. FRIEDMAN, supra note 67, at 101–03. 
343. Id. at 81–86. 
344. Friedman & Ponomarenko, supra note 119, at 1871–75; see also Renan, supra note 68; 
Slobogin, Panvasive Surveillance, supra note 68. 
345. Friedman & Ponomarenko, supra note 119, at 1837.  
346. FRIEDMAN, supra note 67, at 20. 
347. Friedman & Ponomarenko, supra note 119, at 1832.  
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than ever before for local police forces to hear from a variety of 
stakeholders (civil liberties groups and privacy advocates as well as local 
residents) before formulating policies on the use of surplus military 
equipment,348 drones,349 and body-worn cameras.350 
That said, democratic policing will not be easily achieved. Difficult 
questions will need to be addressed about how to scale public rulemaking 
to communities and police forces of various sizes. After all, there are more 
than 13,000 U.S. police departments serving both large cities and smaller 
communities—with more than half of these departments serving 
communities with fewer than 10,000 residents—and there is a high degree 
of variance in police department size.351 For example, the median local 
police department has only eight full-time officers, while the NYPD has 
36,000. The availability of model rules from various sources should help 
ease the burden of smaller communities having to draft rules from the 
ground up.352 Lastly, Friedman and Ponomarenko note that “[b]y virtue of 
their closeness to the citizenry, local governments are already adept at 
fielding input from the community, be it through school boards, zoning 
boards, arts commissions, or neighborhood councils.”353 Of course, it 
follows that local police may develop policies that vary in significant 
ways from one locale to the next, but as Friedman sees it this is “the sign 
of a healthy democratic process at work.”354 
The local surveillance ordinances described in this Article epitomize 
what Friedman has in mind by democratic policing. To begin with, the 
primary goals of the surveillance ordinances adopted (or under 
consideration) in Seattle and New York City are transparency and 
accountability, which are also the primary mechanism for achieving 
secondary goals such as adapting to changes in technology, restoring and 
maintaining public trust, and balancing public safety and civil liberties. 
Both surveillance ordinances are well-designed to achieve these goals by 
requiring the SPD and NYPD to prepare and make publicly available 
detailed reports describing their use of covered surveillance technologies 
(and surveillance data in Seattle) as well as related rules, policies, and 
practices. Such transparency allows privacy advocates to generate 
                                                     
348. FRIEDMAN, supra note 67, at 96–98. 
349. Id. at 98. 
350. Id. at 313–15. 
351. Friedman & Ponomarenko, supra note 119, at 1886–87.  
352. See generally POLICING PROJECT (2017), https://policingproject.org/ 
[https://perma.cc/YVB3-CFLH]. 
353. Friedman & Ponomarenko, supra note 119, at 1888 (emphasis added).  
354. FRIEDMAN, supra note 67, at 96.  
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politically relevant information about privacy protection. This, in turn, 
fosters research and analysis and allows advocates working behind the 
scenes to assist the SPD and NYPD in improving their practices, 
commenting on proposed uses, and, when necessary, exerting leverage 
through the threat of bad publicity.355 
The Seattle and New York City ordinances differ in two important 
respects: the former defines surveillance technology and data very broadly 
and establishes an approval process for numerous items, while the latter 
ignores data and relies solely on transparency without a separate process 
of approval by a political branch. In effect, the POST Act tries to force the 
police to “own” any decision to rely on new surveillance technology by 
requiring disclosures that might prove controversial or embarrassing if 
publicized. It is too soon to say which approach will prove more effective. 
The Seattle process gives elected representatives the final word but 
imposes significant costs and potential backlogs and delays in securing 
approvals. The New York City process may force the NYPD to beef up 
privacy protections to avoid negative publicity. But if the NYPD views a 
new surveillance technology as essential for securing public safety, it may 
be willing to absorb the bad press given the lack of political oversight. 
Moreover, since the proposed bill includes audits but no penalties for non-
compliance, the NYPD is subject to little risk if its internal cost-benefit 
calculations favor pushing the envelope to the outer boundaries of what 
the POST Act allows. 
The Seattle and New York City policies concerning the use of body-
worn cameras and the use, retention, and disclosure of related video 
footage also demonstrate the power of local policymaking. In both cities, 
a court-appointed monitor supervised the policymaking process under the 
terms of a consent decree; in Washington, state law sets minimum 
requirements for body-worn camera policies. And yet both cities engaged 
in extensive consultation with stakeholders and followed highly 
democratic processes in shaping policies that remain subject to future 
revision based on further experience and review. 
2. Closing the Public Surveillance Gap 
One of the main virtues of local surveillance ordinances is that they 
close the public surveillance gap by developing transparency and 
accountability mechanisms free of Fourth Amendment doctrinal 
constraints present in recent cases such as Jones and Carpenter. These 
mechanisms apply even when the government uses panvasive 
                                                     
355. See COLIN J. BENNETT, THE PRIVACY ADVOCATES: RESISTING THE SPREAD OF 
SURVEILLANCE 95–132 (2008) (describing these and other modes of privacy advocacy). 
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technologies. They are also independent of federal and state electronic 
surveillance laws with their obscure and outdated definitions of electronic 
communications and services. Rather, the local surveillance ordinances 
apply to (almost) all surveillance technologies, irrespective of whether 
they monitor public or private spaces. These ordinances require law 
enforcement to prepare and submit impact reports on a technology-by-
technology basis, thereby allowing elected officials or the public to 
determine whether it is appropriate for a city to acquire and use such 
technology.356 This is a remarkable and welcome development in U.S. 
surveillance law. 
How broadly do these surveillance ordinances apply? In particular, do 
they apply to video surveillance and the other components of the DAS? 
The answer both varies by city and remains to be seen based on local 
practices, interpretations, legal challenges, and political oversight. For 
example, the Seattle ordinance excludes body-worn cameras, but the SPD 
has a separate body-worn camera policy.357 The ordinance also excludes 
cameras installed for a single purpose—such as solely to record traffic 
violations, for security purposes, or to protect the physical integrity of city 
infrastructure.358 The POST Act similarly excludes “cameras installed to 
monitor and protect the physical integrity of city infrastructure.”359 These 
exceptions will have to be interpreted and applied, although they seem 
narrow enough to avoid a blanket exemption for something like the 
DAS.360 
3. Closing the Fair Information Practices Gap 
As for data governance, the two cities rely on a similar set of privacy 
principles, although Seattle’s ordinance covers collection, use, and 
disclosure limitations as well as accuracy and accountability, while New 
York City’s chiefly addresses the collection, retention, and disclosure of 
identifying and sensitive information. Seattle has a more expansive 
program than New York City, not so much in terms of breadth (both laws 
apply to all city departments) but rather in terms of depth (Seattle places 
a much a greater emphasis on PIAs). However, both the PIA process in 
Seattle and the biennial city agency reports in New York City serve a very 
                                                     
356. See supra sections II.A.1, II.B.1. 
357. See supra text accompanying notes 173–206. 
358. See supra note 161.  
359. POST Act, supra note 268.  
360. The Santa Clara County surveillance ordinance avoids this issue by defining “surveillance 
technology” in extremely broad terms and supplying examples that match up with every component 
of the DAS. See SANTA CLARA COUNTY, CAL., CODE OF ORDINANCES div. A40, § A40-7(c) (2018).  
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similar purpose to SORNs and PIAs under the federal Privacy Act and the 
related E-Government Act. As noted above, these laws apply exclusively 
to federal agencies. Furthermore, New York’s Privacy Act does not 
require any processes similar to SORNs or PIAs, whereas Washington 
does not even have a Privacy Act. Thus, it falls to the Seattle and New 
York City privacy laws to ensure that both cities take advantage of these 
processes at the local level. 
It seems likely that Seattle’s program will yield superior results to that 
of New York City’s thanks to its reliance on PIAs. To date, Seattle has 
published nine PIAs on a range of programs.361 The first PIA addressed 
smart meter deployment by Seattle City Light (the city-owned electric 
utility).362 Privacy activists initially objected to this program, fearing that 
smart meters might be “misused to act as data collection devices which 
make previously private activities inside our dwellings subject to 
unauthorized official and criminal surveillance.”363 Seattle City Light 
responded by developing an opt-out option and limiting data collection 
and transmission.364 The Seattle CPO not only prepared a PIA, but it also 
hired an outside law firm to suggest actions to mitigate potential privacy 
risks.365 Nevertheless, the ACLU-WA voiced significant concerns about 
the smart meter program, criticizing the smart meter PIA as unclear, 
inadequate, and incomplete.366 A year later, the Seattle City Council 
passed a new ordinance prohibiting the sale of utility consumers’ sensitive 
personal data and limiting its use only for utility service and related 
purposes.367 More recent PIAs have not resulted in similar controversies. 
                                                     
361. Technology Privacy Impact Assessments, CITY OF SEATTLE (Aug. 27, 2018), 
https://data.seattle.gov/City-Business/Technology-Privacy-Impact-Assessments/5mii-56rx 
[https://perma.cc/FCF6-P6VD].  
362. CITY OF SEATTLE, CITY OF SEATTLE PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT (2017), 
https://www.seattle.gov/Documents/Departments/Tech/AMI-PIA-FINAL-Rev2.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/VB47-ED7E]. 
363. See, e.g., Molly Connelly & Jan Bultmann, Seattle City Light: Seattleites Need an Opt-In 
Policy for Smart Meters, SEATTLE PRIVACY COAL. (Mar. 3, 2014), 
https://www.seattleprivacy.org/advanced-metering-devices-and-customer-choice/ 
[https://perma.cc/L95N-4YJQ]. 
364. Advanced Metering: Opt-Out Policy, CITY OF SEATTLE, http://www.seattle.gov/light/ami/opt-
out.asp [https://perma.cc/626F-H8D8]. 
365. CITY OF SEATTLE, CITY OF SEATTLE PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT, supra note 362; About 
the Privacy Program, CITY OF SEATTLE, http://www.seattle.gov/tech/initiatives/privacy/about-the-
privacy-program [https://perma.cc/38F8-MUDA].   
366. Letter from Shankar Narayan, Tech. & Liberty Project Dir., ACLU Wash., to Kshama Sawant, 
Energy & Env’t Comm. Chair, Seattle City Council (May 25, 2017) (discussing Seattle City Light’s 
Advanced Meter Program), https://www.aclu-wa.org/file/101692/download?token=ujQJA9l9 
[https://perma.cc/7TXC-VCTJ]. 
367. Seattle City Council Adopts Nation’s Strongest Law to Protect Utility Customer Personal 
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III. THE CHALLENGES OF PRIVACY LOCALISM 
As the previous discussion demonstrates, privacy localism—as 
exemplified by Seattle and New York City’s adoption of local 
surveillance laws or policies and citywide privacy principles—responds 
to longstanding deficiencies in federal and state privacy protection and 
helps close the public surveillance and fair information practices gaps in 
privacy law. Despite these achievements, privacy localism remains 
vulnerable to objections on multiple fronts. To begin with, skeptics may 
ask: why analyze local privacy regulation in terms of localism rather than 
federalism? How are they different? And even though a few cities have 
taken tentative steps to regulate local surveillance activity and local 
government data practices, do cities have sufficient power to pursue or 
sustain local solutions to pressing privacy issues? Isn’t this unlikely given 
the threat of federal or state legislation eventually preempting these local 
efforts? This Part moves beyond the details of local privacy regulation in 
Seattle and New York City to explore two conceptual challenges: the 
distinction between localism and federalism and the factors enabling 
privacy localism to sustain its momentum in face of the dual threats of 
federal preemption and limited power and immunity from state 
preemption. This Part concludes that despite these threats, privacy 
localism is more robust than one might think. 
A. Localism or Federalism? 
Cities—including Seattle and New York City—are beginning to 
experiment with innovative approaches to protecting the privacy of their 
local residents in the face of inadequate federal and state privacy laws. 
These cities understand that pervasive public surveillance and massive 
data collection erode civil liberties and engender mistrust of local 
government, including (most crucially) local police departments. And 
they recognize that the time for action is now, especially in view of the 
public surveillance gap and the fair information practices gap. 
Additionally, these innovative cities are experimenting with a novel 
approach. On the surveillance side, they are not mimicking one-off state 
laws by addressing specific invasive technologies in response to public 
outcry.368 Rather, they have devised comprehensive, iterative methods for 
reviewing all surveillance technologies prior to purchasing or deploying 
                                                     
Data, ACLU WASH. (Aug. 6, 2018), https://www.aclu-wa.org/news/seattle-city-council-adopts-
nation%E2%80%99s-strongest-law-protect-utility-customer-personal-data [https://perma.cc/VTU2-
JYYJ]. 
368. See infra section III.D.1. 
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them, using procedures that not only capture emerging technologies but 
allow cities to reassess prior decisions in light of new threat assessments 
and other changes in local conditions. On the smart city side, they are 
adopting risk-based principles and methodologies that support privacy-
protective data-sharing programs consistent with their ambitious goals to 
achieve growth, sustainability, resiliency, and equity. Finally, these cities 
are proceeding in the best tradition of local autonomy. They are 
experimenting with diverse solutions that reflect key differences in how 
their political leaders weigh the social costs of surveillance against the 
risk of catastrophic losses of a potential terrorist attack,369 or the tradeoffs 
between maximizing openness and minimizing privacy risks.370 This 
sounds a lot like federalism, or federalism with a local flavor, or perhaps 
just localism. Although the literature on federalism is vast, the following 
section briefly highlights a few key ideas and situates privacy localism 
within mainstream accounts of dual sovereignty and cooperative 
federalism. 
In Gregory v. Ashcroft,371 Justice O’Connor identified five advantages 
of “our federalism”: 
It [1] assures a decentralized government that will be more 
sensitive to the diverse needs of a heterogeneous society; [2] it 
increases opportunity for citizen involvement in democratic 
processes; [3] it allows for more innovation and experimentation 
in government; . . . [4] it makes government more responsive by 
putting the States in competition for a mobile 
citizenry . . . . Perhaps the principal benefit of the federalist 
system is [5] a check on abuses of government power.372 
Privacy localism, as described in the Seattle and New York City case 
studies, certainly exhibits diversity, increased participation, 
experimentation and innovation, responsiveness, and accountability. But 
Justice O’Connor embedded these instrumental values in a theory of 
federalism known as “dual sovereignty.”373 There are several reasons to 
                                                     
369. It is not surprising that New York City’s surveillance law contemplates a less onerous review 
process than the one adopted in Seattle, given the former’s sheer size, the number and importance of 
its landmark buildings, its losses in the 9/11 attack, and the human and symbolic importance of 
keeping the city safe from future attacks.  
370. See supra text accompanying notes 219–25 and 326–33. 
371. 501 U.S. 452 (1991). 
372. Id. at 458; see Richard Briffault, What About the ‘Ism’?” Normative and Formal Concerns in 
Contemporary Federalism, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1303, 1305 (1994) (analyzing the instrumental values 
of federalism). 
373. Gregory, 501 U.S. at 457 (“We begin with the axiom that, under our federal system, the States 
possess sovereignty concurrent with that of the Federal Government, subject only to limitations 
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disentangle these values from dual sovereignty in formulating a theory of 
privacy localism. 
To begin with, the traditional concerns of dual sovereignty have little 
bearing on privacy regulation with the exception of Reno v. Condon,374 a 
decision in which the U.S. Supreme Court rejected a Tenth Amendment 
challenge to the Driver’s Privacy Protection Act (DPPA),375 a federal law 
regulating the privacy of state motor vehicle records.376 In Condon, the 
state of South Carolina challenged the DPPA, which regulates the sale and 
distribution by state Departments of Motor Vehicles (DMVs) of personal 
information in motor vehicle records.377 The DPPA prohibits DMV 
personnel from disclosing driver’s personal information in motor vehicle 
records without the subject’s consent, requires certain disclosures of 
personal information for public safety purposes, enumerates permissible 
uses, and restricts the resale and re-disclosure of such information by 
private persons who have lawfully obtained that information from a state 
DMV.378 Apart from Condon, there is scant evidence of legislatures, 
courts, or scholars treating government restrictions on the collection, use, 
and disclosure of personal data as a power reserved to the states for their 
exclusive control or viewing federal lawmaking in this area as necessarily 
intruding upon state sovereignty.379 
In upholding the DPPA, the Condon Court overturned lower court 
decisions invalidating this law as incompatible with the anti-
commandeering doctrine as developed in New York v. United States380 and 
Printz v. United States381 The Court distinguished these cases on two 
                                                     
imposed by the Supremacy Clause.” (alteration omitted) (citing Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455, 458 
(1990)). See generally ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 256 
(5th ed. 2015). 
374. 528 U.S. 141 (2000). 
375. Driver’s Privacy Protection Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 2099 (codified as 
amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2721–2725 (2012)). 
376. Condon, 528 U.S. at 141–42.  
377. Id. 
378. Id. at 144.  
379. The privacy torts are the obvious exception. Tort law is primarily state law, not federal law. 
See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 625A (AM. LAW INST. 1977); SOLOVE & 
SCHWARTZ, INFORMATION PRIVACY LAW, supra note 1, at 32–33. However, the privacy torts play 
little role in addressing the concerns raised by local surveillance or local government data practices.   
380. 505 U.S. 144, 188 (1992) (invalidating a federal law regulating the disposal of radioactive 
wastes on the grounds that “[t]he Federal Government may not compel the States to enact or 
administer a federal regulatory program”). 
381. 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997) (striking down a federal law requiring state and local law 
enforcement personnel to conduct background checks before issuing permits for firearms and 
reaffirming that “[t]he Federal Government may neither issue directives requiring the States to 
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grounds: first, that the DPPA was prohibiting, not requiring state 
government actions; and, second, that the statute is generally applicable 
because it “regulates the universe of entities that participate as suppliers 
to the market for motor vehicle information.”382 Many commentators have 
criticized the first argument as resting on a dubious distinction between 
affirmative and negative duties.383 After all, most duties can be 
characterized either way. The second argument is more compelling, 
although as Professor Chemerinsky notes skeptically, it leaves open the 
possibility that Congress could reenact the laws at issue in New York and 
Printz “by making sure that some private conduct was regulated by them 
also.”384 But apart from this single decision, disputes over the limits of 
federal power have almost no bearing on the evolution of privacy law at 
the federal, state, or local level. 
Another problem with dual sovereignty is that it tends to evoke a 
conservative political agenda and the use of “States’ rights” to deprive 
individuals of their civil and voting rights, especially in the Jim Crow 
South.385 But as Dean Heather Gerken observes, “[i]t is a mistake to 
equate federalism’s past with its future.”386 Gerken and others have 
developed a progressive theory of federalism that not only 
reconceptualizes intergovernmental relations but also seeks to 
demonstrate the benefits of decentralization for achieving progressive 
goals.387 She argues that “[s]tate and local governments have become sites 
of empowerment for racial minorities and dissenters” who can wield more 
                                                     
address particular problems, nor command the States’ officers, or those of their political subdivisions, 
to administer or enforce a federal regulatory program”). 
382. Condon, 528 U.S. at 151. 
383. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Right Result, Wrong Reasons: Reno v. Condon, 25 OKLA. CITY 
U. L. REV. 823, 827–28 (2000). 
384. Id. at 828.  
385. Heather K. Gerken, A New Progressive Federalism, DEMOCRACY (2012), 
https://democracyjournal.org/magazine/24/a-new-progressive-federalism/ [https://perma.cc/LA5L-
BCQU]. 
386. Id. 
387. Heather K. Gerken, Keynote Address at the New York University School of Law’s Thomas 
M. Jorde Symposium: Federalism 3.0 (Mar. 1, 2017); see also Richard Thompson Ford, The New 
Blue Federalists: The Case for Liberal Federalism, SLATE (Jan. 6, 2005, 5:56 PM), 
https://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2005/01/the_new_blue_federalists.
html [https://perma.cc/2DJU-NSY2] (noting that “the legal arguments once used to invalidate liberal 
policies are equally applicable to federal laws favored by conservatives”); Ernest A. Young, Welcome 
to the Dark Side: Liberals Rediscover Federalism in the Wake of the War on Terror, 69 BROOK. L. 
REV. 1277, 1279 (2004) (analyzing state and local non-cooperation with federal anti-terrorism 
measures).  
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electoral power at the local level than at the national level, allowing them 
to become “efficacious political actors.”388 
Professor Richard Schragger makes a similar argument about the need 
to decouple “the rhetoric of decentralization” from “anti-government 
conservatives” while emphasizing the role of cities in advancing 
progressive policy developments.389 Schragger describes a surge in local 
activity across a range of controversial policy issues such as workers’ 
rights, healthcare, campaign finance, climate change, marriage equality, 
and immigration, which he attributes to two main factors: the growing 
dissatisfaction among progressives with the national responses to these 
problems and the renewed economic growth and political clout of cities.390 
In advocating for what he calls a “progressive decentralism,” he argues 
that “[t]he localness of regulatory initiatives is their greatest strength, 
permitting regulatory innovation to start small and develop as efforts are 
made and programs are improved upon.”391 Privacy localism has far more 
in common with Gerken’s “progressive federalism” and Schragger’s 
“progressive decentralism” than with stale theories of dual sovereignty. 
Schragger describes municipal policy developments that respond to 
specific political dynamics. Some policy developments (like living wage 
campaigns and health care mandates) mainly respond to the absence of 
federal or state activity.392 Others (like campaign finance, climate change, 
and marriage equality) mainly attempt to spur policy activity at higher 
levels of government by experimenting at the local level.393 Still, others 
(like immigration policy) mainly reflect tensions between federal and 
state or local authorities over which level of government controls the 
                                                     
388. Gerken, A New Progressive Federalism, supra note 385. Gerken elaborates on these themes 
in Heather K. Gerken, Dissenting by Deciding, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1745 (2005); Heather K. Gerken, 
The Supreme Court, 2009 Term—Foreword: Federalism All the Way Down, 124 HARV. L. REV. 4 
(2010). 
389. Richard C. Schragger, The Progressive City, in WHY THE LOCAL MATTERS: FEDERALISM, 
LOCALISM, AND PUBLIC INTEREST ADVOCACY 39–46 (Rachel Deutsch et al. eds., 2008). 
390. Id. at 39, 40–44.  
391. Id. at 42. 
392. Upper levels of government may be inactive due to political gridlock, uncertainty over the 
wisdom of uniform state or national treatment, or the greater salience of the issue in question in some 
localities but not others. See Richard Briffault, Local Leadership and National Issues, in WHY THE 
LOCAL MATTERS: FEDERALISM, LOCALISM, AND PUBLIC INTEREST ADVOCACY, supra note 389, at 
67, 74–79. 
393. As Professor Richard Briffault observes: “Local successes can build political support for state 
or national actions, and local failures can spark the search for different solutions.” Id. at 79. 
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relevant policy domain.394 The point is that there are not only a range of 
local policy initiatives but also many different localisms.395 
Finally, while the dual sovereignty doctrine often leads to 
constitutional disputes over the limits of federal power and hence the 
policing of federal-state relations by the U.S. Supreme Court, localism 
turns on the regulatory authority of local governments. And this mostly 
boils down to the subtle interplay of empowerment and immunity that 
local governments enjoy under state “home rule” provisions,396 which are 
discussed below in section III.C. Thus, privacy localism is far removed 
from traditional concerns over the limits of federal power or the 
desirability of maintaining separate federal and state spheres of power and 
authority. 
As to cooperative federalism, the leading alternative to dual 
sovereignty, one might expect that privacy localism would have more in 
common with this doctrine given that it seeks to capture the benefits of 
decentralization and local autonomy while preserving the primacy of the 
federal government in setting national priorities and prescribing standards 
through which to advance those priorities.397 But this is not the case. 
Cooperative federalism—and alternative accounts like Professors 
Bulman-Pozen and Gerken’s “uncooperative federalism”398 or Professor 
Davidson’s “cooperative localism”399—amount to top-down accounts of 
the role local governments play in carrying out, dissenting from, or 
modifying federal programs. In sharp contrast, privacy localism requires 
                                                     
394. See Christina M. Rodriguez, Negotiating Conflict Through Federalism: Institutional and 
Popular Perspectives, 123 YALE L.J. 2094, 2095–98 (2014). 
395. See, e.g., Joseph Blocher, Firearm Localism, 123 YALE L.J. 82, 124–29 (2013) (arguing that 
Second Amendment doctrine and state preemption laws should incorporate differences between urban 
and rural gun use and regulation); Olivier Sylvain, Broadband Localism, 73 OHIO ST. L.J. 725, 800–
11 (2012) (objecting to state laws prohibiting local governments from creating their own broadband 
infrastructure to fill the service gap left by major broadband providers); see also Nestor M. Davidson, 
Localist Administrative Law, 126 YALE L.J. 564, 596 (2017) (identifying three structural dimensions 
of local government: vertical local-state relationships; horizontal local-local relationships; and 
internal relationships within a single local government). This Article focuses almost exclusively on 
the vertical dimension. 
396. Davidson, supra note 395, at 570–71.  
397. See Nestor M. Davidson, Cooperative Localism: Federal-Local Collaboration in an Era of 
State Sovereignty, 93 VA. L. REV. 959, 966 (2007). 
398. Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Heather K. Gerken, Uncooperative Federalism, 118. YALE L.J. 1256 
(2009). The co-authors coin the term to emphasize that federal and state governments may be 
understood, not only in terms of rivalry (dual sovereignty) or collaboration (cooperative federalism), 
but also in terms of dissent and resistance.  
399. Davidson, Cooperative Localism, supra note 397. Davidson coins this term to emphasize the 
importance of direct federal-local relations as opposed to the almost exclusive interest in federal-state 
interactions that still dominates debates over dual sovereignty. 
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a bottom-up account of how local law shapes local government activity in 
connection with potential challenges and conflicts from federal and state 
law. 
A related point is that the federal government has created many privacy 
laws but has not implemented them by designing and funding federal 
regulatory programs. Obviously, there are many privacy laws addressing 
the data practices of federal agencies and specific sectors of the economy 
as well as the confidentiality of communications sought by law 
enforcement or national security agencies. But these laws do not create or 
require state officials to administer and implement federal privacy 
programs in the way that they administer and implement federal welfare, 
environmental, health care, immigration, or law enforcement programs. 
Federal regulatory programs typically work by setting standards that 
must be satisfied to obtain federal funding.400 These programs are not 
usually analyzed in terms of dual sovereignty but rather under the rubric 
of cooperative federalism, which rejects the idea of separate national and 
state spheres of powers and responsibilities in favor of more collaborative 
federal-state relationships in a variety of regulatory contexts.401 Under 
cooperative federalism, federal agencies rely on state assistance in 
carrying out federal regulatory programs. As Professor Spencer Admur 
notes, this may entail “state entities disbursing federal funds, federal and 
state regulators developing joint regulatory standards, or collaborative 
enforcement.”402 A striking feature of cooperative federalism is that 
federal agencies use “inducement strategies” to secure state and local 
assistance and aid such as solicitation, offers, trades, threats, prohibitions 
and mandates.403 These, in turn, raise numerous and complex 
constitutional issues regarding constraints on federal power under the 
commandeering prohibition and the newly-minted coercion 
                                                     
400. Medicaid is an obvious example. States operate their Medicaid programs within federal 
standards and a wide range of state options in exchange for federal matching funds. See Samantha 
Artiga et al., Current Flexibility in Medicaid: An Overview of Federal Standards and State Options, 
KFF (Jan. 31, 2017), https://www.kff.org/medicaid/issue-brief/current-flexibility-in-medicaid-an-
overview-of-federal-standards-and-state-options/ [https://perma.cc/DRM5-Y4G3]. 
401. See Philip J. Weiser, Federal Common Law, Cooperative Federalism, and the Enforcement of 
the Telecom Act, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1692, 1695–96 (2001). 
402. Spencer E. Admur, The Right of Refusal: Immigration Enforcement and the New Cooperative 
Federalism, 35 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 87, 90 n.10 (2016).  
403. Id. at 88. 
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prohibition.404 Very few federal privacy programs employ such 
inducement strategies.405 
As noted above, Condon turns on the fact that “[t]he DPPA regulates 
the States as the owners of data bases.”406 But this is the sole case 
suggesting that principles of federalism are relevant to the interaction of 
federal and state/local regulation of privacy. No other federal privacy 
statute so directly regulates state programs. Nor have there been any 
successful challenges to federal privacy laws on the grounds that they 
violate the anti-commandeering doctrine.407 One reason for this is that 
both Condon and Printz articulate the anti-commandeering doctrine as a 
limit on what Congress can force states to do regarding federal regulatory 
programs. As the Court emphasizes, Congress can neither “compel the 
States to enact or enforce a federal regulatory program” nor command 
state officials “to administer or enforce a federal regulatory program.”408 
When it comes to privacy law and policy, however, there are few if any 
“federal regulatory programs” whose primary concern is the disclosure or 
safeguarding of personal information. 
For example, there are no programs that promote privacy by providing 
federal funds to train chief privacy officers in how to establish and manage 
a privacy program or conduct effective privacy impact assessment 
                                                     
404. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012) (striking down the provision 
of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) that conditioned all of a state’s Medicaid funding on its acceptance 
of the statute’s expansion of Medicaid because this limit on conditional spending was 
unconstitutionally coercive). 
405. One of the few exceptions is the State Health Information Exchange (HIE) Cooperative 
Agreement Program, which is a federally funded program “to rapidly build capacity for exchanging 
health information across the health care system both within and across states.” Office of the Nat’l 
Coordinator for Health Info. Tech., State Health Information Exchange, HEALTHIT.GOV (Mar. 14, 
2014), https://www.healthit.gov/policy-researchers-implementers/state-health-information-exchange 
[https://perma.cc/9DF9-4Y5S]. 
406. Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141, 151 (2000). 
407. See Int’l Sci. & Tech. Inst. Inc. v. Inacom Commc’ns, Inc., 106 F.3d 1146, 1150 (4th Cir. 
1997) (upholding the Telephone Consumer Protection Act’s grant of exclusive enforcement 
jurisdiction to state courts against a New York challenge); Ameritech Corp. v. McCann, 308 F. Supp. 
2d 911, 925 (E.D. Wis. 2004), vacated on other grounds, 403 F.3d 908 (7th Cir. 2005) (rejecting a 
Printz commandeering challenge against the ECPA); Nat’l Fed’n of Republican Assemblies v. United 
States, 218 F. Supp. 2d 1300, 1344 (S.D. Ala. 2002) (upholding IRS provision that required political 
organizations to disclose state and local political contributions or lose federal filing status); Ass’n of 
Am. Physicians & Surgeons, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Res., 224 F. Supp. 2d 1115, 1126 
(S.D. Tex. 2002) (sustaining HIPAA-related privacy regulations); Citicasters, Inc. v. McCaskill, 883 
F. Supp. 1282, 1288 (W.D. Mo. 1995) (rejecting challenge to the Privacy Protection Act of 1980, 
which forbade disclosure of materials seized in law enforcement investigations to third parties); 
Michigan v. Meese, 666 F. Supp. 974, 979–80 (E.D. Mich. 1987), aff’d, 835 F.2d 295 (6th Cir. 1988) 
(per curiam) (rejecting Tenth Amendment challenge to the ECPA). 
408. Condon, 528 U.S. at 149. 
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techniques based on risk analysis or the design and development of 
privacy-preserving technologies.409 And while a few federal agencies do 
engage in such activities—notably, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), 
the National Institute of Standards (NIST), and the National Science 
Foundation (NSF)—they do so by bringing enforcement actions, issuing 
guidelines and, holding workshops (FTC); issuing standards and 
conducting research (NIST); and funding academics to engage in privacy 
engineering research (NSF). They do not carry out these tasks by creating 
regulatory programs that state and local officials administer and 
implement with federal funding. They could, but they do not.410 
Of course, there are federal programs that require federal-state 
cooperation and raise privacy concerns. Most of these are domestic 
intelligence programs that rely very heavily on local actors to conduct 
surveillance, profiling-based investigation, and data collection and 
sharing. A few such programs condition grants and funding on federal 
guidelines “such as information-sharing protocols to promote uniformity 
as well as privacy standards.”411 But a closer look at these privacy 
standards shows that they amount to little more than assistance in 
developing a privacy policy—and no one who works in the privacy field 
would confuse posting a privacy policy with a full-fledged “privacy 
program.” This may sound like hairsplitting. But domestic intelligence 
programs are not about privacy. They are about national security and 
consist of federal efforts to promote local national security activities by 
(1) providing “resources and training to state and local police forces to 
help them establish intelligence units, build databases, and develop 
standards for intelligence gathering”412 or (2) funding state-operated 
fusion centers to “compile, analyze, and route electronically stored law 
enforcement and investigative information, including public as well as 
private sector data.”413 That said, the privacy aspects of national security 
programs have resulted in a limited set of disputes between federal and 
                                                     
409. COMPUTING CMTY. CONSORTIUM, PRIVACY BY DESIGN—ENGINEERING PRIVACY (2015), 
https://cra.org/ccc/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2015/12/PbD3-Workshop-Report-v2.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/P2E4-XDPR]. 
410. See Crump, supra note 23, at 1658 (noting that “the federal government could require that all 
federally funded surveillance technology be governed by a data management protocol that addresses 
the fundamental questions of data collection, retention, use, and sharing”). This would amount to a 
federal privacy program. 
411. Waxman, supra note 48, at 312. 
412. Id. at 307. 
413. Id. at 308. 
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state or local officials that resemble conflicts over federalism.414 But they 
are weak examples at best of federal privacy programs. 
To sum up: the two most prominent conceptions of federalism—dual 
federalism and cooperative federalism—make assumptions about the 
interaction of federal, state, and local government officials and the 
existence of federal regulatory programs that do not match up very well 
with the current structure of privacy law. Cooperative federalism is clearly 
better suited than dual sovereignty for the task of understanding top-down 
federal programs in which Congress provides the basic legal framework 
and delegates to a federal agency the power to administer the program in 
collaboration with state and local officials.415 While this model sheds light 
on the workings of domestic intelligence programs, both cooperative (and 
uncooperative) federalism seem far less useful in understanding bottom-
up programs in which local governments use their own regulatory powers 
to overcome gaps in federal policy.416 Privacy localism, in contrast, does 
not depend on local government prevailing in disputes with state (or 
federal) authorities but instead tends to (1) fill gaps in existing federal and 
state privacy law or (2) where such laws exist, raises the floor established 
by federal or state constitutional or statutory rules. 
Perhaps the best approach to federalism for purposes of understanding 
local privacy regulation is that of Professor Cristina Rodriguez, who sees 
federalism as consisting not in a “fixed set of relationships” but instead 
treats its parameters as “subject to ongoing negotiation by the players in 
the system, according to the advantages each might accrue from a 
particular set of relations.”417 This more flexible approach enables 
Rodriguez to focus on how debates over controversial social welfare 
issues like immigration, marriage equality, drug policy, and healthcare 
reform—and perhaps local surveillance and smart city initiatives as 
                                                     
414. Several scholars have argued that so-called “anti-Patriot Act resolutions” show state and local 
officials relying on the anti-commandeering doctrine to push back against federal policies that 
threaten individual liberty. See generally Ann Althouse, The Vigor of the Anti-Commandeering 
Doctrine in Times of Terror, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 1231, 1232–34 (2004); Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, 
supra note 398; Young, supra note 364. 
415. See Weiser, supra note 401, at 1695–1703. 
416. Although Bulman-Pozen and Gerken offer an account of the ways in which state and local 
officials can resist mandates and challenge federal authority, their theory of uncooperative federalism 
shares certain assumptions with cooperative federalism as to the primacy of federal regulatory 
programs. See Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra note 398, at 1271 (stating that “[m]uch of 
uncooperative federalism takes place in the interstices of federal mandates”).  
417. Rodriguez, supra note 394, at 2095. 
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well—play out in what she calls “the discretionary spaces of 
federalism.”418 
B. Federal Preemption 
Congress’s broad preemption power allows it to block, limit, or 
invalidate local privacy laws; federal preemption may be express or 
implied.419 Implied preemption covers both field preemption, where 
federal regulation is so pervasive that Congress leaves no room for state 
laws on the subject, and conflict preemption, where compliance with both 
federal and state law is impossible, or state laws undermine the 
accomplishment of Congressional objectives.420 
The leading privacy casebook implicates twenty-four relevant federal 
privacy statutes.421 A review of these statutes shows that none of them 
interfere with the city-level privacy regulation under consideration in this 
Article; indeed, only two sufficiently overlap with local privacy laws to 
require extended analysis.422 The two are ECPA, the federal electronic 
                                                     
418. Id. at 2097–98.  
419. See Gade v. Nat’l Solid Waste Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88, 96–98 (1992).  
420. Id.  
421. SOLOVE & SCHWARTZ, INFORMATION PRIVACY LAW, supra note 1, at 37–40. The total of 
twenty-four privacy statutes requires subtracting from the co-authors’ list several laws that merely 
amend or expand existing laws and adding in several laws that are considered elsewhere in their case 
book such as the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), supra at 609–12, and the Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC) Act, supra at 865.  
422. Twelve of the twenty-four statutes may be dispensed with immediately because they only 
apply to federal agencies, see Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2012); Privacy Act of 
1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a; Computer Matching and Privacy Protection Act of 1988, 5 U.S.C. § 552a, or 
to exclusively federal activity like foreign intelligence gathering, see Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act of 1978, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1801–1811 (2012); USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 
107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (codified as amended under scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.) (amending FISA 
and ECPA, and the FISA Amendments Act of 2008). Others only apply to specific sectors such as 
banks, see Bank Secrecy Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-508, 84 Stat. 1114-2 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 12 U.S.C., 15 U.S.C.), or telecommunication providers, see Communications 
Assistance for Law Enforcement Act of 1994, 47 U.S.C. §§ 1001–1010 (2012), or they may govern 
all federal, state, and local governmental agencies in a very narrow sphere, see Right to Financial 
Privacy Act of 1978, 12 U.S.C. § 3401; Privacy Protection Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C. § 2000aa, or all 
employers in a narrow sphere, see Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act 
of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105, or restrict permissible uses of a very limited type of 
record, see Driver’s Privacy Protection Act of 1994, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2721–2725, or criminalize certain 
conduct not at issue here, see Identity Theft and Assumption Deterrence Act of 1998, 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1028, Video Voyeurism Prevention Act of 2004, 18 U.S.C. § 1801. Nine more of the remaining 
twelve statues fall away because they regulate commercial data held by private firms, either via 
sectoral laws, see Fair Credit Reporting Act of 1970, 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (see also the Fair and Accurate 
Credit Transactions Act of 2003 (FACTA), Pub. L. No. 108-159, 117 Stat. 1952 (codified as amended 
in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.) (amending and updating the FCRA)), Cable Communications 
Policy Act of 1984, 47 U.S.C. § 551; Video Privacy Protection Act of 1988, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2710–2711, 
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surveillance statute, and HIPAA, the federal statute governing the privacy 
of certain medical records.423 Few federal privacy laws include express 
preemption clauses424 and those that do typically establish a “floor”—that 
is, a minimum standard that states may exceed.425 Both ECPA and HIPAA 
lack preemption clauses and establish a federal floor that states may 
exceed. 
ECPA has three parts: an updated version of the Wiretap Act; the 
Stored Communication Act (SCA); and the Pen Register Act 
(PRA).426Although state wiretap laws have been in existence for nearly 
the same period as the Wiretap Act, the federal law does not preempt these 
state enactments. To the contrary, looking to the legislative history of the 
Wiretap Act, the Senate Report states: “The proposed provision envisions 
that States would be free to adopt more restrictive legislation, or no 
legislation at all, but not less restrictive legislation.”427 Rather, the Wiretap 
Act is a classic example of a federal privacy floor.428 Nearly every state 
                                                     
Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, 47 U.S.C. § 227, Children’s Online Privacy Protection 
Act of 1998, 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501–6506, Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999, 15 U.S.C. §§ 6801–6809, 
CAN-SPAM Act of 2003,15 U.S.C. §§ 7701–7713, or consumer protection laws, and thus have little 
to do with the privacy aspects of government activity, see Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. 
§ 45; Employee Polygraph Protection Act of 1988, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2001–2009. Finally, the Family 
Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA), 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(a)(4)(A), is mainly a federal 
conditional funding law, which also protects the privacy of student records containing personal 
information directly related to a student and maintained by any educational agency or institution. But 
FERPA establishes a federal floor for student record confidentiality and access that does not preempt 
states from enacting more privacy-protective restrictions. See id. 
423. See Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 
Stat. 1936 (codified as amended in 42 U.S.C. and 29 U.S.C.). 
424. See SOLOVE & SCHWARTZ, PRIVACY LAW FUNDAMENTALS, supra note 112, at 187–93 
(identifying CAN-SPAM, COPPA, FCRA, and the PPA as privacy statutes that contain a preemption 
clause). 
425. Schwartz, Preemption and Privacy, supra note 45 at 919–22. 
426. See Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, 18 U.S.C §§ 2510–2522, 2701–2709. 
427. See S. Rep. No. 90-1097, at 98 (1968), as reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112, 2187. At 
least one court has held that ECPA preempts California’s wiretap law, see Bunnell v. Motion Picture 
Ass’n of Am., 567 F. Supp. 2d 1148, 155–56 (C.D. Cal. 2007), but the court’s reasoning seems flawed. 
See PROSKAUER ON PRIVACY, supra note 103, § 6.2.6. 
428. See Schwartz, Preemption and Privacy, supra note 45, at 919–20. Schwartz points out while 
the VPPA and GLB Act also set a federal “floor” for privacy, “federal privacy legislation has also 
preempted state legislation with the effect of weakening existing state standards,” citing FACTA as 
an example. Id. But FACTA was a trade-off between the credit industry and consumer advocates, 
with the former motivated to support several measures that strengthened consumer credit laws in 
exchange for making permanent certain preemption provisions in FCRA that were otherwise set to 
expire. See Federal Law Targets ID Theft, CONSUMER ACTION (Sept. 1, 2004), http://www.consumer-
action.org/news/articles/fall_2004#Topic_02.pdf [https://perma.cc/7NUL-8KUD]. Indeed, FACTA 
is the only example of a federal privacy law that reverses existing state safeguards.  
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has its own surveillance laws closely patterned on the Wiretap Act,429 and 
a dozen states have laws that exceed federal standards by enacting “all 
party” consent laws that are more restrictive than the “one party” rule 
under the Wiretap Act.430 As for the SCA, most states do not protect 
communications held in storage by an electronic service (such as an email 
provider) in the same manner as the SCA.431 Rather, similar protections 
are more commonly found in state privacy, consumer protection, or 
utilities regulation laws. Circuits are split regarding the preemptive effect 
of the SCA.432 Finally, about half the states have laws regulating devices 
that capture outgoing or incoming phone calls and many of these laws are 
modeled on the PRA.433 A review of these laws confirms that they closely 
resemble the PRA. Like the Wiretap Act, the PRA does not preempt 
stricter state laws.434 In short, ECPA imposes few, if any, limits on states 
wishing to enact electronic communications legislation that is more 
protective than federal law. 
HIPAA applies to health plans, healthcare clearinghouses, and 
healthcare providers and therefore regulates government agencies that 
engage in covered activities including local governments. The statute is 
quite clear that it provides a baseline of privacy protections but does not 
preempt more stringent state laws.435 HIPAA also regulates disclosure of 
“protected health information” to law enforcement, permitting disclosure 
without consent or authorization if required by a court order, warrant, or 
subpoena when certain additional requirements are met.436 
In short, the only two federal privacy laws that arguably overlap with 
local privacy laws do not actually prevent states or cities from enacting 
more stringent requirements. Further, local governments are not 
especially active in separately regulating electronic surveillance or 
protected health information, likely because ECPA and HIPAA already 
do so; there is little evidence that cities are seeking to innovate in these 
arenas by enacting local laws. Rather, local government officials follow 
                                                     
429. PROSKAUER ON PRIVACY, supra note 103, at § 6.2.5.  
430. Schwartz, Preemption and Privacy, supra note 45, at 920.  
431. The exception is Pennsylvania. See 18 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5741 (West 2018) 
(criminalizing unauthorized access to stored data).  
432. See Prohibited Voluntary Disclosure under Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C.A. 
§§ 2701–2712 (2012), 9 A.L.R. Fed. 3d Art. 6 §§ 93–94 (2016). 
433. See Bellia, supra note 45, at 882 n.50 (2009).  
434. The main prohibition in the PRA begins with the phrase: “Unless prohibited by State Law,” 
which suggests that Congress anticipated states enacting stricter standards. See 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3122(a)(2). The Bill’s legislative history supports this position as well. See S. Rep. No. 99-541, at 
46 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3600. 
435. See 45 C.F.R. § 160.203(A) (2018). 
436. See id. § 164.512(2)(B). 
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the law of each higher level of government within the federal-state-local 
hierarchy, thereby meeting the federal floor or exceeding it when the 
applicable state standard is more protective. Thus, these two federal 
privacy laws are controlling when city officials can access, collect, use, or 
disclose electronic communications or protected health information. But 
in the absence of preemptive provisions and given the lack of activity at 
the local level, these laws do not seem to constrain local efforts to regulate 
surveillance technology or data governance practices. 
C. The Threat of State Overrides Due to Lack of City Power 
Do cities have sufficient power to regulate privacy at the local level? 
At first glance, it appears not. Of the three levels of government in the 
United States, city government is certainly weaker than federal or state 
government in terms of political power, fiscal resources, and 
constitutional standing.437 Indeed, the conventional view is that, as sub-
national governments, cities enjoy only those specific powers granted to 
them under state constitutions and statutes, with the result that governors 
and state legislatures inevitably play an ongoing role in city 
governance.438 States may also exercise powers over cities free from 
federal constitutional constraints or injunctive relief.439 Thus, states can 
and do control or stymie urban initiatives even when they have the strong 
backing of powerful mayors.440 
Local government autonomy has two aspects: the ability to initiate 
policy and the ability to resist encroachment from another governmental 
entity or from a private party.441 Both aspects of local autonomy rest on 
what is known as “home rule.”442 Until the early twentieth century, many 
states limited the power of local governments to undertake independent 
action without a specific delegation of authority under a doctrine known 
                                                     
437. See generally GERALD E. FRUG & DAVID J. BARRON, CITY BOUND: HOW STATES STIFLE 
URBAN INNOVATION (2008); RICHARD SCHRAGGER, CITY POWER: URBAN GOVERNANCE IN A 
GLOBAL AGE (2016). 
438. Barron, supra note 24, at 390; Richard Briffault, Our Localism (pt. 1), 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 
7–8 (1990). 
439. See FRUG & BARRON, supra note 437, at 44; SCHRAGGER, supra note 407, at 79. 
440. See FRUG & BARRON, supra note 437, at ix–xiii (describing the New York State constraints 
on New York City’s (former) Mayor Michael Bloomberg’s power to alleviate Manhattan traffic by 
introducing congestion pricing).  
441. Professor Nestor M. Davidson refers to these two aspects as empowerment and immunity, 
respectively. Nestor M. Davidson, Cooperative Localism, supra note 397, at 967 (2007); see also 
RICHARD BRIFFAULT & LAURIE REYNOLDS, STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW 346 (8th ed. 
2016) (describing two aspects of home rule, which they refer to as “initiative” and “immunity”). 
442. FRUG & BARRON, supra note 437, at 31–43.  
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as “Dillon’s Rule.”443 Home rule reverses the presumption in Dillon’s 
Rule by giving local government the authority to take many kinds of 
action without state permission. Today, over forty states delegate this 
authority to local governments.444 Home rule may be constitutional or 
statutory or a mixture of the two. Whatever the structure a state adopts, 
home rule empowers local governments by delegating broad—but by no 
means unlimited—regulatory and spending authority.445 
Cities generally have sufficient power to make policy decisions about 
(1) local policing including surveillance activities and (2) local municipal 
services including any privacy safeguards applicable to the collection, 
use, and disclosure of personal data by local government agencies. Local 
policing is the paradigm case of regulatory power or what is more 
commonly referred to as “police power,” the term used to describe state 
and local government’s general authority over health, safety, and 
welfare.446 Police power encompasses creating and managing a local 
police force and providing and managing municipal services. Arguably, 
this is true in every state, city, and town in the United States. It is certainly 
true in both Seattle and New York City. 
D. State Preemption 
Unlike federal preemption and lack of city power, state preemption of 
local privacy regulation poses a more serious and ongoing threat to 
privacy localism. Although state preemption of local laws generally 
follows the same analytic model as federal preemption,447 there are over 
700 state privacy statutes,448 which make for a crowded regulatory arena 
that may leave little room for local privacy law. As noted above, 
progressive cities are increasingly taking the lead on a broad range of 
policy issues—but some states are fighting back. States have preempted 
local authority in areas ranging from labor and employment (such as local 
                                                     
443. See Paul A. Diller, Intrastate Preemption, 87 B.U. L. REV. 1113, 1140 (2007); Hugh D. 
Spitzer, Home Rule vs. Dillon’s Rule for Washington Cities, 38 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 809, 813–24 
(2015). 
444. RICHARD BRIFFAULT ET AL., AM. CONSTITUTION SOC’Y FOR LAW & POLICY, THE 
TROUBLING TURN IN STATE PREEMPTION: THE ASSAULT ON PROGRESSIVE CITIES AND HOW CITIES 
CAN RESPOND 3 (2017), https://www.acslaw.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/ACS_Issue_Brief_-
_Preemption_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/56NC-GWVQ]. 
445. Id.  
446. See Diller, supra note 443, at 1123 n.47.   
447. Id. at 1140 (noting differences in a few states not relevant here). 
448. See generally ROBERT E. SMITH, COMPILATION OF STATE AND FEDERAL PRIVACY LAWS 
(2015). 
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minimum wage rules), to civil rights (local anti-discrimination laws), to 
environmental protection (local fracking rules), to public health (local 
tobacco regulation), to immigration law (sanctuary cities).449 Thus, both 
now and in the future, the greatest challenge to privacy localism comes 
from the possibility of state preemption. 
In general, state law preempts local law in two situations: when a 
statute includes explicit language establishing a statewide scheme of 
regulation, or by implication when the state and local powers materially 
conflict.450 Additionally, courts may limit preemptive effect where state 
law inadequately protects a right recognized in a state constitution.451 
Apart from these general rules, there is no one-size-fits-all answer to 
which state privacy laws preempt city privacy regulations. Rather, most 
state privacy preemption issues begin (and end) with an analysis of the 
interaction of specific state privacy laws and specific city privacy 
regulations. For present purposes, this requires identifying and reviewing 
laws in Washington and New York that regulate specific surveillance 
technologies insofar as they may overlap with Seattle and New York 
City’s local surveillance ordinances. At a minimum, this includes 
Washington and New York state laws regulating video cameras and/or 
facial recognition, ALPRs, and drones. Additionally, it is necessary to 
identify and review Washington and New York’s laws that regulate 
government records or personal data collected by government agencies 
insofar as they overlap with Seattle and New York City’s locally-adopted 
data governance rules. 
                                                     
449. See BRIFFAULT ET AL., supra note 444, at 5–8. 
450. State courts decide when a conflict arises under state law and this is often a question of 
legislative intent. See Diller, supra note 443, at 1155. 
451. In theory, this would include the right of privacy, which ten states have recognized in express 
constitutional provisions protecting personal privacy. See SOLOVE & SCHWARTZ, PRIVACY LAW 
FUNDAMENTALS, supra note 112, at 126–27 (identifying the ten states as Alaska, Arizona, California, 
Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Louisiana, Montana, South Carolina, and Washington). The author has not 
found any cases limiting preemptive effect based on a right to privacy as enumerated in a state 
constitution.  
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This task is large but manageable. The analysis begins with a 
discussion of state regulation of a few specific surveillance 
technologies452 and then turns to local government data laws.453 
1. Laws Regulating Specific Surveillance Technologies 
a. Video Surveillance and Facial Recognition 
Video cameras observe and record activity in public spaces for many 
purposes, including: crime prevention and detection, security and safety, 
and counter-terrorism. They may be mounted on building facades, lamp 
posts, utility poles, or inside businesses and public facilities in any area 
that requires monitoring including airports, ATMs, banks, city streets, 
convenience stores, hotels, public transportation, and schools.454 The first 
generation of video surveillance cameras (also referred to as closed-circuit 
television or CCTV) stored footage locally on analog videotapes. This 
meant that investigators had to physically retrieve and manually play back 
the tapes, which was cumbersome and inefficient. Today, advanced 
surveillance cameras take full advantage of digital formats, cloud storage, 
remote viewing, and controls. Most importantly, these new devices are 
compatible with video content analysis, which detects movement and 
even anomalous patterns of movement, and facial recognition 
                                                     
452. The state preemption analysis omits certain surveillance technologies which are available to 
SPD and NYPD: StingRay tracking devices (devices that simulate a cell tower and detect cell phone 
signals) and electronic toll collection systems (like Sound Transit’s ORCA pass or the Metropolitan 
Transit Authority’s MetroCard). StingRays are omitted because federal policy applies across the 
board, thereby avoiding localism issues. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 
POLICY GUIDANCE: USE OF CELL-SITE SIMULATOR TECHNOLOGY 2–5 (2015), 
http://www.justice.gov/opa/file/767321/download [https://perma.cc/CT5N-5WQE] (explaining that 
Stingrays are regulated by a 2015 DOJ policy requiring federal, state, and local law enforcement to 
obtain a search warrant before using the device); accord Jones v. United States, 168 A.3d 703, 709–
10 (D.C. 2017); Maryland v. Andrews, 134 A.3d 324, 328 (Md. 2016). Washington State also requires 
a warrant for the use of StingRays. See Cyrus Farivar, Cops Must Now Get a Warrant to Use Stingrays 
in Washington State, ARS TECHNICA (May 12, 2015, 6:49 AM), https://arstechnica.com/tech-
policy/2015/05/cops-must-now-get-a-warrant-to-use-stingrays-in-washington-state/ 
[https://perma.cc/K3V5-MNX6]. Electronic toll collection systems are omitted because the fare cards 
in Seattle and New York City are not issued by the city but rather by regional transportation 
authorities, which are beyond the scope of this paper. 
453. The rules governing acquisition of data by government agencies from other government 
agencies is beyond the scope of this Article. In future work, the author plans to analyze police 
department data sharing with other city agencies, with regional, state, or federal agencies, and with 
private sector firms.  
454. See CONSTITUTION PROJECT, supra note 101. 
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applications, which automatically match a face in a digital image or a 
video frame to a person in a facial database.455 
In recent years, surveillance cameras have become more prevalent in 
U.S. cities, thanks to lower costs and easier installation as well as the 
availability of government grants for cities to install surveillance camera 
networks.456 Although proponents of video cameras argue that they 
enhance public safety by preventing or deterring crime and assisting in 
criminal prosecutions, there have been few credible studies,457 and the 
evidence supporting these claims is mixed at best,458 which only serves to 
heighten privacy-related concerns. 
One of these concerns is the risk of abuse. There are documented cases 
of police officers using video data for criminal abuse (like blackmail), 
institutional abuse (such as spying on or harassing political activists), 
personal abuse (such as stalking women), discriminatory targeting (such 
as targeting black or Latino youth who enter a majority-white 
neighborhood), and voyeurism (such as male operators viewing or sharing 
video feeds of scantily clad women or acts of intimacy).459 Additionally, 
video surveillance may capture (and store for later analysis) ordinary 
citizens exercising their First Amendment rights, thereby creating a 
chilling effect on political and religious expression.460 Regardless of any 
                                                     
455. See generally LOREN SIEGEL, ROBERT A. PERRY & MARGARET HUNT GRAM, N.Y. CIVIL 
LIBERTIES UNION, WHO’S WATCHING?: VIDEO CAMERA SURVEILLANCE IN NEW YORK CITY AND 
THE NEED FOR PUBLIC OVERSIGHT (2006), https://www.nyclu.org/sites/ 
default/files/publications/nyclu_pub_whos_watching.pdf (last visited Oct. 26, 2018). 
456. See Somini Sengupta, Privacy Fears Grow as Cities Increase Surveillance, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 
14, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/14/technology/privacy-fears-as-surveillance-grows-in-
cities.html (last visited Oct. 26, 2018). New York City’s Domain Awareness System has about 9,000 
video surveillance cameras linked together in a sophisticated network that also permits video content 
analysis. See infra text accompanying notes 55–59. 
457. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-03-748, VIDEO SURVEILLANCE: INFORMATION ON 
LAW ENFORCEMENT’S USE OF CLOSED-CIRCUIT TELEVISION TO MONITOR SELECTED FEDERAL 
PROPERTY IN WASHINGTON, D.C. 29 (2003) (“There is general consensus among CCTV users, 
privacy advocates, researchers, and CCTV industry groups that there are few evaluations of the 
effectiveness of CCTV in reducing crime . . . .”).  
458. An exhaustive study of the effectiveness of San Francisco’s video surveillance program found 
no evidence of an impact on violent crime and a decline in overall homicides in areas near the cameras 
but an increase in areas far from the cameras and statistically significant and substantial declines in 
property crime within view of the cameras. See JENNIFER KING ET AL., CITRIS REPORT: THE SAN 
FRANCISCO COMMUNITY SAFETY CAMERA PROGRAM (2008), 
www.popcenter.org/library/scp/pdf/219-King.pdf [https://perma.cc/9JBR-V5ZG]. 
459. What’s Wrong with Public Video Surveillance?, ACLU (2018), 
https://www.aclu.org/other/whats-wrong-public-video-surveillance [https://perma.cc/AQ6H-
X6UQ]. 
460. As Justice Sotomayor observed in a related context, “GPS monitoring generates a precise, 
comprehensive record of a person’s public movements that reflects a wealth of detail about her 
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First Amendment concerns, the Fourth Amendment’s reasonable 
expectation of privacy test has little application to silent video 
surveillance in public spaces.461 
When law enforcement combines video surveillance systems with 
facial recognition technology (FRT), these privacy concerns are greatly 
increased. Although early experiments with the use of FRT in criminal 
investigations or airport security were disappointing, the technology is 
starting to improve and local police departments are renewing their 
interest in adopting FRT.462 While still far from perfect, FRT is steadily 
improving in quality as recent advances in 3D imaging and machine 
learning have increased the reliability of the identification process.463 
Moreover, facial databases are expanding and now include not only mug 
shots but also driver’s licenses and other types of ID photos; a recent study 
estimates that “law enforcement face recognition affects over 117 million 
American adults.”464 
Professor Laura Donohue argues that facial recognition represents the 
first of a series of next generation biometrics that when paired with 
surveillance of public space, transforms identification techniques in 
several ways. According to Donohue, “immediate” biometric 
identification is “focused (1) on a single individual; (2) close-up; (3) in 
relation either to custodial detention or in the context of a specific physical 
                                                     
familial, political, professional, religious, and sexual associations . . . . The Government can store 
such records and efficiently mine them for information years into the future.” United States v. Jones, 
565 U.S. 400, 416–17 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (citations omitted). 
461. See SLOBOGIN, supra note 71, at 89–90. Several circuit courts have held that the Fourth 
Amendment requires heightened specificity for video surveillance warrants but only in non-public 
settings. See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 124 F.3d 411 (3d Cir. 1997); United States v. Falls, 34 
F.3d 674 (8th Cir. 1994); United States v. Koyomejian, 970 F.2d 536 (9th Cir. 1992); United States 
v. Torres, 751 F.2d 875 (7th Cir. 1984). 
462. Clare Garvie & Alvaro Bedoya, Smile! You’ve Just Been Identified by Face Recognition 
Technology, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Mar. 27, 2017), http://www.nydailynews.com/opinion/smile-
identified-face-recognition-article-1.3008512 [https://perma.cc/9HBU-7GRQ] (noting that the 
NYPD has been using facial recognition technology in criminal investigations since 2011 and as of 
last year has conducted “more than 8,500 facial recognition investigations, with over 3,000 possible 
matches, and approximately 2,000 arrests” and plans to expand it use of this technology in the future 
(citations omitted)). 
463. Laura K. Donohue, Technological Leap, Statutory Gap, and Constitutional Abyss: Remote 
Biometric Identification Comes of Age, 97 MINN. L. REV. 407, 554 (2012). 
464. CLARE GARVIE ET AL., GEORGETOWN LAW CTR. ON PRIVACY & TECH, THE PERPETUAL LINE-
UP: UNREGULATED POLICE FACE RECOGNITION IN AMERICA (2016), 
https://www.perpetuallineup.org/background [https://perma.cc/N5R4-9W6Q]; see also U.S. GOV’T 
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-16-267, FACIAL RECOGNITION TECHNOLOGY: FBI SHOULD BETTER 
ENSURE PRIVACY AND ACCURACY 48 (2016) (stating that the FBI has access to more than 411 million 
facial images, including driver’s license photos from sixteen states as well as visa application and 
passport photos from the State Department). 
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area related to government activity; (4) in a manner often involving notice 
and often consent; and (5) in a one-time or limited occurrence.”465 In 
contrast, “remote” biometric identification provides the government “the 
ability to ascertain the identity (1) of multiple people; (2) at a distance; 
(3) in public space; (4) absent notice and consent; and (5) in a continuous 
and on-going manner.”466 The intrusiveness of these remote techniques 
presents a unique challenge to liberty because they enable prolonged 
surveillance that will also occur more frequently yet require significantly 
fewer resources than existing systems.467 
State Regulation of Video Surveillance—Most states do not regulate 
video surveillance of public spaces. Washington State’s eavesdropping 
law does not cover silent video recording,468 and its criminal procedure 
laws are non-specific regarding video surveillance warrants, which may 
fall within general warrant procedures requiring probable cause.469 New 
York criminal procedure requires detailed warrants for individualized 
video surveillance.470 These standards reflect heightened Fourth 
Amendment protections for video surveillance established by the Second 
Circuit because of the technology’s capacity to capture large volumes of 
information.471 But such procedures are limited to situations where 
warrantless surveillance would infringe on reasonable expectations of 
privacy, which the courts do not recognize in public places, making New 
York’s procedural requirements inapplicable to video surveillance of 
streets and sidewalks.472 Professor Susan Freidwald argues that all video 
surveillance implicates the same privacy concerns as wiretapping because 
it is “hidden, intrusive, indiscriminate and continuous” and thus should be 
subject to constitutional constraints.473 Despite these and other calls to 
                                                     
465. Donohue, supra note 463, at 415–16 (2012). 
466. Id. at 415. 
467. Id. at 529. 
468. See Haymond v. Wash. Dep’t of Licensing, 73 Wash. App. 758, 761, 872 P.2d 61, 63 (Wash. 
App. 1994) (holding that WASH. REV. CODE § 9.73.030 “does not apply to the operation of a video 
camera without an audible sound recording”). 
469. WASH. REV. CODE § 10.79.035 (2018). 
470. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW §§ 700.10–70 (McKinney 2018); 7-28 BENDER’S NEW YORK 
EVIDENCE § 28.30(2) (2018).  
471. See United States v. Biasucci, 786 F.2d 504, 507–09 (2d Cir. 1986). 
472. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. United States, 878 F. Supp. 20, 25 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (finding no 
protection from video surveillance of apartment building entrance by DEA from public street). See 
generally Olivia J. Greer, No Cause of Action: Video Surveillance in New York City, 18 MICH. 
TELECOMM. TECH. L. REV. 589 (2012). 
473. See Susan Freiwald, First Principles of Communications Privacy, 2007 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 
3, 6 (2007). 
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impose limits on surveillance of public spaces, courts have yet to respond. 
But recognition of the “mosaic” capabilities of new technologies may well 
prove a catalyst for future change.474 
State Regulation of Facial Recognition—A few states have been 
active in regulating commercial uses of biometrics, which under some 
definitions includes face scans.475 In June 2017, Washington enacted a law 
regulating businesses that collect and use biometric identifiers for 
commercial purposes.476 However, this law applies solely to biometric 
identifiers in commercial databases and excludes facial recognition data 
from the definition of such identifiers.477 Although the Washington 
Legislature enacted a second bill regulating state agency collection, use, 
and retention of biometric identifiers (including facial recognition 
data),478 this law applies to state, but not local, agencies479 and exempts all 
“general authority Washington law enforcement agencies.” 480 Thus, it 
does not apply to local police departments. 
However, Seattle has stepped up to this regulatory task by developing 
strict controls restricting the SPD’s use of facial recognition software to 
comparisons of unidentified images and jail mug shots.481 SPD policy also 
requires reasonable suspicion that the person in the image has committed 
a crime and prohibits using the software to connect with live camera 
systems.482 SPD developed this policy with input from ACLU-WA, 
secured approval of the policy by an independent body (the Seattle City 
Council), and published the policy online, all of which makes this policy 
unique among U.S. cities that regulate facial recognition technology.483 
                                                     
474. See Levinson-Waldman, supra note 101, at 539–42. 
475. For example, the 2008 Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act, 740 ILCS 14/1, requires 
that before collecting and storing any biometric identifier (defined as including face scans), the subject 
of collection must receive notice in writing of the specific purpose of collection and the length of time 
the identifier will be stored and must execute a written release before any biometric information is 
captured. However, these restrictions only apply to a “private entity” and this term “does not include 
a State or local government agency.” Id. 
476. H.B. 1493, 65th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2017).  
477. WASH. REV. CODE § 19.375.010 (2018).  
478. H.B. 1717, 65th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2017); WASH. REV. CODE § 40.26.020. 
479. WASH. REV. CODE § 40.26.020(7)(a). 
480. Id. § 40.26.020(8). 
481. See Steven Miletich, Seattle Police Win Praise for Safeguards with Facial-Recognition 
Software, SEATTLE TIMES (Oct. 19, 2016), https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/crime/seattle-
police-wins-praise-for-safeguards-with-facial-recognition-software/ (last visited Oct. 26, 2018). 
482. Id.   
483. Id. The SPD policy is published in the Seattle Police Department Manual. SEATTLE POLICE 
DEPARTMENT MANUAL, supra note 130, § 12.045.   
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New York also introduced a bill modeled on the Illinois law, but it did 
not advance out of committee.484 The NYPD, which has been using facial 
recognition technology since 2011, has been much less transparent than 
Seattle regarding its policies and procedures.485 
b. Automatic License Plate Readers 
ALPRs are computer-controlled, high-speed camera systems that 
automatically capture an image of every license plate that comes into 
view.486 Many police departments now use them mounted on patrol cars 
or fixed objects (e.g., light poles, bridges, overpasses).487 There are also 
applications that allow police officers to scan license plates with their 
smartphones.488 When a license plate enters the camera’s field, ALPRs 
capture an image of the car and its surroundings, and convert the image 
of the license plate into machine-readable alphanumeric text, which may 
be checked for matches against manually entered plate numbers and “hot 
lists” of the plate numbers of stolen cars, AMBER alerts, felony arrest 
warrants, registered sex offenders or people who are on supervised 
release.489 ALPRs record and store data on each scanned licensed plate 
(regardless of whether a match or “hit” is generated), including the plate 
number and the date, time and place of recording.490 It is also possible to 
aggregate ALPR data in centralized databases and trace a vehicle’s past 
movements by plotting all of the license plate reads associated with a 
vehicle’s owner or passenger. Additionally, ALPRs allow police to 
identify each vehicle seeking to enter a specific geographical area and 
construct a virtual fence around it. 
As with any surveillance technology, the use of ALPRs by law 
enforcement presents a risk of abuse if officers use data to stalk, 
                                                     
484. See S.B. 4887, 238th Leg. Sess. (N.Y. 2015). 
485. See Ava Kofman, NYPD Refuses to Disclose Information About Its Face Recognition 
Program, so Privacy Researchers Are Suing, INTERCEPT (May 2, 2017, 5:36 PM), 
https://theintercept.com/2017/05/02/nypd-refuses-to-disclose-information-about-its-face-
recognition-program-so-privacy-researchers-are-suing/ [https://perma.cc/AZB7-DK9V].  
486. ACLU, YOU ARE BEING TRACKED: HOW LICENSE PLATE READERS ARE BEING USED TO 
RECORD AMERICANS’ MOVEMENTS (2013), https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/071613-aclu-
alprreport-opt-v05.pdf [https://perma.cc/4MHS-DAAG]. 
487. DHS and DOJ are key sources of funding for the acquisition of license plate readers by local 
police departments. Id. 
488. See Levine, supra note 55.  
489. See Street-Level Surveillance: Automated License Plate Readers (ALPRs), ELEC. FRONTIER 
FOUND., https://www.eff.org/sls/tech/automated-license-plate-readers [https://perma.cc/D5VT-
LY52]. 
490. Id. 
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embarrass, or otherwise spy on innocent parties or engage in 
discriminatory targeting. This is especially problematic if police 
departments lack policies limiting access to license plate data or lack audit 
or other mechanisms for ensuring accountability.491 Because ALPRs 
capture and retain information about every vehicle that crosses their path, 
rather than limiting such collection and retention to vehicles that generate 
a hit, they enable law enforcement to gain significant insight into people’s 
movements over a span of months or even years. As discussed below, this 
would raise issues under both concurrences in Jones if the extended use 
of ALPRs is of sufficient duration and pervasiveness to constitute “long-
term monitoring.”492 On the other hand, the police certainly treat current 
Fourth Amendment doctrine as permitting law enforcement use of ALPRs 
in any single instance because “an observation made by a police officer 
without a physical intrusion into a constitutionally protected area does not 
implicate the Fourth Amendment or require a search warrant.”493 
State Regulation of ALPRs—Over a dozen states permit the use of 
ALPRs by law enforcement but limit retention periods and sale to third 
parties, while exempting ALPR data from disclosure under state public 
record laws.494 Washington has not regulated ALPRs, although the SPD 
has developed its own policy guidelines requiring certification and 
training of operators in the proper use of this technology, limiting the use 
of ALPRs to routine patrol and criminal investigations, and restricting 
access to ALPR data.495 Seattle’s surveillance ordinance does not apply to 
ALPRs because, as previously noted, it specifically excludes both 
cameras installed in or on police vehicles and certain stationary cameras. 
In contrast, the New York State Senate is considering a bill prohibiting 
businesses and individuals from using ALPRs and limiting allowable uses 
                                                     
491. See generally Jennifer Lynch, Automated License Plate Readers Threaten Our Privacy, ELEC. 
FRONTIER FOUND. (2013), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2013/05/alpr?from=sls 
[https://perma.cc/54VT-PCY3]. 
492. See supra text accompanying notes 98–100; KEITH GIERLACK ET AL., RAND CORP., LICENSE 
PLATE READERS FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT: OPPORTUNITIES AND OBSTACLES 37–38 (2014), 
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/247283.pdf [https://perma.cc/9VXX-JEFY]. 
493. DIV. OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE SERVS., STATE OF N.Y., SUGGESTED GUIDELINES: OPERATION OF 
LICENSE PLATE READER TECHNOLOGY 10 (2011), 
http://www.criminaljustice.ny.gov/crimnet/ojsa/motor-vehicle/LPR-Operation-Suggested-
Guidelines-2011.pdf [https://perma.cc/2QUV-EE73]. 
494. See Automated License Plate Readers: State Statutes Regulating Their Use, NAT’L CONF. ST. 
LEGISLATURES (Jan. 2, 2018), http://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-and-information-
technology/state-statutes-regulating-the-use-of-automated-license-plate-readers-alpr-or-alpr-
data.aspx [https://perma.cc/7JR6-UJKN]. 
495. SEATTLE POLICE DEPARTMENT MANUAL, supra note 130, § 16.170. 
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by law enforcement agencies.496 Additionally, the bill would limit the 
retention of captured plate data to no more than 180 days with certain 
exceptions. Finally, the bill would require law enforcement agencies to 
destroy evidence gathered with ALPRs unless they “apply for a court 
order for disclosure of captured plate data” while offering “specific and 
articulable facts showing that there are reasonable grounds to believe that 
the captured plate data is relevant and material to an ongoing criminal or 
missing persons investigation.”497 Both the Senate bill and (weaker) 
Assembly bill remain in committee. 
c. Drones 
“Unmanned aerial vehicles” (UAVs), commonly known as drones, 
raise surveillance issues because they are often equipped with digital 
recorders, microphones, and other sensors. UAVs range from small 
“quadcopters” that can hover near ground level to high-altitude planes 
with extremely powerful cameras. Many cities in the United States have 
acquired the smaller UAVs for non-controversial purposes such as 
handling bomb threats, search and rescue missions, and crime-scene 
photography.498 But UAVs also facilitate ubiquitous government 
surveillance, combining cost-effectiveness with high levels of technical 
capability.499 Commentators suggest that U.S. law enforcement is 
expanding its use of drones for surveillance purposes,500 while drone use 
by hobbyists and commercial firms raises separate but related privacy 
concerns ranging from voyeurism to corporate espionage. As Professor 
Ryan Calo reminds us, “George Orwell specifically describes small flying 
devices that roam neighborhoods and peer into windows.”501 Orwell’s 
                                                     
496. S.B. S23, 2017–2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2018). The amended version of a companion bill 
in the N.Y. State Assembly all but eliminates the requirements on law enforcement. See Shane Trejo, 
Fail: New York Assembly Committee Guts Bill to Limit Automatic License Plate Readers, TENTH 
AMENDMENT CTR. (June 1, 2016), http://blog.tenthamendmentcenter.com/2016/06/fail-new-york-
assembly-committee-guts-bill-to-limit-automatic-license-plate-readers/ [https://perma.cc/U4ZA-
A592]. 
497. Additionally, New York has set out suggested guidelines for the operation of ALPR 
technology in the form of best practices that sought to “provide authorized users with the information 
necessary to ensure public safety while protecting individual privacy rights.” See DIV. OF CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE SERVS., supra note 493. 
498. See Marc Jonathan Blitz et al., Regulating Drones Under the First and Fourth Amendments, 
57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 49, 54–55 (2015). 
499. See id. at 56–59. 
500. See Domestic Drones, ACLU (2016), https://www.aclu.org/issues/privacy-
technology/surveillance-technologies/domestic-drones [https://perma.cc/T8KC-VH83]. 
501. See M. Ryan Calo, The Drone as Privacy Catalyst, 64 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 29, 32 (2011).  
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1984 is the starting point for imagining the level of intrusion society may 
expect from silent, low-cost, low-profile, highly maneuverable devices, 
outfitted with digital cameras and microphones, and wireless connections 
to the cloud. But the end point may look more like the constant 
surveillance of Blade Runner 2049.502 
State Regulation of Drones—Almost two-dozen states regulate drone 
privacy, requiring law enforcement agencies to obtain a warrant prior to 
their use for surveillance.503 In Washington, the legislature passed a bill 
that would have placed limits on the use of drones for law enforcement 
purposes.504 But the governor vetoed the bill citing concerns about 
conflicting provisions on public disclosure and the definition of public 
information, while simultaneously announcing the creation of a task force 
to study surveillance technology and postponing any purchasing of UAVs 
pending completion of the study.505 In 2016, Washington’s Chief Privacy 
Officer issued drone guidelines encouraging law enforcement officials to 
use drones only in connection with properly authorized investigations and 
activities, respect existing state and federal laws and regulations regarding 
the privacy of personal information, and respect civil rights.506 
In New York, the legislature has introduced three bills to regulate the 
use of drones by law enforcement. The strictest bill bans drone 
surveillance in “locations where a person would have an expectation of 
privacy,” with exceptions for the use of drones in “exigent circumstances” 
                                                     
502. BLADE RUNNER 2049 (Warner Bros. 2017). 
503. See Allie Bohm, Drone Legislation: What’s Being Proposed in the States?, ACLU (Mar. 6 
2013, 3:15 PM), http://www.aclu.org/blog/technology-and-liberty-national-security/drone-
legislation-whats-being-proposed-states [https://perma.cc/4L7H-5DX7]. At the federal level, the 
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) regulates UAVs with respect to commercial use, safety, and 
licensing, but not privacy. See Stephanie Condon, FAA Sued for Lack of Drone Privacy Rules, ZDNET 
(Aug. 24, 2016, 1:00 PM), http://www.zdnet.com/article/faa-sued-for-lack-of-drone-privacy-rules/ 
[https://perma.cc/4PFQ-WE5D]. Congress has considered a number of drone privacy bills, including 
several versions of the Drone Aircraft Privacy and Transparency Act, a bill that would “require law 
enforcement agencies . . . to describe how they plan to minimize the collection and retention of data 
that’s unrelated to a crime investigation” and “to obtain a warrant before conducting surveillance” 
subject to certain exceptions. See Jennifer Martinez, Markey Introduces Drone Privacy Bill, HILL 
(Dec. 18, 2012, 7:54 PM), http://thehill.com/policy/technology/273519-markey-introduces-drone-
privacy-bill [https://perma.cc/7QSZ-4MTA]. 
504. See H.B. 2789, 63d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2014). A bill that is similar to H.B. 2789 is now 
pending in the state legislature. See H.B. 1102, 65th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2017). 
505. See Leilani Leach, Washington Gov. Jay Inslee Vetoes Drone Bill, GOV’T TECH. (Apr. 18, 
2014), http://www.govtech.com/state/Washington-Gov-Jay-Inslee-Vetoes-Drone-Bill.html 
[https://perma.cc/T7FN-SSB2].  
506. OFFICE OF PRIVACY & DATA PROT., STATE OF WASH., WASHINGTON STATE POLICY 
GUIDELINES FOR UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS (2016), 
http://www.wsdot.wa.gov/NR/rdonlyres/AC738BE5-FDCE-4FD9-A173-6C913FDABE24/0/ 
DronePolicyGuidelines.pdf [https://perma.cc/CFS7-KTMQ].  
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or pursuant to a search warrant in investigations of serious crimes.507 A 
second bill imposes similar restrictions on law enforcement use but 
contains additional privacy restrictions applicable to all state agencies.508 
A third bill bans warrantless use of UAVs (with a few exceptions) and 
voids the use of such evidence in criminal proceedings.509 All three bills 
were introduced in earlier sessions but did not advance. 
2. Laws Regulating the Privacy of Government Records 
Few states regulate the data governance practices of state agencies in a 
manner comparable to the Privacy Act or have anything resembling the 
Privacy Act’s requirement for publishing SORNs or PIAs.510 This broad 
generalization requires further clarification. All fifty states have public 
record or freedom of information laws requiring government agencies to 
disclose certain information to people upon request.511 Most of these are 
patterned after FOIA. These state counterparts typically apply to both 
state and local agencies; this is certainly true in both Washington and New 
York.512 These laws generally include some form of privacy exemption, 
which may be similar (or more restrictive) than the two privacy 
exemptions in FOIA.513 
The Washington Public Records Act (PRA) is unusual in that it 
combines a very broad public disclosure requirement514 with a very 
narrowly construed privacy exemption that parallels the elements of the 
tort of public disclosure of private facts.515 Thus, an agency exempting 
information from a record must do so based upon an independent statute 
that creates a right to privacy and that outweighs the PRA’s broad policy 
                                                     
507. S.B. 1174, 2017 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2017).  
508. A.B. A3396, 2017 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2017).  
509. S.B. 2913, 2017 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2017). 
510. See supra notes 114 and 115.  
511. For a list of all fifty laws, see SOLOVE & SCHWARTZ, PRIVACY LAW FUNDAMENTALS, supra 
note 112, at 119–21.  
512. See, e.g., Washington Public Records Act, WASH. REV. CODE § 42.56.010(1) (2018); N.Y. 
PUB. OFF. LAW § 86(3) (McKinney 2017). 
513. See Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 552(b)(6)–(b)(7)(C) (2012).  
514. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 42.56.030 (stating that the public disclosure requirements “shall 
be liberally construed and its exemptions narrowly construed” to promote the policy of an informed 
public); see also Sargent v. Seattle Police Dep’t, 179 Wash. 2d 376, 385, 314 P.3d 1093, 1097 (2013) 
(discussing how the PRA mandates “broad public disclosure”).  
515. See WASH. REV. CODE § 42.56.050 (limiting exemptions to disclosures of personal 
information that are highly offensive to a reasonable person and not of legitimate concern to the 
public). 
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in favor of disclosing records.516 In Does v. King County,517 the 
Washington Court of Appeals found that individuals did not have a right 
to privacy when they were captured on surveillance video of a public area. 
New York’s FOIL also provides citizens with access to records related 
to government operations subject to various exemptions. This includes a 
standard privacy exemption for information that “if disclosed would 
constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.”518 The statute 
offers several examples of unwarranted invasions519  and in cases beyond 
these explicit terms courts “must decide whether any invasion of 
privacy . . . is ‘unwarranted’ by balancing the privacy interests at stake 
against the public interest in disclosure of the information.”520 New York 
law also includes a provision that broadly exempts police and other 
uniformed officers from the reach of the FOIL,521 which arguably blocks 
the public disclosure of footage from body-worn cameras.522 
Finally, Washington and New York both have several narrower state 
privacy laws that may affect how cities treat specific records including 
school records,523 medical records concerning HIV/AIDS status,524 and 
library records.525 
In sum, the threat of state preemption of local privacy regulation turns 
out to be less severe than anticipated. Most states (including Washington 
and New York) either do not regulate law enforcement’s use of the 
surveillance technologies highlighted above or impose requirements that 
would not conflict with local surveillance laws. Only ten states (including 
New York but not Washington) regulate the data governance practices of 
state agencies but none of these laws apply to local governments. It 
follows that both Seattle and New York City have a relatively free hand 
in regulating surveillance technologies and devising local data governance 
policies and practices. Most importantly, even if New York enacted 
pending ALPR or drone bills, these laws would likely set state floors on 
                                                     
516. For example, personal information in agency employee files is exempt if disclosure would 
violate the employee’s right to “privacy.” See WASH. REV. CODE § 42.56.230(3). 
517. 192 Wash. App. 10, 366 P.3d 936 (2015). 
518. N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW § 87(2)(b) (McKinney 2017). 
519. Id. § 89(b)(2)(b). 
520. In re New York Times Co. v. N.Y.C. Fire Dep’t, 829 N.E.2d 266, 269–70 (N.Y. Ct. App. 
2005). 
521. N.Y. CIVIL RIGHTS LAW § 50-a (2018). 
522. See Cynthia Conti-Cook, Open Data Policing, 106 GEO. L.J. ONLINE 1, 3 (2017).  
523. WASH. REV. CODE § 28A.605.030 (2018); N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 3222. 
524. WASH. REV. CODE § 70.02.220; N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2782. 
525. WASH. REV. CODE § 42.56.310; N.Y.C.P.L.R. § 4509.  
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local activity without preventing the city from strengthening these privacy 
protections or devising more comprehensive regulatory schemes 
governing all surveillance technology and all local government data. 
Finally, suppose that Washington or New York were to enact laws 
directly covering surveillance technologies or local data governance? 
Wouldn’t such laws preempt the local privacy regulations under 
consideration in Part II and render them superfluous? In fact, one need not 
look further than California to determine what a state law on surveillance 
technology might look like and how it would affect local surveillance 
ordinances in Santa Clara County, Oakland, Berkeley, and Palo Alto. 
Senate Bill 21 (S.B. 21) requires transparency and accountability in 
decisions about the use of surveillance technology.526 It is highly 
consistent with local surveillance ordinances already in effect in 
California’s cities and preserves their underlying structure by requiring all 
local law enforcement agencies to develop use polices for surveillance 
technologies and seek executive approval at the local or regional level 
before deployment. Indeed, as one legislator stated, S.B. 21 “is inspired 
in part by a Santa Clara County ordinance . . . passed in 2016.” 527 Once 
again, the California legislature serves as a laboratory for policy 
experimentation, in this case by responding to innovative city regulations 
by emulating them, not supplanting them, and enacting a state law 
mandating local or regional approval. Of course, one can also imagine 
state legislatures doing the opposite by passing laws to prevent cities from 
enacting surveillance ordinances, arguing that they stymie law 
enforcement efforts. But so far this has not been the case in the seventeen 
states that have passed or considered local surveillance ordinances.528 
CONCLUSION 
Seattle and New York City have begun to experiment with local 
privacy regulation in a thoughtful and innovative fashion, cognizant both 
of gaps in federal and state privacy law and the importance of working 
within their limited power and immunity as local governments. It is too 
soon to determine the extent to which these surveillance ordinances and 
city privacy principles will achieve their stated goals, or whether they will 
require further refinement in response to emerging issues. Nevertheless, 
it is already clear that both cities have embraced a novel approach to 
regulating local surveillance that transcends the limitations of modern 
                                                     
526. S.B. 21, 2017–2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2017).  
527. Hearing on S.B. 21 Before the Assemb. Comm. on Privacy and Consumer Protection, 2017–
2018 Leg. (July 10, 2017) (written summary by Ed Chau, Comm. Chair). 
528. For a map of these states, see supra note 20.  
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Fourth Amendment doctrine, related federal statutes, and piecemeal state 
legislation. Both cities have taken important steps toward appropriately 
balancing the potential benefits of smart city and open data programs and 
the public demand for transparency, privacy, and trust in elected officials. 
While obstacles remain, these cities are less susceptible to federal or state 
override because they are acting well within their “police powers” and 
enacting laws that either do not conflict with federal or state statutes or 
exceed the floor these statutes establish. 
Other cities, too, are embracing privacy localism as described in this 
Article. Assuming the Seattle and New York City experiments achieve 
their promise of more democratic policing and smarter but more 
trustworthy municipal services, these trends may expand to additional 
locales as well. At the very least, the potential success of privacy localism 
may inspire federal and state regulators to develop more robust privacy 
frameworks that benefit everyone regardless of locale. Thus, privacy 
localism has the potential to shape emerging privacy norms in a world that 
is increasingly urban and increasingly focused on harnessing big data to 
serve the public good. 
 
